Twice in nine months, the United States and Iran have stood on the brink of reaching a real agreement on the hardest issue separating them: the Iranian nuclear program and the American fear that it could have military aims. Therefore, it was a shock, though not a surprise, that on February 28 — just hours after the most recent and substantive talks — Israel and the United States launched again an illegal military strike against a peace that, for a moment, had seemed truly possible.
The Iranian retaliation against what Tehran views as American targets on the territory of its neighboring countries was an inevitable outcome, though deeply regrettable and completely unacceptable. In the face of what both Israel and the United States described as a war aimed at ending the Islamic Republic, it was probably the only rational option available to Iran’s leadership.
The effects of that retaliation are felt most acutely along the southern shore of the Gulf, where Arab countries that had placed their trust in security cooperation with the United States now experience that cooperation as an acute vulnerability, threatening their present security and their future prosperity.
For the Gulf states, an economic model in which global sports, tourism, aviation, and technology were to play an important role is now in jeopardy. Plans to become a global data hub may have to be revised. The effects of Iranian retaliation are already being felt worldwide, as shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has been seriously disrupted, pushing up energy prices and threatening a deep recession. If those who designed this war did not foresee this scenario, it would undoubtedly be a major miscalculation.
“This is not the United States’ war, and there is no plausible scenario in which both Israel and the United States get from it what they want”
The biggest miscalculation of the American administration was, of course, the decision to become involved in this war in the first place. This is not the United States’ war, and there is no plausible scenario in which either Israel or the United States achieve what they want from it. One should expect that the American commitment to regime change will be largely rhetorical, while Israel openly pursues the overthrow of the Islamic Republic and probably cares little about how the country is governed, or by whom, once that objective is reached.
With that objective in mind, Israeli leaders appear to have convinced the United States that Iran had been rendered so weak by sanctions, internal divisions, and the bombing of its nuclear facilities by the United States and Israel last June, that unconditional surrender would promptly follow the initial attack and the killing of the Supreme Leader. But it should now be clear that, for Israel to achieve its declared aim, a long military campaign will be required, with the United States committing troops on the ground (troops on the ground), opening a new front in the endless wars that President Donald Trump vowed to end. This is not what the U.S. government wants. Nor does its people, who certainly do not view this conflict as their war.
The question for America’s friends is simple: what can we do to disengage the superpower from this unwanted mess? First, America’s friends have the responsibility to tell the truth. And that truth begins by recognizing that there are two sides in this war that have nothing to gain from it, and that the national interests of both Iran and the United States lie in ending the hostilities as quickly as possible. It is a hard truth to state, because it implies acknowledging how far the United States has lost control of its own foreign policy. But it must be said.
“A measured assessment of those interests would indicate they should include a definitive and conclusive end to nuclear proliferation in the region”
Next, the leaders of the United States must decide where their real national interests lie and act accordingly. A measured assessment of those interests would indicate they should include a definitive and conclusive end to nuclear proliferation in the region, secure energy supply chains and new investment opportunities in the context of the region’s growing global economic importance. All of this would be better achieved with Iran at peace with its neighbors. Perhaps those objectives can be identified as shared goals by all Gulf countries. The challenge is to figure out how to get there from the current catastrophe.
It may be difficult for the United States to return to bilateral negotiations from which it was pulled apart twice by the lure of war. It will also be difficult for the Iranian leadership to resume dialogue with an Administration that abruptly swapped talks for bombings and assassinations on two occasions. But the path away from war, hard as it is for both sides to travel, may have to pass precisely through that resumption.
Imagining a Positive Energy
The parties need an incentive that gives them the courage to re-engage. That incentive could arise if the bilateral negotiations, essential to resolving the core issue between the United States and Iran, are linked to a broader regional process designed to establish a framework of transparency on nuclear energy—and on the energy transition in a broader sense—in the region. Since all the region’s countries look toward a common post-carbon future, safe innovation and development may depend on some basic agreement about the role that nuclear technologies will play.
“Some initial talks could, over time, lead to confidence-building measures and a consensus on the role nuclear energy should play in the energy transition”
Could this offer a reward sufficiently significant for all major actors to willingly accept the difficulties of dialogue and strive to reach it together? Certainly, Oman and its Gulf Cooperation Council neighbors could propose it. Some initial talks could, over time, lead to confidence-building measures and a consensus on the role that nuclear energy should play in the energy transition. The ultimate fate of such a process is, of course, impossible to determine, especially in the middle of a war. But perhaps it is possible, maybe within the framework of a regional non-aggression treaty, to secure a substantive regional agreement on nuclear transparency.
