Sometimes, one has the right questions (or so one likes to believe), but no one to ask them to. From the moment I was told I would be able to speak with Professor Elias Dinas, I knew I would be sitting in front of someone capable of answering all those questions.
The Greek researcher is director of the Swiss Chair in Federalism and International Governance at the European University Institute. In Florence, during the fiftieth anniversary of the institution, I had the opportunity to speak with him —in flawless English— about the erosion of democratic norms, the radical right and, above all, immigration.
This conversation comes on the eve of a tightening of the European Union’s migration policy, following the approval, among other measures, of the creation of deportation centres in third countries. The researcher offers a reading that goes to the root of the problem, starting with how immigration enters the political agenda: “Immigration entered the agenda through new actors, outsiders to the system, who expected to divide traditional elites”, he explains.
He then turns his attention to the role played by the center-right both in the battle over these frames and in the maintenance of democratic norms. “When people talk about immigrants”, he continues, “spillover effects are created” and the consequence is that “people begin to believe that the norm is changing and, by acting according to that expectation, they help it change”. At the same time, he is aware that this is a complex challenge, because “we should not deny that accepting demographic change in the place where one lives is not always easy”.
Finally, there is also time to talk about Spanish politics. On Pedro Sánchez, whom he calls “the new Tsipras”, he highlights “his ability to survive politically and to dominate the center-left space”. At the same time, he expresses doubts about his leftward turn on some issues and says he does not know “whether all of this began from intrinsic conviction or from a more strategic motivation”.
Dinas and De Diego, political scientists, discuss the role of the center-right in the immigration discourse. Photo: Agenda Pública
On the plane, I was reading your article on how democratic norms are affected when a traditional party talks about immigration through a negative frame, compared with when a radical-right party does so. The focus is often placed on voters, but you focus on elites. What role do they play in transmitting or changing political frames, especially on immigration?
Immigration has reshaped European politics over almost three decades for two main reasons. First, there existed a gap between the median voter and the elites, with elites generally being more liberal than the median voter, though this distance was not always obvious.
The second reason is that political systems tend to gatekeep access, excluding actors from outside the established order. To gain entry, those actors needed to contemplate issues or strategies beyond the standard repertoire. One such move was precisely to foreground immigration as a new issue. And it was an area where traditional elites were prone to internal divisions.
That is exactly what happened. Immigration entered the agenda through new actors, outsiders to the system, who expected to fracture traditional elites. And that has deeply unsettled European party systems.
In some countries this occurred as early as the 1990s. In Spain it arrived later, partly due to the shadow of the dictatorship, which made it harder to establish a political market for a radical-right party. A similar dynamic occurred in Portugal. In Greece, it unfolded earlier.
“Center-right parties have chosen to accommodate and incorporate part of that rhetoric into their own discourse”
Once immigration is on the agenda, established elites have to respond. They can accommodate it, that is, try to attract voters who have moved toward tougher positions on immigration; they can confront those frames; or they can try to ignore them. But ignoring the issue does not work as a long-term strategy, because once a topic is on the agenda, it remains there.
What has happened in many cases is that center-right parties have chosen to accommodate and incorporate part of that rhetoric into their own discourse. The problem is that, when this happens, those arguments gain credibility. They no longer come from a force outside the system, but from a party that is part of it.
That has a very strong signaling effect: if they are voicing it too, then the problem appears significant, serious and true. As a result, the risks and threats associated with immigrants, or with people perceived as outsiders to one’s own group, begin to erode democratic norms and norms of coexistence. I think this is one of the roots of what we are seeing now.
The moderate right can stay outside that frame, try to challenge it or even anticipate it. But from the left, it sometimes seems that one simply cannot talk about security or immigration. If someone does, other parts of the left accuse them of playing into the hands of the radical right. How can this loop be broken?
The problem is that democratic norms endure precisely because they are norms, not merely because everyone deeply believes in them. In Spain, for example, there were people who were quite favorable toward the Franco regime, but publicly they did not voice it for a long time.
“When people talk about immigrants, about other groups or about the so-called ‘anti-woke’ agenda […] spillover effects are created”
With the Catalan referendum process, something interesting happened: it facilitated a certain coordination among people who realized that others shared similar views. When someone recalculates how many people share their perspective, and begins to believe that their opinion is less stigmatized than they had thought, they become more willing to express it publicly.
This is also happening with democratic norms more broadly. When people discuss immigrants, other groups, or the so-called anti-woke agenda, and when basic rules of respect for political adversaries are questioned, spillover effects are created.
There are successful new politicians openly challenging those norms. This produces a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy: people start to believe that the norm is changing and, by acting in line with that expectation, they help it change. This is how the new norm spreads and the old norms are overturned. I think this is what we are witnessing across many European countries and also in the United States.
Dinas explains how immigration has destabilized European party systems over recent decades. Photo: Agenda Pública
There does not seem to be a clear recipe to stop the growth of the radical right, except perhaps for these parties to enter government and then wear themselves down.
