The Re-Islamization of French Muslim Youth

IFOP has just published the results of a survey that is causing quite a stir. They show a clear “re-Islamization” of the Muslim population, especially among the young. This evolution is not really surprising (it had already been pointed out in the 2018 book edited by Olivier Galland and Anne Muxel, based on a survey conducted among secondary school students and titled La Tentation radicale, but now it is confirmed and intensified.

The most striking aspect is the rise of this religious fervor and the expressions of “religious absolutism,” as it was described in the cited book: that is, the idea that religion holds the complete truth about everything and must impose itself on the secular world. Let us view a few examples, focusing on young people, whose behavioral shift is the most spectacular.

The Rise of Religiosity

To begin with, 80% of Muslims in France define themselves as “religious people,” compared to 48% among those who profess other religions. The level of religiosity is even higher among young Muslims: 30% describe themselves as “extremely or very religious,” versus 12% of those over 50, for example. Here there is probably a clear generational effect.

“The degree of religiosity is even higher among young Muslims: 30% describe themselves as ‘extremely or very religious,’ compared with 12% of those over 50 years old.”

This surge in religiosity among young Muslims has deep roots. Hugues Lagrange already highlighted it in a 2013 article, comparing the results of the survey Movilidad geográfica e inserciones sociales (MGIS), conducted by INED in 1992, with those of the Trajectories et Origines (TeO) survey of 2008, both focused on descendants of immigrants or youths from immigrant backgrounds. Lagrange showed that religious affiliation had already increased among descendants of immigrants between those two dates, and that signs of religiosity were stronger in 2008 among youths of Maghrebi origin than among adults of that same background.

“Everything happens,” wrote Lagrange, “as if the factors driving secularization at the heart of society were suspended among young people from non-European migrations socialized in France.” Not only are they suspended, but they seem reversed, and the IFOP survey shows clear signs of that shift, which has accelerated in recent years.

For example, 67% of Muslim youths aged 18 to 24 say they pray at least once a day, whereas in the nineties or early 2000s they were only about one in five (or less). A spectacular growth. 40% say they attend the mosque on Fridays, compared with a little over one in ten thirty years ago. And we could multiply the examples (Ramadan practices, adherence to religious prohibitions, etc.).

Let us pause a moment on the use of the veil, which nicely illustrates this generational split (in the chart below). The curves for those under 25 and those over 50 cross after 2016. The Muslim women who are now over 50 years old belong to the generations surveyed in 1992 in MGIS, which showed a clear convergence between the cultural practices of younger people of immigrant origin and those born to French parents. It is likely that those generations, today around 50 or 60, have preserved certain cultural traits from their youth that keep them away from the more divisive symbols of adherence to Islam (which does not mean they have stopped considering themselves believers).

“Today’s young Muslim women, however, have been socialized in a completely different environment and do not hesitate to adopt these symbols that openly express their faith”

Today’s young Muslim women, however, have been socialized in a completely different environment and do not hesitate to adopt these symbols that openly express their faith (80% say they do so to respect a religious obligation), without forgetting that the veil can also respond to the need to protect themselves from pressures in public spaces (44% say they wear it to “not attract the gaze of men”). The explanation for this generational shift remains an open question.

The Position of Islam in Society

Religiosity rising is one thing, but it does not necessarily imply a predetermined view on the role that religion should play in society. One can be deeply religious and believe that civil matters, relating to social organization, do not fall within the purview of religion. It is a process that the Catholic Church also experienced: under John Paul II and Benedict XVI it ended up recognizing this separation between the sacred and the profane, ceasing to oppose, for example, theories of evolution, even while rejecting a purely materialist view of the human being.

“The rise in religiosity is one thing, but it does not necessarily imply a definite view on the role religion should play in society”

The IFOP survey clearly distinguishes religiosity from Islamism, posing distinct questions to approach each dimension. Hence, criticism in a Le Monde article that denounced a “confusion between the rise of religiosity and Islamism” does not seem justified. The prudent interpretation rests with the analysts; that is what we try to do here.

The Muslims surveyed appear to broadly adhere to the idea that religion dominates the secular world and can shape it. This had already been observed in the 2016 survey on religious radicalism among secondary school students.

François Kraus, head of the IFOP survey, revisited (with the authors’ permission) one of the questions posed in that study: “When religion and science clash over the question of the creation of the world, which usually has more truth—the religion or the science?” Among Muslim students in 2016, 81% sided with religion… and exactly the same percentage appears among Muslim youths in the IFOP survey. For them, the preeminence of religion is evident, whether due to its historical antiquity or because they believe that “science did not exist as much as it does now.” For many, science is just another belief. And apparently that has not changed.Here too, the generational gap is strong: 52% of Muslims over 50 side with religion, compared with 81% among the youths.

Other questions go further, because they address the direct relationship between religion and social organization. Two are particularly significant: the one concerning the sharia and the one asking to choose between respecting French laws or the rules of Islam. These responses help approximate the degree of adherence to religious fundamentalism (and, in the case of Islam, to Islamism), which is clearly distinct from mere religious orthodoxy. Orthodoxy is traditional practice; fundamentalism is a deeply politicized vision with universal pretensions.

