Seen from Spain, a year ahead of the expiry of Emmanuel Macron’s term as head of the French Republic, France’s political and economic landscape appears to be in a hold pattern, with repercussions that only the 2027 presidential elections might loosen. Yet that impression does not reflect reality. In recent months, France has assumed a notably proactive posture on the world stage. While Paris has not led the bloc in opposing Iran—an attitude more commonly associated with the governments of Spain and Italy—the Lebanon crisis has prompted Paris to advocate for restraint to prevent a regional flare‑up that could become a combustible and hard‑to‑manage powder keg. At the same time, France has been intensely engaged in efforts to resolve the war in Ukraine, largely as a response to what many regard as the reduced involvement of the United States since Donald Trump’s ascent to the presidency. Since the start of 2026, Paris has backed several joint initiatives with Ukraine and Germany aimed at addressing the next phases of the conflict. Moreover, France has stood among the most persistent advocates for unlocking international aid packages to Ukraine, packages that are deemed essential to the country’s long‑term defense stability. “Inflation is reaching 2%, and the small margin left by the debt-to-GDP ratio is dragging down economic growth forecasts.”
At the domestic level, things seemed calm—until now. With the approval of this year’s budget, Sébastien Lecornu managed to steady Parliament’s upheavals, yet the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East has shattered even the most cautious forecasts. On May 19, the Prime Minister warned that social cutbacks could be deeper than anticipated, given the circumstances. The broad rise in prices (notably for fuels) and frictions along France’s industrial supply chains have been keenly felt in recent weeks. Lecornu argued that the aid measures announced at the outset of the conflict must be reviewed and redistributed so that the burden of those measures does not fall solely on the State—the primary duty of which is to meet established deficit targets. “Inflation is reaching 2%, and the small margin left by the debt-to-GDP ratio is dragging down economic growth forecasts.”
As expected, those statements have not been well received by various forces within the parliamentary spectrum, which have already voiced opposition to higher taxes on labor income and further reductions in social spending. Although a press conference is anticipated to clarify the direction to be pursued, everything suggests that the end of 2026 will bring a cooling of the economy and a rise in social discontent, which is already markedly evident.
The emotional balance of Macronism
In a sense, that discomfort encapsulates the emotional equilibrium of Emmanuel Macron’s two mandates. The President once vowed to overturn the status quo to restore public confidence in the Republic and ensure its lasting solidity; today, many feel that this objective has not been attained. Ten years on, the country appears more socially fractured, more politically polarized, and more economically strained. Republican institutions have earned a degree of distrust, and French society speaks with little optimism about its own future, regardless of political leaning. That disillusionment is mirrored in voting patterns; polls point to a comfortable first‑round triumph for the Rassemblement National in next year’s presidential ballot. Whether Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella leads the ticket, the prospect of that party reaching the Élysée after a second round no longer seems implausible, and there does not appear to be another candidate capable of being perceived by a majority as “the lesser evil.”
The question then becomes: what should be done from the presidency of the Republic in the immediate aftermath of a victory over Le Pen’s party?
But suppose such a profile existed. The question then becomes: what should be done from the presidency of the Republic immediately after a victory over Le Pen’s party? First of all, it should be clarified that those now considered potential contenders, such as Gabriel Attal or Édouard Philippe, do not a priori presuppose a revolution capable of overturning the State. Moreover, the country would still confront the same urgent problems, such as bringing the annual deficit down toward around 3%, or reducing the debt‑to‑GDP ratio, which largely shapes any room for maneuver for a government proposing structural reforms. Given the current political climate, the government would likely be a liberal‑conservative coalition. Yet that need not equate to paralysis. Since the end of World War II, France’s center‑right has frequently been active in pursuing structural and institutional reforms. The key is not so much what cannot be done (such as drastic or unjustified increases in expenditures) but what remains undone because of a lack of political will. Such a platform could be perfectly acceptable for a future administration emerging from the 2027 elections, and it can be summarized in three points:
A more conciliatory and magnanimous presidency. In domestic policy, polarization and mistrust of Republican institutions go hand in hand, with neither side claiming preeminence. One might have expected Macron—a young President who a decade ago seemed acutely aware of widening polarization and the discredit into which the political system was sinking—to display greater flexibility when he assumed office. That has not proven to be the case, especially since his re‑election. From the outset, Macron revealed certain authoritarian traits that fueled rejection from both the left and the right. His domestic policy approach has been personalist, marked by improvisation and a limited capacity to anticipate the consequences of his choices. The most conspicuous example was the dissolution of the National Assembly: far from liberating the political rhythm, it left Parliament ungovernable and precipitated a phase of instability, triggering a sequence of prime ministers over two years. It also failed to stem the advance of the radical right, despite legal‑financing scandals surrounding it and the disqualification of its leader. In the event of a RN victory, whatever succeeds Macron will have to contend with a fragmented Parliament and a radical right that is no longer a symptom of weariness or anger but an authentic political alternative. Within that more radical right, two contrasting visions coexist, though that issue deserves separate analysis. Present indications suggest that after 2027, if the situation has not been addressed with diligence and adaptability, there is a risk that the traditional parties and the post‑1945 consensus ideas could be erased from the political map for an extended period.