Yes, that is a plausible scenario. When these parties assume office, they often end up further marginalized or relegated to a minority position. Governing tends not to help them flourish.
But there is a nuance: once they have held office or wielded power, both institutionally and in public perception, the situation does not revert exactly to its previous state. A new equilibrium emerges, and that equilibrium is no longer at the same point.
Even if a generation of radical-right elites is harmed by governance experience, that experience spawns a new cadre of leaders who can step in. We have seen this, for instance, in the Netherlands. In countries where the radical right endures, it has often progressed not through a single party, but via a succession of parties or leaders. France is partly an exception, but even there fresh actors keep surfacing in the same space.
Once a political family is formed, it becomes a difficult creature to eradicate. Strike one head and others spring up.
Mainstream party officials often say they lack the discursive tools to fight the radical right. Is it being explained properly, for example, why immigration is necessary or why a border cannot simply be sealed off?
Numerous studies document the positive long- and mid-term effects of immigration on the economy and other spheres, including culture. Some even suggest part of Italy’s recent football struggles can be linked to not adequately leveraging the human capital generated by immigration, as other nations have done, Spain to a degree.
Delving into the data could foster a broader consensus that immigration brings net benefits. The challenge is that such a conversation requires resources, time, favorable conditions and a deliberate process. Those conditions are not always in place.
It is much easier to erect a scapegoat. It is simpler to blame people who cannot defend themselves. This dynamic also exists in Europe and international institutions, but with migrants it is amplified because they have less status, less ability to defend themselves, and are more vulnerable to accusations about jobs, crime, or other problems.
The media’s role also matters. If coverage disproportionately highlights exceptional cases or non-representative anecdotes, that is what most people end up absorbing.
“It is important to look at things in a more objective and rational way, without always being driven by emotions that make reasonable conclusions more difficult”
That said, we should not deny that accepting demographic change where one lives is not always easy. It is a process. But that is precisely why it is crucial to approach things with objectivity and rationality, rather than letting emotions blur sound conclusions.
The Greek researcher analyses Spain’s position on immigration and Pedro Sánchez’s leadership within the European left. Photo: Agenda Pública
Spain is trying to regularize more than half a million people, marking a certain break with other European countries. What do you think of this decision?
We are living through a particularly telling period. Colleagues from Greece have repeatedly asked me to comment on the Sánchez phenomenon. I am more skeptical of Pedro Sánchez than of parts of the Italian, Greek, or foreign left, perhaps because I am more familiar with his trajectory and the shifts it has involved.
That said, I must admit I admire his political resilience and his capacity to command the center-left space in Spain. I’m inclined to call him, in a sense, the new Tsipras. Tsipras mobilized the more radical left in 2015; even in Italy there were small parties bearing his name. Sánchez is pursuing something similar, but on a far broader stage: the center-left, the moderate left, and left overall.
That development can have positive effects. Spain has recently tended to align with a more progressive stance on migration. Surveys also reflect this: Spain has not faced the same degree of hostility toward migrants or Syrian refugees as some other European countries and has shown greater liberalism on these issues.
I view it as beneficial for Spain to exercise a measure of leadership on this issue, at least within the European moderate left. This is already apparent in discussions in Italy—with the Democratic Party and Elly Schlein—and in Greece as well. I’m not sure how far this influence can travel north, but I do believe it has the potential to become a tipping point.
“Germany went from Merkel’s decision to accept one million people to a strong domestic backlash”
The unfortunate coincidence is that this is unfolding as Germany shifts in the opposite direction. Germany moved from Merkel’s decision to admit one million people—a choice tied to an opportunity to confront its past—with a strong domestic backlash. And when Germany experiences that kind of reaction, there is always concern about drifting back toward darker chapters. To avert that internally, it begins pushing a much stricter European agenda on immigration.
I believe this could develop into a significant European flashpoint in the months ahead.
To balance things out and conclude: earlier you said that you knew aspects of Sánchez that make you more critical of him. What did you mean?
In Greece and Italy, many people view Pedro Sánchez as a type of Zapatero, a politician who treats identity issues or second-dimension politics with particular emphasis. Yet Sánchez was also the figure who, from the outset, proclaimed that he would reclaim the Spanish flag because it mattered and would not cede it to the right.
He carried a massive Spanish flag in a campaign, reached a deal with Ciudadanos, and once he realized he needed the votes of pro-independence and regional parties, he adjusted his rhetoric.
He could no longer occupy that left-wing space of Spanish nationalism. So he did the opposite: he carved a division between right and left through the memory of Francoism. He continually reminds people that Franco sits on the opposite side and creates a division between “us” and Franco’s heirs.
Accompanying that narrative are policies as well. It is positive that he continues and expands the policies of Zapatero and other governments on migration, social rights, and women’s labor rights. I think all of that is commendable.
The question I have is whether all of this sprang from intrinsic conviction or from a more strategic motivation.
Thank you very much.
