One of the singular features of Italian electoral politics is the contrast between the substantial immobility concerning the First Republic (the Christian Democratic regime, 1948-1994) and the frequent reforms that followed (the journalistic jargon has christened the various laws with pseudo-Latin expressions depending on their promoters or other circumstances: Mattarellum 1994-2005, Porcellum 2005-2015, Italicum 2015-2017 and Rosatellum, in force since 2018) up to the government’s proposal by Giorgia Meloni on February 26, 2026, already dubbed as Stabilicum for its aim of ensuring stability. The current electoral law (advocated by Ettore Rosato) is mixed: 37% of the seats (147 in the lower house and 74 in the Senate) are elected in single-member constituencies and the remaining 63% (245 deputies with national distribution and 122 senators with regional distribution) through proportional representation with closed and blocked lists and various exclusion clauses. Although polls show the right maintaining a majority, under the current law the governing coalition could be at risk, at least in the Senate.
“This could pave the way for a scenario of a practical technical deadlock, which is why Meloni has chosen to propose now her electoral reform to cohesion and reinforce her majority and hurt the opposition”
In 2022, the current opposition presented itself divided: the Partito Democratico (PD) and allies; Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), and the centrist figures of Matteo Renzi and Carlo Calenda, while the right united: Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), Lega, Forza Italia and Noi Moderati. On the one hand, Lega has suffered a drift to the right (Roberto Vannacci, who leans toward fascism and Putinism, has formed his own party, Futuro Nazionale), and on the other hand, PD, M5S, Alleanza Verdi Sinistra (AVS) and a portion of the centrists are negotiating a coalition. This could give rise to a scenario of a practical technical deadlock, hence Meloni has chosen to put forward now her electoral reform to cohesion and reinforce her majority and to disadvantage the opposition in order to ensure with minimal risk a second term. All of this occurs amid difficulties, since she has not fulfilled much of her electoral promises on taxes, health, pensions, family aid and the large-scale outsourcing of irregular migrants.
In addition to these factors, there is another political reason explaining Meloni’s haste: fear of losing the referendum on the justice reform scheduled for March 22 and 23. It is not the same to present now the electoral reform project, before the referendum, as it would be after: if she were to win, there would be no problem, but in case of defeat (remember that this is her first major political reform), she would be weakened to present later the electoral reform project. Moreover, the procedure requires time, and even though the Government would like the Chamber of Deputies to approve the project in July and the Senate in October, the President of the Republic, Sergio Mattarella, has advised not to rush a matter as crucial as this.
Even if Meloni’s government loses the referendum, it is very unlikely that they would then seek early elections — which, by the way, is a matter within Mattarella’s prerogative and it would not be inconceivable that he opt for a technical government— and at present the poll situation shows low turnout (42%) and a yes victory that is very narrow (51.2%) with a tendency to recede. There are additional reasons to almost dismiss early elections: exhausting the five-year legislature would confer great prestige on Meloni because such a thing is relatively rare in Italian politics, and, although it may seem mundane, many parliamentarians will want to complete the five-year term to secure their supplementary incomes until the end of the legislature (the qualification for full compensation is that the term lasts at least four years and six months). The only advantage for Meloni in a potential early election would be to catch the PD and the M5S by surprise, who are negotiating a coalition with considerable difficulty, and also to undermine the prospects of Vannacci (who is around 3%).
What does Meloni gain and what does the opposition fear with the new system
Therefore, Fratelli d’Italia needs to further consolidate its position and keep the alliance with the Lega and FI, which fear being harmed, although all of them still maintain today different positions than those they defended in the past; for example, they had opposed closed and blocked lists. At the same time, the PD and M5S oppose Meloni’s electoral reform (which they label as a law of deceit) because it devalues representation and grants an outsized prize to the majority, not to mention that the rivalry between Elly Schlein and Giuseppe Conte for leadership is intense.
“Meloni’s electoral maneuver is tied to her grand project, which is to move toward a ‘Premierato’, a semi-parliamentary system, but these are two distinct matters”
The arguments Meloni uses to justify her project are to clearly reflect parliamentary majorities, to strengthen governability and to ensure stability, typical pretexts to give the Executive a freer hand. Meloni’s electoral maneuver is connected to a broader project, which is to move toward the Premierato, a semi-parliamentary form, but they are two intertwined issues, though they are not identical. On one side, the Israeli precedent was disastrous — and quickly abandoned — and on the other Italy would require constitutional reform and likely a referendum. In other words, this is a much more complex project than the electoral reform, which does not require a validation referendum, even though it could be subjected to an abrogative referendum once in force. In fact, the Premierato has been frozen and, moreover, it is not very compatible with Meloni’s electoral formula of closed and blocked lists given the personal nature of the direct popular election of the Prime Minister.
