The euro was born as a currency, but it quickly became something more. Since its physical introduction almost twenty-five years ago, it has served as one of the most visible expressions of European integration. It sits in pockets, in shops, in travel, in contracts, and in the everyday experience of millions of citizens. Today, nearly 360 million people in twenty-one EU member states pay with the common currency. It is also a means of payment in Monaco, Andorra, San Marino, and the Vatican, while in Kosovo and Montenegro it has been adopted unilaterally. Over these decades, the euro has acted as an accelerator of the single market, has consolidated itself as the second most important currency in the world, and has brought considerable economic value to its members, from the elimination of conversion costs and exchange-rate fluctuations to the ability to compare prices more easily.
Often questioned, and even declared dead at various moments of crisis, the euro has proven to be an anchor of stability. It has also made Europe more tangible for its citizens. That practical dimension partly explains its political strength. Despite having been used at times as a scapegoat for the poor management of some countries or as a symbol of European drift that has been poorly explained, the common currency preserves broad social support. In Austria, Spain, and much of the euro area, the euro is not merely a monetary instrument. It is also an infrastructure of trust.
“The euro has proven to be an anchor of stability. It has also made Europe more tangible for its citizens”
As the world grows more unstable, belonging to a common monetary space becomes increasingly valuable, contributing to independence, resilience, and the ability to act collectively. From the EU’s internal perspective, the euro has fostered convergence while reducing cross-border barriers and strengthening the single market. From an external perspective, it projects European capacity that does not depend entirely on the currencies of other powers. Yet, that strength today has a clear gap. The European currency has been a success in the physical world, but not fully in the digital world.
The problem is not minor. In today’s era of great-power competition, payment systems are a critical infrastructure. Whoever processes payments starts with an advantage, because they set the standards, obtain the data, and charge fees, consolidating a strategic position in the economy. Visa, Mastercard, Apple Pay, or Google Pay have brought efficiency, security, and convenience, but Europe cannot afford to lack its own alternatives in an increasingly hostile geopolitical context.
Why digital payments are a matter of European sovereignty
Cards are already the main electronic payment method in the European Union, and international schemes account for a majority of card payments in the euro area. We are talking about one of the fundamental layers of European economic life. Each everyday payment forms part of a network of information, fees, technological standards, and interdependencies. If Europe has learned with energy, semiconductors, defense, or critical raw materials that strategic dependencies are often revealed far too late, digital payments should not repeat the same mistake.
“Who processes payments starts with an advantage, as they set the standards, obtain the data and charge fees”
Here is where the digital euro comes in. Not as a substitute for cash nor as a miracle solution, but as a extension of public money into the digital space. If for centuries central-bank money has existed for citizens in the form of banknotes and coins, in an increasingly digital economy it too must exist in electronic form. The digital euro would enable payments with public money in stores, online, or person-to-person, with a secure solution, free for end users, widely accepted and backed by the Eurosystem. Its objective, rather than replacing what already works, would be to ensure that the future of European payments does not depend exclusively on private and external networks.
The digital euro should not be portrayed as a rival to Bizum, Wero, Bancomat, and other schemes. Europe already has relevant private capabilities, but they remain fragmented across national or regional markets. Bizum demonstrates in Spain that a simple, fast, and broadly adopted solution can be built. Wero, for its part, aims to offer a pan-European alternative. Other national schemes have advanced in the same direction. The question is how to connect these capabilities, scale them across Europe, and ensure they are built on interoperable standards. The digital euro can provide a common public layer on which these private solutions can rely.
sovereignty in payments will not be achieved merely because the players are European. It requires common rules, scale, trust, security, reasonable costs, and a flawless user experience. It also requires clear governance. Who sets the standards? How are costs shared? What role will banks play? How is the digital euro integrated into existing financial applications? How can a public infrastructure be kept from being seen as a bureaucratic intrusion into daily life? These questions are central, because the success of the digital euro will hinge more on social acceptance than on technical sophistication.
“The digital euro can provide a common public layer on which private solutions like Bizum can rely”
That is why design guarantees are decisive. The digital euro must be voluntary, so no one should be forced to use it. It should be free for users in everyday transactions. And it must also protect privacy, especially through the possibility of offline payments with protection levels close to cash. This point is essential to dispel some recurring misunderstandings: the digital euro should not replace cash, it should not be a public cryptocurrency, and it should not become a surveillance tool. Its legitimacy will depend on citizens perceiving it as an additional, safe, and useful option rather than an imposition.
In this regard, the practical dimension will be as important as the strategic one. For businesses, especially small enterprises and retail outlets, a European alternative could reduce costs associated with commissions and strengthen their bargaining power against large international operators. For citizens, it could offer an easy way to pay across the euro area, even in situations of connectivity outages or emergencies. For European banks and payment service providers, it could create a common infrastructure that fosters innovation and reduces fragmentation. For the EU, it would represent an additional piece of strategic autonomy.
The digital euro can also have a broader integrative dimension. If candidate EU countries could anticipate some steps of integration before formal accession, in order to accelerate a slow-moving enlargement process, digital payments could play a relevant role in that sectoral integration. Their introduction and extended use would bring member states and candidate countries closer more quickly, practically anticipate certain benefits of belonging to the European economic space, and reinforce the ties between the euro area and its immediate surroundings.
An example lies in the Western Balkans, where the euro already has a considerable physical presence. In some countries in the region, remittances sent from the EU represent an important source of income for families and local economies. A European, secure, cheap, and interoperable payments solution could have added appeal there, both for private transfers and for commercial activity. Moreover, millions of people from candidate countries live and work within the EU. For them, a more efficient European payments infrastructure would be a practical tool in their daily relationship with their countries of origin.
“The digital euro must be voluntary, so no one should be forced to use it. It should also be free for users in everyday payments”
It could also influence EU member states that have not yet adopted the euro. Although the use of the digital euro would initially be aimed at the euro area, the practical pressure to be able to use it in other Union countries will be significant if the instrument works well. Everyday experience can have political effects. If citizens and businesses perceive that the digital euro makes payments easier, reduces costs, and improves integration with the European market, it can indirectly strengthen the willingness to adopt the common currency. European integration rarely advances solely on grand statements. It often does so through useful infrastructures that end up becoming indispensable.
What the digital euro can and cannot resolve
However, it is worth not exaggerating its scope. The digital euro can reinforce European autonomy in payments, but there will still be much to do regarding the structural limits of the euro as an international currency. For the European currency to gain global weight against the dollar, other pieces are still necessary: a more complete banking union, deeper capital markets, more euro-denominated safe assets, and greater common fiscal capacity to finance European public goods. The digital euro is a necessary condition to adapt European monetary sovereignty to the digital era, but it is not enough to turn the euro into a currency fully comparable to the dollar.
Its importance lies precisely in other domains. The digital euro can connect three debates that often appear separate: the daily life of citizens, the competitiveness of the internal market, and Europe’s strategic autonomy. It can make the euro visible again in a sphere where there is a risk of being overshadowed by applications, cards, and third-party platforms. It can reinforce confidence in public money in a context of accelerating digitalization. And it can help Europe not to depend on others for a function as basic as paying.
Paying has always been a matter of power. It was so when states minted money, it was so when the great banking systems were built, and it is now, as payments are processed through global digital networks. Europe understood the political importance of the common currency with the creation of the euro, and now it must understand that that currency also requires its own digital infrastructure. In a more fragmented world, having a European, public, secure, and reliable way to pay is nothing less than a sovereign condition.
