In 1985, the worldwide fertility rate stood at 3.5 children per woman, well above the 2.1 threshold that ensures generational replacement. Four decades later, it sits right at that level and, if it weren’t for African countries, the decline would have been even more pronounced. A priori, we might think that the fall in birth rates is a phenomenon affecting the wealthier nations, including our own. However, this is a half-truth: emerging countries in South America such as Brazil, Colombia or Peru, and some of the most populous Asian nations like India, Turkey or Vietnam already display fertility rates below replacement today. A number of these are among the main sources of young migrant populations moving to Europe, so relying on the influx of foreign residents to boost our birth rate seems unrealistic, especially considering the convergence in reproductive patterns between foreigners and natives that tends to occur after a few years.
The cold data offer a positive reading of economic and social progress: demographic transitions toward longer life expectancies and more controlled fertility rates are characteristic of societies reaching higher income levels, broader welfare states, advances in reproductive rights, and a fuller participation of women in the labor market. Yet, when fertility stalls at ultralow levels—as is the case in most European countries—and youthful cohorts without children accumulate, alarms go off and the debate intensifies about what to do to curb this trend.
“It is difficult to plan on having offspring when you don’t even have a stable job or a home to establish one”
As in many other areas, the immediate reductive answer is with “money” or, in other words, with higher wages and greater job stability. To this monetary equation we must add the availability of affordable housing: it’s hard to consider having children when you lack both a steady job and a place to start a home. According to the 2018 Fertility Survey, the most recent available, one in three Spanish women aged 30 to 34 cited economic and work-related reasons (including reconciliation difficulties) for not having children or for not planning to have more, and 36% of those aged 35 to 39 gave these same reasons to delay motherhood.
However, even when those two conditions—employment and housing—are guaranteed, there is another, equally important barrier connected to the employment situation many women face: the motherhood penalty for advancing in their careers. After the birth of their first child, the probability of having paid work can be up to 40% lower than that of men. Therefore, as women progress in education and employability, the opportunity cost of relinquishing their economic autonomy rises. It is higher when they are engaged in what Claudia Goldin calls greedy jobs, those that demand intense dedication and penalize the scheduling flexibility associated with parenting, and when caregiving duties are distributed unevenly (extended work hours and after-school activities don’t come free). Goldin illustrates this by comparing Italy and Japan, where women spend, on average, three hours per day more on domestic and caregiving tasks than men, with Denmark and Sweden, where the difference does not exceed an hour per day. The first group has lower fertility rates than the second. Correcting these gaps should be a priority.
“Young generations are starting to have other priorities. That doesn’t mean they renounce fatherhood, but they think twice before having children”
Apart from underscoring the above, the truth is that behind the broad-based decline in fertility there seems to be something more. Recent evidence points to a significant shift in how we relate to one another and in the social norms surrounding family formation, parenting, and the value we assign to leisure and personal development. Younger generations are starting to hold different priorities. That doesn’t mean they reject parenthood, but they think twice before having children. In many cases, because they do not have a stable partner or a suitable partner (this is the second reason Spanish women aged 30 to 34 report for not having offspring). In others, because their life project does not revolve around having children or having them early as was common in earlier generations, or simply because they place more importance on what parenting entails and weigh all the constraints that could prevent them from being a present father or mother.
In light of this reality, making motherhood and fatherhood compatible with a fully realized adult life as envisioned by younger generations requires more resources, but also substantial changes in work and culture. And that takes time, a great deal of time.
