The Director of Institut Montaigne: Reconnecting the Link Between Political Decisions and Their Outcomes

The Montaigne Institute occupies in France a space that is somewhat unusual from a Spanish viewpoint: a private center, funded by companies, that works with experts, public officials, and economic actors to intervene in the design of public policies. Marie-Pierre de Bailliencourt has been leading it since 2022 with a very practical sense of the craft. She wants the institute to be something more than a factory of reports: “I try to transform a think tank into what I would call, at least in part, a do tank“, she explains.

The conversation starts there, at the role such an institution can play in a country that is approaching decisive presidential elections. De Bailliencourt believes France arrives at 2027 with an evident fracture between elites and citizens, eroded trust in institutions, and a public debate that has lost the link between decisions and consequences. Her answer is to explain public policy more clearly: “We don’t tell people what they should choose; we explain the consequences of each option”, she summarizes.

Afterwards, the dialogue moves on to the big issues that condition that choice and France’s place in Europe: semiconductors, economic security, industry, China, the United States, energy, and strategic autonomy. De Bailliencourt does not place Washington and Beijing on the same level, but she does insist that Europe must learn to think in terms of power. “The United States is a crucial ally, but also a competitor”, she argues. And on China, the diagnosis is equally clear: “France cannot compete effectively on its own against either China or the United States”.

What do you think of the heat that has been here in Paris in recent weeks?

I’m always a bit skeptical when we talk about climate. A cartoon was circulating online showing a map of France with temperatures around 30 degrees and a TV host saying: “Nice weather in France.” That was in the eighties. Then the same map appears again, with the same temperatures, but today accompanied by heat alerts and health-risk messages. My skepticism isn’t about the reality of heat or climate change, but about the way we talk about it and shape people’s perception.

This time, however, the authorities were much better prepared. France endured a traumatic experience in 2003, when an exceptional heat wave caused a sharp rise in mortality among the elderly. That trauma explains much of our current approach. We have to live with the heat, stay vigilant, and educate the population about what it means.

In Spain, Portugal, or North Africa, people have a different relationship with the climate. France has been extremely fortunate to enjoy a temperate climate. We are not used to extreme heat or extreme cold. In many ways, we have been privileged: we have no hurricanes, we have very few earthquakes, and we are not used to major climatic phenomena.

“France experienced a traumatic event in 2003, when an exceptional heat wave led to a sharp rise in mortality among the elderly”

We are learning to deal with this. Sometimes we may overreact a bit, but the climate is changing, and we must adapt, mitigate its effects, and keep reducing emissions. Paradoxically, France is one of the leaders in climate policy and industrial decarbonization. It is one of France’s many paradoxes: we have suffered less than many other countries and yet we are among the loudest voices about climate change. At the same time, we act in a positive way. We have one of the lowest carbon footprints among industrialized nations, we have been very active in ESG compliance and corporate social responsibility, and we are on a trajectory better than many other countries. Still, we constantly feel we are not doing enough. That is the French paradox.

Let me ask you about the Montaigne Institute’s role in the French public debate.

The Montaigne Institute is a private, independent, non-partisan think tank. We do not receive public funding, which is quite unusual in France. We are funded entirely through the dues of our members, which include small, medium, and large companies. Those companies support Montaigne because they want to ensure that economic issues are properly reflected in policy-making.

Twenty-five years ago, Claude Bébéar, former president of AXA, thought it was a mistake to keep companies out of the policy debate. His idea was that companies possess practical knowledge that can improve public action, which is why he founded the Montaigne Institute. Today we are one of the leading think tanks in France and we also have a permanent presence in Brussels.

I have been directing the Montaigne Institute for four years, and I have deliberately steered the organization toward something far more operational. My conviction is that ideas are everywhere. There are reports, conferences, and publications, but very little action and very little impact. I come from the industrial world, so I am very focused on execution. Together with my team, we have tried to identify the critical points where intervention can truly make a difference.

For example, we identified semiconductors as a strategic vulnerability for French and European economies. We realized how much we depended on external suppliers and concluded that this issue had to be addressed. With Mathieu Duchâtel, our Director of International Studies, we have developed what is now the main European initiative on resilience in semiconductors: the Chips Diplomacy Initiative.

