From Remus Enterprises 1, LLC v. Breece, a decision issued Thursday by the D.C. Court of Appeals (Judge Shanker, with Judges Easterly and Ruiz):
Punctuation matters. The core of this dispute centers on where a comma should sit. The appellant, Remus Enterprises 1, LLC (“Remus 2023”), filed a tort complaint in the Superior Court against Quinn Breece, asserting claims arising from Remus 2023’s asserted ownership of, and intent to sell, a parcel of land located at 3308 16th Street, NE, in Washington, D.C. Yet a consent judgment in a separate proceeding determined that a different entity, whose name contains all the same words and letters but with a differently placed comma—Remus Enterprises, 1 LLC (“Remus 2018”)—was the actual owner of the property. Because Remus 2023 lacks standing to sue based on another entity’s property interest, we hold that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, and we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Remus 2023’s complaint, albeit on grounds different from those relied upon by the trial court….
The consent decree in this matter aimed to conclusively resolve the question of who purchased, owned, and agreed to sell the 16th Street property. First, the text of the consent decree supports this result by including specific “factual findings” related to that issue: (1) Remus 2018 acquired the 16th Street property in February 2023; (2) the deed of transfer contained a typo that listed the transferee as “Remus Enterprises 1, LLC” instead of the correct “Remus Enterprises, 1 LLC”; (3) Remus 2023 did not purchase and does not own the 16th Street property; and (4) Remus 2018 entered into a contract to sell the 16th Street property. The presence of these findings in the consent decree submitted by the parties and approved by the court supports the inference that the parties deliberately agreed to be bound by the court’s determinations on these issues….
Our determination of standing flows logically from our resolution of collateral estoppel. The consent decree in the Nasi case concluded that Remus 2018, not Remus 2023, purchased, owned, and contracted to sell the 16th Street property. In the present case, Remus 2023 was the sole plaintiff, seeking relief based on its alleged purchase, ownership of, and contract to sell the 16th Street property. But because we accord the consent decree in the Nasi case a preclusive effect (and also given the complaint’s own allegation that Remus 2018 owned the property), Remus 2023 cannot plead an injury arising from its purchase, ownership, or sale of the 16th Street property. And because Remus 2023’s claims derive entirely from an asserted injury to Remus 2018’s property interest, we conclude that Remus 2023 has not suffered an “injury in fact” sufficient to confer standing. Consequently, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, and dismissal of the complaint is appropriate….
{We note that Remus 2023’s counsel argued at oral argument that he was the sole member of both LLCs, and that ownership of the 16th Street property at one point transferred to him. But no such allegations appear in the operative complaint, and Remus 2023 did not develop any argument addressing what implications, if any, this scenario could have on the resolution of the standing question in this case.}
Attorney Jude E. Wikramanayake appeared for Breece.
