On the eve of the summit between President Trump and Xi Jinping in China, Public Agenda has consulted a range of public policy experts, analysts, and former senior government officials about the upcoming meeting between the leaders of the two great world powers. This is what they told us.
Alexander B. Gray, senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council and former chief of staff of the National Security Council from 2019 to 2021:
The upcoming U.S.–China summit is an important opportunity for Washington to recalibrate the relationship in a way that serves the United States’ national security and economic interests. Beijing’s capacity to coerce the United States economically, whether in the pharmaceutical arena or in the realm of rare earth minerals, has demonstrated the need to rebuild internal industrial resilience so that the United States has more political options in the future.
“The capacity of Beijing to coerce the United States economically has demonstrated the need to rebuild internal industrial resilience”
The president Trump seems to understand that, in order to buy time until the industrial policies his Administration is pushing take effect, he needs a fundamentally stable U.S.–China relationship in the short term. This stability will benefit the United States and its allies and partners in Europe and Asia, and will offer a unique opportunity for allies to collaborate to increase their resilience in economic security in the face of the malign activity that China continues to pursue.
Scott Shaw, vice president of The Cohen Group and senior nonresident fellow at the Asia Society. Shaw was a senior Foreign Service officer, who retired in 2024 after a 36-year career at the U.S. Department of Commerce with the rank of minister-counselor. He also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for China and Mongolia at the U.S. Department of Commerce:
I think one of the most significant outcomes of the summit will be the announcement of a Trade Council and perhaps an Investment Council. While both would be relevant, we’ll have to see what their structures look like to determine how durable these new mechanisms will be.
“One of the most significant outcomes of the summit will be the announcement of a Trade Council and perhaps an Investment Council”
My expectation, based on similar bilateral formats from the past, is that they will be useful until 2026, as the two leaders meet three or four more times over the year. But, given that the two sides seem to have different objectives for these formats, when leadership-level discussions at the cabinet or ministerial level wane after this annual marathon of leader-level meetings, the challenge will be to make these formats robust and effective.
Lucas F. Schleusener, former U.S. Department of Defense official (2012–2017), with experience in U.S.–China relations, and speechwriter for former Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta, Chuck Hagel, and Ash Carter:
The Trump–Xi summit should be understood less as an opportunity for decisive progress and more as a test of resilience for the United States’ policy-formulation capacity. I would expect the agenda to include trade, technology controls, critical minerals, Taiwan, military-to-military communications, and China’s role in managing the fallout from the Iran war, especially pressure on energy markets, East Asian economies, and food security in parts of the Global South. Washington enters this meeting after weakening precisely the machinery that makes presidential diplomacy effective: the National Security Council process, key cabinet agencies, and much of the United States’ development capacity.
“The summit should be understood less as an opportunity for decisive progress than as a test of resilience for the United States’ policy-formulation capacity”
That leaves the United States seeking Chinese cooperation from a position of lesser influence, and Xi Jinping will clearly understand these vulnerabilities. The most likely outcome is not a durable strategic realignment, but limited tactical understandings that preserve room for dialogue while Beijing seeks advantages in Washington’s volatility. For U.S. allies and partners, the question is not just what is said at the summit, but whether Washington can turn leader-to-leader engagement into a coherent strategy. Personal diplomacy does not replace a disciplined process, technical expertise, coordination with allies, or a clear theory of American interests.
Dominic Chiu, senior analyst of China and Northeast Asia at Eurasia Group:
The summit will be defined less by spectacular advances than by a shared interest in maintaining stability. I expect a positive display and the announcement of relatively easy-to-attain outcomes. Among these are Chinese commitments to purchase American agricultural and energy products and Boeing aircraft, as well as the announcement of a Trade Council to formalize dialogue and permit selective tariff adjustments. We will probably see an early sign of these results after the technical-level trade talks in Seoul the day before the summit. Neither side currently has an interest in escalating tariff tensions. Section 301 investigations will likely modestly raise tariffs on China by the late summer, though they will stay below the maximum levels under the IEEPA. China could respond with a marginal increase in its own tariffs, but it will be calibrated. It is crucial to note that I do not expect any new tariff to be linked to fentanyl, which removes a key political tension factor for Beijing that, otherwise, could have complicated the summit atmosphere.
The Iran war certainly adds complexity to the talks. Recent U.S. sanctions on Chinese entities that import Iranian oil and Beijing’s blocking measures as retaliation will not escalate tensions, but they do indicate that the Chinese are firmer in countering Washington’s coercive measures. I expect Trump to urge Xi to press Iran harder on the blockade and to stop purchasing Iranian oil. There may be some mention in the official communiqué after the summit of concern about the situation, but I don’t think there will be substantive coordination between the two countries beyond that.
“Beijing keeps a close hand on its rare earths card and calculates it will have more influence over Trump as the midterm elections approach”
We do not expect the summit to yield a preventive extension of the truce on tariffs and export controls, whose deadline is October 30. If it did occur, however, it would be clearly positive for the markets, as it would remove a key source of uncertainty before the midterm elections. It is more likely that technology and investment deals will be delayed. Beijing keeps a close hand on its rare earths card and believes it will have more influence over Trump as the midterm elections approach. The question remains Taiwan. We expect discussions on a renewed postponement of U.S. arms sales to the island. A verbal shift in the White House’s official stance on Taiwanese independence is not our central scenario, but it cannot be ruled out, given that both leaders will have ample time alone without senior officials warning Trump not to concede to Xi. If Trump were to take a tougher stance against Taiwanese independence, the ensuing consequences for cross-strait dynamics and U.S. credibility in the region would weigh more than any other issue addressed at the summit.
Zack Cooper, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute:
This summit will be more about optics than substantive results. The two leaders will undoubtedly announce some purchases by China alongside several leading U.S. CEOs, but it is unlikely that they will tackle the underlying structural issues in the U.S.–China relationship: trade and Taiwan.
That means that, while the relationship may look more stable in the short term, the two leaders are not making progress that would guarantee long-term stability and guard against future crises.
Leland Lazarus, CEO and founder of Lazarus Consulting:
Both sides arrive at this meeting with the sense that they have leverage over the other. Xi is likely to seize this opportunity as host to portray China as a global stabilizing force, in sharp contrast to Trump—a bull in a china shop. Xi is likely to offer to buy more American agricultural products and Boeing aircraft, as well as to press Iran harder to capitulate.
In return, Xi will want Trump to loosen further the chip export restrictions and issue a stronger statement against Taiwanese independence. But what we don’t know is how much each side is truly suffering and where their red line lies.
Ali Wyne, senior advisor for research and advocacy on U.S.–China relations at the International Crisis Group:
Although it is unlikely that the summit will yield major breakthroughs, it is essential that Trump and Xi maintain regular dialogue, especially because their relationship is likely to play a disproportionately large role in shaping U.S.–China relations for the rest of Trump’s second term.
“Although it is unlikely that the summit will yield major breakthroughs, it is essential that Trump and Xi maintain regular dialogue”
The two leaders should prioritize two tasks in Beijing: extend the trade truce they reached in Busan last October, and express joint support for Iran’s return to negotiations. Chinese officials have indicated that Taiwan will also feature prominently on the agenda. While it is unlikely that Trump will alter the United States’ official policy toward the Taiwan Strait, he could be open to discussing U.S. arms sales to the island, thereby breaking with more than four decades of precedent.
