The ongoing political crisis in Romania, precipitated by the rupture of the coalition government, offers more than a new display of domestic instability. It is, without a doubt, a symptom of a broader inflection point in Central and Eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole. The recent moves in Bucharest, Sofia, and Budapest, which should not be treated as isolated episodes, illustrate a silent yet significant reconfiguration of the political balance within the European Union. And they do so at a moment that is particularly delicate, when the negotiation of the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the maintenance of support for Ukraine, and the redefinition of Europe’s strategic relationship with Russia must be addressed simultaneously.
For the last sixteen years, the region’s tension has orbited Hungary under Viktor Orbán’s leadership, who became a disruptive actor within the Council, capable of blocking key decisions and straining European consensus from within. His exit from power has been greeted in Brussels with a mix of relief and expectation. Relief because a systematic veto that had paralysed fundamental dossiers is gone; expectation because it opens the door to greater decision-making fluidity. Yet, reducing the European challenge to Orbán’s figure would be a diagnostic error. What unfolds before us now is a more complex scenario, less visible in its frictions, but not therefore more stable.
Romania serves as a prime example of this new phase. Traditionally regarded as a reliable partner in European policy—especially with regard to backing Ukraine and aligning with Brussels’ positions—its current political crisis introduces an element of uncertainty that transcends domestic borders. The split of the coalition between the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the liberal bloc stems from a series of tensions surrounding fiscal policy, power-sharing, and the management of mounting social discontent. The PSD’s withdrawal of parliamentary support, a central force in the country’s political system, leaves the government without a majority and opens a scenario of prolonged instability, with the potential departure of several ministers, a minority government, or even early elections.
“Romania carries one of the EU’s highest public deficits and has had to adopt unpopular measures that have eroded the coalition’s legitimacy”
This political fragility is compounded by a demanding economic backdrop. Romania bears one of the EU’s largest deficits and has had to implement unpopular measures—from tax increases to the restraint of social spending—that have eroded the coalition’s legitimacy. Added to this is a particularly sensitive European-level factor: the risk of jeopardising access to about €28 billion in EU funds linked to the Recovery Plan. The inability to sustain stable governance not only affects the country’s internal balance but also restricts its credibility as a partner within the EU.
Meanwhile, the wear of traditional parties has fueled the rise of populist and far-right forces, such as the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), who capitalise on social discontent and challenge the pro-European consensus. The coalition that emerged after the 2024 elections had, for the most part, a defensive character—to curb that rise—but the lack of a coherent political project eventually made it unviable. In this sense, the Romanian crisis is not solely institutional or economic, but also a crisis of representation, in a context where trust in the political system has been eroded by recent episodes such as the controversy surrounding presidential elections and perceptions of external interference.
If Hungary was for years the most visible face of disagreement, present-day Bulgaria points toward a more ambiguous form of distancing. After a decade marked by electoral instability and parliamentary fragmentation, Sofia’s recent political shift has not produced strategic clarity so much as a redefinition of balances. The emerging leadership, though formally committed to EU membership, reveals a greater willingness to explore middle-ground positions on key issues, especially regarding the war in Ukraine and relations with Russia. This ambivalence does not necessarily translate into explicit vetoes, but it does translate into greater difficulty in forging solid common positions in foreign policy.
“The departure of Viktor Orbán does not completely eliminate the problem of European disagreement, but it does transform it”
In this new context, Orbán’s exit does not completely remove the problem of European disagreement, but it transforms it. We move from a model of open confrontation, easily identifiable, to a more diffuse fragmentation logic, in which disagreements are expressed in a less visible but equally effective manner. Decision-making within the European framework, based on delicate balances and gradual consensus, thus becomes more complex not because of the existence of a blocking actor, but due to the proliferation of unstable or strategically ambiguous national positions.
This pattern shift is especially relevant within the negotiations for the next MFF. Historically, Central and Eastern European countries have acted as a relatively aligned bloc in defending cohesion policies and an ambitious budget. However, the current internal fragmentation threatens to weaken that collective capability. The budgetary negotiations, already one of the EU’s most intricate exercises, could become even more strained by the lack of clear and stable positions among some member states.
There is another element at play: the growing use of European funds as a tool of political conditionality. Hungary’s case, where access to Community resources has been linked to compliance with rule-of-law standards, has set a precedent that will be hard to ignore in the future. In a scenario of political instability, as in Romania, or strategic ambiguity, as in Bulgaria, the Brussels–member state relationship could become more transactional, introducing new frictions into the operation of the Union’s framework.
All of this converges in the most sensitive arena of the current European agenda: the stance toward the war in Ukraine and the relationship with Russia. The removal of the Hungarian veto has allowed meaningful advances in the short term, facilitating the approval of aid packages and sanctions. Yet, European cohesion on this front remains fragile. Energy dependencies, internal political dynamics, and differing threat perceptions continue to shape states’ positions.
Thus, what is at stake is both the EU’s capacity to respond to the Ukraine crisis and its ability to sustain a coherent foreign policy in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. The diversity of national interests, far from vanishing with the leadership change in Hungary, takes on new forms that complicate the construction of a unified European voice.
“What is at stake is both the EU’s capacity to respond to the Ukraine crisis and its ability to sustain a coherent foreign policy”
The recent evolution in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary suggests, in short, that the EU is entering a new phase, yet another one, in which the main challenge will not be managing the frontal opposition of some members, but dealing with growing heterogeneity and, in many cases, unpredictability. European governance, based on the constant search for balance, must adapt to this more fragmented environment, where stability cannot be taken for granted even in those countries traditionally considered reliable partners.
The departure of Orbán has removed an obvious obstacle, but it has also exposed a deeper reality. European cohesion no longer depends solely on the absence of disruptive actors, but on the existence of solid political consensuses that today are largely undergoing redefinition. And it is there that much of the near-term European future will be decided, precisely when the EU requires greater firmness and political coherence, both internally and externally.