The initiative maps supply chains, analyzes regulatory frameworks, identifies strategic vulnerabilities, and proposes concrete risk-mitigation measures. We work closely with Japan and South Korea, while coordinating at the European level with the Netherlands and ASML, as well as with France, with Italy through STMicroelectronics, with Germany, and with other partners. The objective is not only to analyze problems, but to act on them.

“We realized how much we depended on external suppliers and concluded that it was necessary to address the issue of semiconductors”

Another example concerns public health after COVID-19. Many companies are increasingly worried about the impact of mental health on their staff and on society at large. I think Spain faces similar challenges. We studied best international practices, especially in the United States, and designed a new approach to organizing mental health care.

We then launched a pilot program in Yvelines, near Versailles, with hospitals, doctors, and patients. The results have been very encouraging: fewer relapses, lower use of psychotropic drugs, and a higher rate of return to work and normal life. Initially, the Montaigne Institute financed the pilot entirely. After those results, we asked the Parliament to allocate public funding to expand the program to five departments. There are still about six months left in the pilot phase, but if the final results confirm what has been observed so far, the program could be rolled out nationwide.

“Ideas matter, but it matters even more to ensure they become concrete actions. Companies, whether small, medium, or large, play a crucial role in that process”

I’m trying to transform a think tank into what I would call, at least in part, a do tank. Ideas matter, but it matters even more to ensure they become concrete actions. Companies, whether small, medium, or large, play an essential role in that process. They tell us what they face every day: how they manage their teams, their supply chains, regulatory burdens, and strategic risks. The Montaigne Institute is thus a place where companies, experts, and public officials work together to identify both problems and practical solutions. That collective approach is very important to me because it lends our work a legitimacy that governments are willing to listen to.

France will hold presidential elections in 2027, and Spain should also have elections that year. What is the best way to involve citizens in the debate, not only about politics but about public policy? I have the sense that we are living in a period where politicians talk more about politics than about policies. And I think it is increasingly important to involve citizens in the discussion of public policies.

This is a very important question. I can tell you what we are trying to do. I do not claim it is the only path, but it is the path we have chosen. We start from a simple observation: today there is a significant gap between the elites and the citizens. Trust in institutions has eroded steadily. I do not know if the situation is exactly the same in Spain, but in France there is a deep sense of mistrust.

This mistrust stems from three main factors. First, people no longer understand what is happening. The world has become too complex, it changes too quickly, and no one has taken the time to explain it well. Second, people no longer trust what they are told. They feel politicians have lied to them for years, that they no longer listen, and that they are therefore not credible. Third, social networks have reinforced what we call confirmation bias. People are constantly exposed to information that confirms what they already believe. As a result, they are not confronted with opposing viewpoints, and society becomes increasingly polarized and radicalized.

“The world has become too complex, it changes too quickly, and no one has taken the time to explain it well”

Our response is to do the opposite. We do not tell people what to think or what is right or wrong. We try to give them the tools to make their own decisions: well-informed decisions. And an informed decision requires understanding the consequences of the available options.

For the presidential election, we have organized our work around three pillars. The first is to explain the situation France currently faces and, above all, how that situation affects people’s daily lives. If we talk about economic security, we do not do so in abstract terms. We ask practical questions: can you still get antibiotics for your children? Can factories continue to operate because they have access to essential components? Last year France experienced shortages of children’s antibiotics, and several factories had to slow down or halt production due to disruptions in global supply chains. The same goes for innovation, social protection, health care, or any other major public-policy issue. We always start with the concrete impact on citizens’ daily lives.

The second pillar consists of explaining how we arrived at the current situation. This is essential because people often forget that today’s circumstances are the result of political decisions taken years ago. The link between cause and effect has disappeared from public debate, and our objective is to reconnect those two elements. For example, if someone says they want to retire at 62, that is perfectly legitimate. But one must explain the consequences: what it means for pension levels, for contributions, and for public finances. We do not tell people what they should choose; we explain the consequences of each option.