“Nearly half of the Muslim respondents consider that Sharia ‘does not have to be applied in non-Muslim countries'”

The raw results show that a relatively small minority (15%) declares itself in favor of full application of the sharia “regardless of the country”. Among youths, the figure rises to 21%. On the other hand, almost half (47%) consider that the sharia “does not have to be applied in non-Muslim countries,” which does not entail rejecting its application in Muslim countries. A 31% opts for an intermediate stance: partial application adapted to the country’s rules.

We can view the glass as half-empty—worrying that one in five youths seems to adhere to a fundamentalist vision—or half-full, noting that half do not identify with it. Something similar happens with the question of whether to respect French laws or Islamic rules: half choose the laws, but 44% (and 57% of youths) choose the religious rules.

The survey also shows that a significant proportion of young Muslims (42%) fully or partially approves Islamist positions and feels sympathy for at least one Islamist current, especially the Muslim Brothers: a third of 15- to 24-year-olds declare themselves close to them. In the 2016 survey, the “absolutist” students accounted for about one third.

What Future Scenario?

Are we headed toward stronger Islamization and greater adherence to fundamentalist positions? Or, as happened with Catholicism, will Islam modernize over time?

“The generational logic is evident today: young people are more religious and more radical than the previous generations were when they were young”

To answer, one would need to know what weighs more: the age effect or the generation effect. The generational logic is evident today: the young are more religious and more radical than earlier generations when they were young. But nothing guarantees that with aging and socioeconomic integration there will not be some moderation. Cross-cutting data show that Muslims in higher socio-professional categories or living in the Paris region are less radicalized. It is true that they are, on average, somewhat older, but social mobility could also play a role. Fostering it and breaking down barriers that hinder the employment of young people of immigrant origin would be, in this sense, an important message.

What Attitude to Adopt?

The re-Islamization of the Muslim-origin population in France is a major social phenomenon, which will probably persist as it is driven by generational replacement. We must try to understand it and respond intelligently.

In a recent editorial of Le Figaro, Yves Thréard proposes adopting a combative stance. He argues that we have not known how to defend laicity nor counter the loss of Judeo-Christian references after the decline of Catholicism, and calls for “waging a cultural and spiritual battle.” Yet this strategy can be questioned: it could further inflame the debate, radicalize a portion of the population that already perceives discrimination, feed the (misguided) idea of structural “Islamophobia,” and inflame political clientelism.

The re-Islamization of young people appears first as a religious phenomenon, but it can also be interpreted through the lens of collective identities. Members of a social group, in this case Muslims, become aware of their belonging by sharing a common identity. A certain parallel can be drawn with the transformation of the working population into a ‘working class’ between the 19th and 20th centuries.

In both cases, a social group that feels mistreated creates a collective identity to demand autonomy and recognition: workers from their position in production; Muslims from their religious belonging. In both cases there were political structures that offered an ideological framework: socialist and communist parties on one side and the Muslim Brotherhood on the other. And in both cases forms of radicalism emerged.

Before waging a “cultural and spiritual battle” (What would that entail exactly?), a pedagogical effort seems necessary to convince young Muslims that they are not victims of a structural rejection by the society in which they live.

It will not be easy. As Ruud Koopmans notes in a recent interview, “in the countries of origin, Islamism has become in recent decades the dominant form of Islam.” And this phenomenon is transmitted “by capillarity” to Europe. If collective identity is based on a radical opposition between “them” and “us,” it leads to closing doors and dehumanization of the other.

“Just as French Communists abandoned the idea of importing the Soviet model, French Muslims will have to abandon Islamism”

Following the historical parallel, just as French communists abandoned the idea of importing the Soviet model (facilitated, of course, by its collapse), French Muslims will have to abandon Islamism. It can also be expected that second or third generations will be less receptive to that “capillarity.” In fact, the survey indicates that youths of Maghrebi origin are less receptive to Islamism than those from Sub-Saharan Africa, probably more recent immigrants from regions where Islamism is advancing rapidly.

Moreover, not all trends point toward increased religious orthodoxy. In 2008, 38% estimated that the sharia should not apply in non-Muslim countries; today it is 47%. Regarding religious taboos, only 6% (versus 9% in 2016) reject being cared for by a health professional of the opposite sex. 20% reject mixed swimming pools versus 34% in 2016. And, above all, 73% now accept apostasy, compared with 44% in 1989.

On the other hand, it is worth keeping in mind that the histories of Christianity and Islam are very different. Christianity incorporated from the outset a strong Greco-Roman element, which allowed—starting in the 12th and 13th centuries—to integrate reason, weakening anti-scientific orthodoxy and leading to the Enlightenment a few centuries later. Islam, by contrast, after Averroes’s disappearance in the 13th century, remained anchored in an orthodoxy hostile to reason, which still weighs on it. Ignoring this specificity would prevent addressing the crucial question of its relation to scientific knowledge.

We must also remember that, if we truly defend religious freedom, we cannot deny it to Muslims while it is exercised within the legal framework. The re-Islamization confirms that the old assimilationist project was mistaken and that integration, although more realistic, must be reconsidered. A new war of religion would be disastrous. That does not prevent—on the contrary—us from firmly defending our values, starting with laicity and freedom of thought.

© Telos, 2025.