When the problem is the same for everyone and all share the same concern to solve it, differences and suspicions disappear, said Jean Monnet. Those were the words that the President of the European Council, António Costa, reminded us of on his X account last Thursday, just before beginning one of the most challenging gatherings of European leaders in recent times.
Some words needed in the face of the rivers of ink that have flowed these days about losers and winners from the latest EUCO meeting as well as the EU’s inability to be a global power. I think we have to lift our gaze and go beyond the click-driven strategy pursued by those who talk about winners and losers, as well as precisely analyze the steps the EU has been taking since everything blew up when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began and the WHO had not yet decided that COVID-19 was no longer a public health emergency of international concern. It did so on May 5, 2023.
“We have to raise our gaze and move beyond the click-driven strategy of those who speak of winners and losers, as well as precisely analyze the steps the EU is taking since everything exploded with the start of Russia’s invasion”
I hold onto a phrase from the president of the EIB, Nadia Calviño, whom I interviewed last Friday:“The Prime Minister spoke of the need for a Marshall Plan, which materialized in the Next Generation funds. The key was having Ursula von der Leyen and Olaf Scholz, who at the time was Germany’s finance minister, which enabled a social-democratic response to the pandemic”. The amounts of economic support that we, the countries hardest hit by the pandemic, received are so large that we cannot fully imagine what they imply, but we can today affirm that our economies would not function as they do if this support had not been provided.
And it is necessary to remember, when we lean toward self-criticism, what the Kiel Institute tells us and what is too rarely recalled in the European public debate: the EU and its member states have matched or surpassed the total U.S. aid to Ukraine in several aggregates, especially when adding together different kinds of assistance: military, financial, and humanitarian.
How could it not be difficult for European leaders to manage that in less than four years, a pandemic and a war have upended the Europe and the world we know?
For decades, the European Union advanced thanks to a singular blend of pragmatism, institutional inertia, and an almost tacit faith that the process of integration, by itself, would yield stability and prosperity. It was not a project free of conflicts, but it was defined by a passive consensus: member states accepted decisions without intense political debate, trusting that the European machinery—rules, treaties, procedures—would keep functioning. Today, that model has run its course. Europe is entering a political phase.
“The passive consensus was not an anomaly, but a functional solution for a specific period. For much of the second half of the 20th century and the early 21st century”
The passive consensus was not an anomaly, but a functional solution for a specific period. For much of the second half of the 20th century and the early 21st century, the agendas dominating Europe were largely technical: harmonization of markets, regulation, gradual enlargements, structural funds. Excluding milestones such as the creation of the euro, few decisions carried existential or immediate geopolitical significance. In that context, it was reasonable for many countries to accept what the major founding states proposed, particularly France and Germany, whose leadership acted as a stabilizer of the system.
That Franco-German leadership operated less as an imposition than as a reference point. When Paris and Berlin agreed, the rest tended to align, not out of submission, but calculation: the cost of opposing often outweighed the cost of going along. The result has been an Europe efficient at managing economic integration, but relatively depoliticized, where conflict was softened and deep strategic deliberation was postponed.
The problem is that model worked only while the world did. Globalization, the American security umbrella, the relative stability of the international order, and sustained economic growth allowed Europe to advance without questioning too much about power, security, or strategic autonomy. The passive consensus was possible because risks seemed distant and benefits obvious.
That balance was broken in several phases. The financial crisis first, the pandemic second, and, finally, the war in Ukraine marked the end of automatic Europe. Suddenly, decisions were no longer technical or second-order: they involved mutualizing debt, financing massive closures of the economy, supporting a country at war, rethinking defense and energy security.
No longer is it enough to follow the leaders. Moreover, in the German case we have seen decisions taken with a short-term view—such as dependence on Russian gas—that have not always been the wisest. And, although those decisions affected us all, the other member states barely spoke up.
Today it is imperative to decide politically and assume collective responsibility. And we can view that as a problem, as an incapacity of the EU, or as a way to adjudicate national interests and turn them into common will.
“Unlike what happens in autocratic systems, European leaders need to justify every step before multiple audiences: parliaments, markets, and citizens”
Here arises one of the most criticized—and least understood—paradoxes of the European Union: its slowness. Facing strong leaders who have become fashionable and boast rapid and spectacular decisions, the EU appears hesitant, trapped in endless processes. Yet, that slowness is not mere bureaucracy; it reflects a system designed to build active consensus, not passive acceptance. European decisions take time because they require aligning national interests, legitimizing the sharing of costs and benefits, and building trust among institutions and States.
And that trust is Europe’s real political capital. Slow decisions are often, precisely for that reason, more solid in the medium term. The Next Generation program, unimaginable a few years earlier, would not have been possible without weeks of negotiation and open frictions. The same can be said of the use of common debt to finance strategic priorities or of sustained support to Ukraine. Europe takes its time, but when it decides, it does so credibly and durably.
The constant self-criticism must evolve into a permanent interpretation of the keys to how the EU works. Europe questions itself even when it acts successfully; it reviews procedures, doubts publicly, and exposes its disagreements. It is, in fact, an emergent political nature of EU decisions. Unlike in autocratic systems, European leaders need to justify every step to multiple audiences: parliaments, markets, and citizens. And, incidentally, if they do not, and even if it may seem contradictory, extremism will grow. The passive consensus, in fact, may have been perceived by part of society as the absence of differences that we know can lead us to ‘everyone is the same’.
This trait also explains why the passive consensus is no longer enough. When decisions affect fiscal sovereignty, security, or the social model, automatic acceptance becomes politically unsustainable. Small and medium-sized states no longer settle for following; they demand to participate. And the large ones cannot lead without persuading. The result is a Europe that is louder, more conflictive, and, paradoxically, more political.
The transition is not without risks. A politicized Europe is also a Europe more exposed to blocks, vetoes, and internal tensions. But the alternative —returning to the inertia of passive consensus— no longer exists. The outside world is too volatile, and the decisions too important to hide.
“The political Europe is needed both so that Merz must accept European collective debt to finance Ukraine and so that the European Commission can invoke Article 122 of the treaty to immobilize Russian assets without Hungary’s support”
In this sense, European slowness is a form of strategic prudence. I return to my conversation with Nadia Calviño. Against the drifts that generate uncertainty, the EU bets on processes that, although sometimes exasperating, weave trust between people and institutions. That trust explains why, once adopted, European decisions tend to resist the test of time better than many policies adopted with speed.
Everything is in question and that compels us to deliberate. We can no longer take for granted open markets, the transatlantic military alliance, the welfare state, or even democratic stability. The passive consensus was useful when history seemed linear. Political Europe is needed now that history has returned and is needed both so that Merz must accept European collective debt to finance Ukraine and so that the European Commission can invoke Article 122 of the treaty to immobilize Russian assets without Hungary’s support, for emergency and extraordinary necessity reasons. Also to allow, as diplomat Pablo García-Berdoy has suggested, something akin to European royal decrees that would enable provisional legislation to be adopted with subsequent ratification.
The European Union is learning, sometimes awkwardly, to exercise power. Not with grand gestures, but with decisions that are as collectively as possible, slow, and debated to exhaustion. In an impatient world, that may be its greatest advantage.
Bonus: A political Europe that wants to leave behind the passive consensus must also accept that Italians might have opinions about the decisions of German leaders, that a American media outlet with German capital may intervene in the European public debate, and above all it needs Spain to be an active part of this new political Europe. Here our parties and the media bear a high responsibility.