We also explain the constraints we face. The French pension system is based on intergenerational solidarity. If birth rates fall while the number of retirees keeps rising, the system will eventually reach its limits. In fact, we reached that point several years ago. Today we are borrowing money simply to finance pensions rather than investing in future growth. That means increasing public debt to preserve the status quo, something clearly unsustainable.

Alongside these constraints, we explain France’s strengths: what assets we can build on and what opportunities we have. We also compare with other countries. How have Germany, Italy, Canada, or Japan responded to similar challenges? Looking outward usually helps people understand that France is not facing unique problems.

Finally, we devote a lot of attention to correcting misconceptions, what we call idées reçues. Many assumptions circulating in public debate are simply not supported by evidence. Whenever possible, we correct those ideas with facts, scientific evidence, and a non-judgmental approach.

“The link between cause and effect has disappeared from the public debate and our objective is to reconnect those two elements”

Only after all that do we move to the second stage. At that point we say: “Now that you understand the situation, let us examine the various public policy options available.” We have identified twenty-five major topics, including purchasing power, defense, housing, health, innovation, energy, and the environment. For each, we present the different policy options that a future president could realistically pursue.

Every proposal we analyze must meet four conditions: it has to be operational, financially credible, implementable, and legally viable. Constitutional or legislative reforms are possible, but everything must stay within the rule of law. We present the options available, without telling citizens which option they should support. We show them what is realistic.

The third pillar is different. After presenting the facts and the available options, we explain how we would approach the decision ourselves. Not because we think citizens should follow us, but because every public decision involves balancing and trade-offs. We evaluate policies according to three criteria: impact, feasibility, and acceptability. A policy can be solid from an economic point of view, but if society entirely rejects it, it becomes impossible to implement. Our goal is not to propose reforms that provoke social unrest, but to find the right balance between impact, feasibility, and public acceptance.

“A policy can be solid from an economic point of view, but if society completely rejects it, it becomes impossible to implement”

For the presidential election, we will publish these analyses very broadly. Ultimately, our approach is based on respect for citizens. That means making a real effort to explain complex issues in plain language, without technocratic jargon and without political posturing. We focus on identifying policies that can be realistically implemented during the next presidential term and that can generate the greatest possible impact.

Did you follow the same approach during the last presidential election?

No. We had never done that before. What is part of the Montaigne Institute’s tradition is our economic analysis of presidential candidates’ programs.

The presidential election will be held in May, but candidates typically publish their programs in January or February. When they do, we analyze them and estimate their cost. This has become one of our reference areas because political parties often do not conduct a rigorous financial evaluation of their own proposals. As a result, our estimates are widely recognized as an independent benchmark for assessing the cost and credibility of campaign promises.

“Political parties often do not conduct a rigorous economic assessment of their own proposals”

Of course, we will continue doing that work. But before evaluating the financial cost of candidates’ programs, it is essential to ensure that the public debate unfolds properly. During the 2022 presidential election there was very little substantial debate. The context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine overshadowed much of the campaign. We believe France must consciously choose its future, and to do so, citizens need to understand the different options available. That is what we aim to contribute.

To maximize our reach, we work closely with television channels, newspapers, radio stations, and social media platforms. Our aim is to enrich the public debate by making citizens aware of the range of options available.

France, like Spain, does not make decisions in isolation. When people vote today, they do not vote only for France: they also vote in a European context. And beyond Europe, many of the forces that determine our future come from elsewhere, especially China. For me, understanding this new international environment is becoming essential for citizens to make informed election choices.

I do not think you can present it to people in those terms. When French citizens vote in a presidential election, they believe they are choosing the president of France. They do not see themselves voting for Europe. Ironically, it happens almost the opposite in European Parliament elections: many people vote there mainly to send a message to the French government, rather than to influence European policy. It’s a fairly paradoxical situation.

I agree with the substance of your argument. There are many external forces affecting France and, if citizens do not understand them, they cannot make informed decisions. The way we have chosen to address this is to organize our work around specific public policy topics.

“There are many external forces affecting France and, if citizens do not understand them, they cannot make informed decisions”

Take economic security as an example. Economic security cannot be achieved if France acts alone. Given the scale of the current challenges and the commitments in European treaties, cooperation is unavoidable. When we present policy options to citizens, one possibility is to strengthen economic security through greater European integration. Another option, which is also part of political debate, is to build what some would call a national fortress.