Economic security and strategic autonomy. In this regard, Germany and other nearby states (such as the Netherlands and Austria) have emerged as the principal stumbling blocks within the EU to building a coherent, long‑term, sustainable economic strategy. Whether under Merz or, previously, Scholz, the missteps with which Germany has confronted Europe’s industrial challenges are difficult to overlook. Of particular note is its inaction regarding what has been labeled China Shock 2.0, a matter that deserves careful scrutiny for its profound impact on Germany’s productive capacity. Over the past two years, Chinese exports have surged—especially to countries long regarded as the EU’s economic core. Until recently, that surge in Chinese imports was counterbalanced by surpluses with other regions, but that compensatory effect is nearly exhausted. European companies are already competing with Chinese firms both globally and within the EU. Sectors like batteries and electric vehicles offer emblematic cases. Although Macron and his government have pushed to mitigate the worst consequences of the shock (such as the erosion of the business fabric and the reallocation of investment), their actions have sometimes been viewed with suspicion in Germany, which appears to fear that France is pursuing its own interests at the EU’s expense. The liberal doctrines of the 1990s are clearly out of date. China’s triumph in strategic sectors has come about through massive subsidies, pervasive public intervention, and the scale economies of a vast domestic market. Given that Beijing is unlikely to relinquish those tools, the threat of competitive displacement in areas like critical minerals, semiconductors, or aerospace will continue to intensify. Persuading the different partners to act will not be easy; to move in the right direction, broader alliances among the Member States will be necessary.
France will need to set military objectives that are both ambitious and achievable, aligned with finite resources despite their diversity.
Spearhead of European geopolitical power. In terms of defense and intelligence, France stands as Europe’s premier power. At a pivotal moment for the EU’s future, with a conflict on Europe’s doorstep and a volatile geopolitical backdrop, it is crucial for France to remain open and to devote all possible energies to crafting a common and coherent defense strategy. The next holder of the presidency will need to account for several realities. Regardless of whoever occupies the White House, the cultural and political distance between Europe and the United States will widen. Concepts such as the utility and relevance of NATO will require redefinition, and the European Union must determine its own position within that framework. With planned defense spending of €413 billion for 2024–2030 and as Europe’s largest investor in military equipment, applied research, and experimental development, France will have to delineate military objectives that are both ambitious and feasible, calibrated to resources that are finite yet diverse. The real challenge lies in reconciling the pursuit of a unified European defense system with national security prerogatives—traditionally viewed as a cornerstone of state sovereignty—thereby shaping a European geopolitical sovereignty that does not exist merely to satisfy Washington’s demands or to serve particular military interests. Overcoming resistance within the EU will be a major task for Macron’s successor, as will trying to correct missteps in joint projects such as the SCAF, the Future Air Combat System. The present year, therefore, stands as a decisive one for France, a moment in which the foundations of its institutional development and external reach will be laid for the decade to come, once the presidential elections have run their course. The EU seeks a strong France with a robust economy and clearly defined objectives for the Union. France should likewise be keen on building bridges with partners with whom tensions have historically run high and in maintaining flexibility about the Union’s broader trajectory.