What the ‘Stabilicum’ would look like: goodbye to single-member districts and tighter control of the lists
Meloni’s proposal resembles a Porcellum (the much-criticized pig acknowledged by the same Ligurian minister Roberto Calderoli) somewhat more presentable and bears a strong likeness to Renzi’s Italicum, approved in 2015 and in force in 2016, but declared unconstitutional and replaced by the Rosatellum in 2017. The formula Meloni puts forward eliminates the single-member quota altogether in favor of full proportional representation (national tally for deputies and regional tally for senators), with a majority prize, closed and blocked lists and a 3% exclusion clause. By abolishing the single-member districts, the need for complicated negotiations among allies to agree on withdrawals is avoided, while also removing the risk that a possible alliance of all opposition forces could endanger the right-wing majority.
This is because in single-member districts the personal and local factor can count as much as the national one, and it is clear that Meloni’s option is to standardize coalition candidacies across the country. To facilitate agreement among all the right, Meloni has also barred the reintroduction of preferential voting on each list and has given up having the government’s candidate name on every ballot, since those were internally divisive issues. By removing the majority quota of the Rosatellum and by not including the possibility of preferential voting, it yields a parliament of candidates strictly designated by the parties in closed and blocked lists, something that in Italy—despite some precedent (the Porcellum, precisely)—is not broadly welcomed by public opinion. Nevertheless, at the time the Constitutional Court noted that lists of this type, though legally admissible, should not be excessively long so that voters could at least have an idea of who the district’s candidates are, and this operates as a limiting principle for Meloni’s proposal.
“The most controversial issue of Meloni’s proposal is the majority prize because, with its current wording, it would cause a strong distortion of representativeness”
Coalitions, when registering, will have to indicate who their candidate to lead the government is, which will in principle necessitate primaries for their designation, a source of tension, not so much among the right, given that Meloni is wholly unquestioned, but among the progressives because of the Schlein–Conte rivalry. The issue of the exclusion clause also triggered tensions, since the initial draft set it at 4%, but pressure from the partitini managed to reduce it to 3%. Hence some may run independently and then sell themselves to the highest bidder (that is the case of Vannacci or Calenda, for example). Yet the most controversial aspect of Meloni’s proposal remains the majority prize, because, with its current drafting, it would produce a strong distortion of representativeness in the name of governance: it would award 70 deputies and 35 senators more to the coalition that reaches 40%, which would then hold 55% of the seats.
Technically, this addition would yield 57.5% (with serious implications for the election of the president of the Republic and other offices requiring supermajorities, for example), which is why it has been slightly reduced to 55%. Whether it could hold up is uncertain because the Corte Costituzionale, in relation to the Italicum, noted that the majority prize could not be too substantial so as not to distort representativeness, and specifically determined that obtaining 55% of the seats with 40% of the votes would be excessive; in other words, Meloni’s copy of Renzi’s proposal does not seem likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny. In this sense, the prime minister has shown openness to readjusting the percentages: with 40% of the votes, 52% of the seats and only 45% of votes to reach 55%, it could be possible to reach that threshold, but it is doubtful that this would pass constitutional muster.
If no coalition reaches 40% there could be a second round if the first two coalitions collect at least 35% of the votes. Simulations—based on polls—have been made to compare the effects of the Rosatellum and the Stabilicum: under the Rosatellum, the right would win 186 of 400 seats versus 192 for the opposition, though 96 senators to 95 for the latter. However, with Meloni’s reform, the right would obtain 228 deputies and 113 senators, while the opposition would have 147 and 76 respectively, not counting options that have not clearly declared their coalition alignment, and the two blocs are nearly tied: the right at 46.1% and the progressives at 44.4% (excluding Vannacci and Calenda, respectively).
In conclusion, , and even less so to avoid serious negotiations with the opposition. In truth, this initiative is the latest maneuver by Meloni to secure her undisputed political leadership, and she has adopted it because, even though she enjoys a comfortable majority, there are fissures within her coalition and some voters are dissatisfied with the promised programmatic measures.