A position holds that France cannot compete effectively on its own against either China or the United States. Only the scale of the European Union provides enough bargaining power against major powers like China. Another position argues exactly the opposite: its supporters believe Europe is too slow, too divided, and too ineffective. From that perspective, France should reinforce its own national resilience and become more self-sufficient.

There is also a third approach, perhaps more pragmatic. Instead of choosing between Europe and national sovereignty, it proposes selecting the level of cooperation that is most appropriate on a case-by-case basis. Depending on the issue, France could work with the European Union, with Canada, with India, or with any other relevant partner. The goal is to identify which partnership best serves French interests.

We devote a full section of our work to the relationship between France and Europe. In France there is growing European skepticism, but that does not necessarily mean people reject Europe as a project. More often, it questions how Europe currently functions. That is why we pose a simple question: how can France and Europe create mutual benefits? Again, we do not provide a single answer. We present the various options.

“In France there is growing skepticism toward the European Union, but that does not necessarily mean people reject the European project”

The same approach applies to defense. Should it be organized primarily at the European level? Or should France rely more on its own national capabilities? These are legitimate policy options. Talking about Europe in broad, abstract terms is usually ineffective. It is a conversation that mainly appeals to elites. Most people do not wake up in the morning thinking about the balance between global, European, national, and regional levels. They think about whether they feel safe, whether their company can keep operating, whether they can access healthcare or find a job. Our role is not to tell them what to believe, but to explain how all those levels of government are interconnected and how they affect everyday life.

You are the director of the Montaigne Institute, which, as you have explained, is funded by private companies. What are today the main concerns of French companies?

There are several. Just yesterday we published a report on regulatory burden, which is one of the issues most worrying to businesses. Many people complain about European regulation itself, but when we look at the matter closely, we often find that the real problem lies in how European directives are transposed into French law. In many cases, the French implementation goes far beyond what Europe actually requires.

That’s why we always try to stay evidence-based and facts-driven. We want to understand where the real problems lie. Regulation is, without a doubt, one of the main concerns. Another fundamental issue is economic security. Businesses are increasingly worried about resilience, supply chains, customs duties, tariffs, the instrumentalization of interdependence, and the extraterritorial application of foreign laws. In broader terms, they worry about how to stay competitive in a world that is becoming more fragmented, more confrontational, and more unpredictable. That is probably their number one concern.

“Many people complain about European regulation itself, but we often find that the real problem lies in how European directives are transposed”

The second major matter concerns people: talent, skills, and human capital. Companies wonder how they need to adapt to deep changes in society. That includes mental health, especially among younger generations, new management styles, demographic change, and the impact of artificial intelligence. AI is transforming organizations, and companies are trying to understand how to adapt.

There is also the issue of robotics and what we call “physical AI.” How can automation boost productivity while remaining socially acceptable? These are fundamental questions. Finally, there is institutional stability. Businesses need a predictable environment for investing: fiscal stability, regulatory stability, and confidence that they can plan for the long term. I would summarize their main concerns in three blocks: economic security, adapting to technological and social transformation, and institutional stability.

What worries French companies most about China? And in this line, does France currently have a coherent policy toward China?

It depends a lot on the size of the company. If you run a small business, your main concern is unfair competition. If you run a large multinational, your concerns are very different: the instrumentalization of interdependence, supply-chain vulnerabilities, extraterritorial legislation, intellectual-property theft, and market disruptions.

“How can automation improve productivity and, at the same time, remain socially acceptable? These are fundamental questions”

We know, for example, that China is currently accumulating a number of strategic materials, not only for internal use but also because that gives it leverage over global markets. Large multinational companies operating internationally are very aware of these risks. Small businesses, by contrast, experience Chinese competition mainly through subsidized production and price distortions. They see competitors who benefit from state support that European companies do not receive. That creates a significant competitive disadvantage.

Regarding your second question, yes, France does have a policy toward China. There is a French policy and a European policy. France has long been one of the European countries most advanced in economic security. For many years we have paid particular attention to the protection of intellectual property and to technology transfer. We are relatively advanced in these areas, though our policies remain largely defensive.

At the European level, France is one of the countries pushing hardest for a stronger response to China’s economic strategy. This Wednesday I had lunch with the French Minister of Industry, and we talked at length about the difference between Made in Europe and Made with Europe. France strongly defends the former approach. Germany leans more toward the latter. That difference reflects Germany’s much greater dependence on Chinese components and supply chains. Germany is therefore in a particularly difficult position.

Interestingly, today the Chinese ambassador invited me to lunch and told me: “I would like to discuss all that you are currently working on.” It is clear that these matters are attracting attention. France also played an important role in promoting the European Industry Act because we believe Europe must reindustrialize.

Our main critique is not that Europe does nothing, but that Europe reacts too slowly. The pace is wrong, governance is inadequate, and the reach of action remains too limited. Europe is still mostly defensive, not offensive. Its decision-making procedures are too slow to respond effectively to today’s strategic challenges. As you know, European decisions require broad political consensus, and a relatively small number of member states can block major initiatives in industrial policy, sanctions, or other strategic matters.

“Our main critique is not that Europe does nothing, but that Europe reacts too slowly. The pace is wrong.”

In the Montaigne Institute we believe Europe needs a much stronger industrial strategy. We support a real Buy European Act and a stronger preference for products made in Europe. The goal is not to turn hostile toward China, but to acknowledge that China pursues a long-term strategic agenda and to stop being naïve. Europe also needs its own strategy. The difficulty is that some European countries remain very exposed to Chinese economic pressure, which makes maintaining a unified European position increasingly difficult.

China and the United States are engaged in an ever more intense strategic competition, and Europe is in the middle. Both countries try to exploit divisions within Europe. How do you view the United States from France’s and the Montaigne Institute’s perspective? At the political level as well as among the businesses of each country.

I see the United States today very much as I did three years ago, or even ten. It is a crucial ally, but also a competitor. As we often say, countries do not have friends; they have interests. That has not changed.

“Some European countries remain very exposed to Chinese economic pressure, making it increasingly difficult to maintain a unified European position”

What has changed is that recent events in the United States have accelerated European awareness of our own dependencies. That is particularly true in the digital realm, but also in defense, finance, and several other strategic sectors. We are far more aware of how vulnerable we are to the decisions of our allies, suppliers, and partners. That awakening is extremely important. In the Montaigne Institute we are working to help structure a European response that reduces these vulnerabilities.

That said, I do not place China and the United States on exactly the same plane. One is a democracy and the other is not. If Europe were finally forced to choose between them, my personal position is clear. Nonetheless, President Macron has chosen to define France as what he calls a balancing power, a puissance d’équilibre, positioned between China and the United States. It is an intellectually interesting position, but also incredibly difficult to maintain. I have always been cautious about playing the role of arbitrator: when neither side is satisfied with the result, the first impulse is usually to blame the arbitrator, or even to remove it. Still, it is a coherent strategic stance and remains France’s official position.

“I do not place China and the United States on exactly the same plane. One is a democracy and the other not”

The reality is extremely complex. We must maintain a constructive relationship with the United States while seeking greater strategic autonomy. We also need to reduce our dependence on China without provoking unnecessary confrontation, because we remain economically interlinked. In many respects, Europe is in a difficult position. The positive aspect is that we are now fully aware of that reality, and there is growing willingness, at least in some parts of Europe, to change it.

The situation is particularly complex in the case of Germany. Germany remains heavily dependent on the United States for its security, on China for large parts of its industrial economy, and, until very recently, on Russia for energy. That combination has left the country in a particularly vulnerable position. Today, Germany seems increasingly focused on protecting its own national interests. It is rebuilding its own capabilities and becoming more introspective. In some respects, it follows a more national than genuinely European approach, and that inevitably weakens Europe’s collective response.

France, by contrast, tends to adopt a more strategic, long-term view. Perhaps we are somewhat less reactive, but there is still a lot of work to do. At the Montaigne Institute we devote substantial attention to European energy policy, industrial strategy, and technological sovereignty.

That brings us to energy. You know better than I that there is an open debate, especially among countries like France and Spain, about nuclear energy and renewable energy.

The debate is usually misframed. I do not see nuclear energy and renewables as opposing alternatives, but as complementary. We need both. Each has its own strengths and weaknesses.

“The demand for electricity will not decrease but will continue to rise. Rather than arguing endlessly about which energy source is preferable, we should recognize that Europe needs a diversified energy mix”

What is not under debate is that we are entering a world that is increasingly electricity-intensive. Electricity demand will not decrease, but will continue to rise. Instead of endlessly arguing about which energy source is preferable, we should recognize that Europe needs a diversified energy mix. We also need a truly integrated European energy grid. We must strengthen our networks, improve resilience, and manage demand collectively. These are the real priorities.

Returning to the United States, has it become harder for French companies to do business there than in the past?

I don’t think so. Americans are, first and foremost, very pragmatic. Business comes first. If your company is competitive, innovative, and runs well, there remains plenty of room to do business in the United States. I certainly do not see French companies pulling back from the American market. Quite the opposite.

The incentives to invest in the United States remain very attractive. Many French companies are expanding their U.S. operations or reorganizing their activities there. I don’t see a significant withdrawal. What I do see is much greater emphasis on risk management. CEOs are paying more attention to geopolitical risk and reorganizing their international operations accordingly. But that is different from a disconnection.

In broader terms, I do not think the United States wants to disengage from Europe. Likewise, many American companies remain firmly committed to maintaining their presence in Europe. That relationship remains strategically important for both sides.

My final question is about the upcoming presidential election. Many polls suggest the runoff could be contested between candidates from the far ends of the political spectrum, but my question is broader. Does genuine political competition still exist in France? Are there real ideological differences today between figures like Emmanuel Macron and Jordan Bardella, or has French politics become more about personalities than about programs?

Yes, there are real differences. The first thing to remember is that France operates under the Fifth Republic’s institutions, which is a fairly singular political system. When people talk about the presidential election, they tend to focus exclusively on the election of the president. But that is only part of the picture. What really matters is how the future president will govern, and that depends as much on parliamentary elections as on the presidential one. If you ignore the legislative dimension, you miss a fundamental aspect of how political power actually works in France.

“What really matters is how the future president will govern, and that depends as much on the legislative elections as on the presidential”

We are often described as revolutionary, but we are actually quite conservative. Whoever the next president is, Parliament will act increasingly as a check and balance. That was not necessarily the case fifteen years ago. Back then it was almost assumed that the president would have a parliamentary majority and could govern effectively. Today the situation is very different. Even if a candidate from one of the extremes were elected president, Parliament would provide an important institutional balance.

At this point, no one really knows what will happen. Everything remains open. We are waiting for the judicial decision on Marine Le Pen. The ruling is expected on July 7 and will determine whether she can run for the presidency. That decision could profoundly reshape the campaign. If she cannot run, the immediate question would be whether Jordan Bardella would take her place. From that moment, the political landscape could change very quickly.

We are already starting to see signs of political realignment. Just yesterday, Laurent Wauquiez, speaking on behalf of Les Républicains in Parliament and despite the internal dynamics of his own party, signaled a willingness to work with Édouard Philippe. That suggests that politicians are already positioning themselves for possible new alliances.

Almost anything remains possible. Do not forget that Emmanuel Macron entered the 2017 presidential race somewhat late. He appeared as what we often call the “third man,” transforming the campaign completely. Now many people speculate that another external actor could emerge later this year. It is possible.

Beyond domestic politics, we must also consider the international context. What would happen if France experienced a deadly heat wave? What would happen if there were a major terrorist attack? What would happen if another geopolitical crisis erupted? Events of that magnitude could completely reshape the campaign.

“Ultimately, this election should not be about personalities or political labels alone. The real question is much more fundamental: what project do we want for France?”

I don’t think anything is decided. The election remains completely open. Precisely for that reason, at the Montaigne Institute we are placing so much emphasis on improving the quality of public debate. Our goal is to ensure that France discusses the issues that truly matter. Ultimately, this election should not be about personalities or political labels alone. The real question is much more fundamental: what project do we want for France?

Thank you very much.