The Venice Commission has previously noted that, given the richness of Europe’s legal culture —which is valuable and must be preserved— there is no single model for organizing an independent judiciary that applies to all countries. It has also indicated that there is no standard model that a democratic state is obliged to follow when establishing its Council for the Judiciary, provided that the function of said Council is framed within the objective of ensuring the proper functioning of an independent judiciary within a democratic state. Therefore, European norms should be regarded as indicative benchmarks, allowing states to exercise a margin of discretion when applying them within their respective legal systems.
This paragraph (26) forms part of thedictamen emitido por la Comisión de Venecia respondiendo a la petición del Consejo General del Poder Judicial (CGPJ) para que se pronunciara sobre el Informe aprobado por este órgano constitucional en cumplimiento de lo dispuesto por la Disposición Adicional de la Ley Orgánica 3/2024 (DA LO 3/2024). La disposición adicional fue la traducción jurídica del acuerdo entre los dos partidos mayoritarios para desbloquear y renovar el Consejo y obligaba al CGPJ a elaborar, en seis meses y por mayoría de tres quintos, un informe comparado y una propuesta de reforma de elección de sus vocales judiciales que garantizara la independencia, reforzara la participación directa de la carrera y pudiera ser valorada positivamente por la Comisión Europea. Entre octubre de 2024 y febrero de 2025, un grupo de cuatro vocales identificó dos vías plausibles de reforma del sistema de elección de los vocales judiciales: por una parte, la elección por la carrera judicial y, por otra, la elección parlamentaria con mejoras que refuerzan la participación de jueces y la calidad de la selección en las Cortes. El Pleno del CGPJ aprobó un informe que recoge ambas opciones y lo elevó al Gobierno, al Congreso y al Senado, tal y como preveía la disposición adicional ya citada.
“La evaluación de la Comisión de Venecia fue una exigencia del sector conservador del CGPJ para que el Pleno aprobara un informe con dos opciones”
La remisión a la Comisión de Venecia para una evaluación del informe conforme a sus estándares no estaba prevista en la DA de la LO 3/2024. Sin embargo, dicha evaluación, suplementaria y previa a la existencia de una iniciativa legislativa, fue una exigencia del sector conservador del CGPJ para que el Pleno aprobara un informe con dos opciones. No es un detalle menor: es pacífico entre la doctrina especializada que los estándares de la Comisión de Venecia se inclinan por la elección “entre pares” de los vocales judiciales, lo que situaba bajo un escrutinio especialmente exigente la Propuesta 2 (elección parlamentaria con mejoras).
The Venice Commission’s Evaluation
As acknowledged in the reproduced paragraph, Venice’s parameters are indicative, not legally binding. What is binding, however, is the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) or the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Regarding the matter at hand, neither of these tribunals has determined which model the States, whether EU members or Council of Europe members, must establish to govern their judiciary. Thus, there is no legally binding parameter forcing Spain, or any other State, to adopt a particular model of governing the judiciary, as illustrated by the variety of models existing in Europe: from countries where the government of the judiciary is held by the Ministry of Justice (Germany or Austria, for example), to those where it is in the hands of a judicial council (Spain or France). There are even states where the council, with a mixed composition, is chaired by the president of the republic (Italy).
What is clear is that the Venice Commission’s evaluation, albeit with critical notes regarding the enhanced parliamentary election, begins by recognizing what our proposal proposed: there is no single model of judiciary governance in Europe, and national institutional autonomy must be respected, with the only condition that the system established guarantees the “proper functioning of an independent judiciary within a democratic state“.
Undoubtedly, the independence of the members who administer justice is indispensable, and this is recognized by our Constitution as well as all standards in this area. Nevertheless, the outright rejection of the parliamentary election of the judicial members because it would politicize them, and the assumption that the only way to avoid politicization is for them to be elected by their peers, are statements without a solid legal basis. Admittedly, perhaps, because there is no perfect or infallible system. In any case, peer election does not guarantee that politicization of the Council will not occur. This is what the Venice Commission maintains, noting that in Spain the so-called “internal politicization” would be caused by the alignment attributed to some associations with the major parties. In other words, judicial associationism in Spain, or part of it, would be politically positioned and this would also pose a danger to the independence of the CGPJ. It should be highlighted that STC 108/1986 already warned of this possibility of internal politicization, even after the CGPJ’s judicial members had been elected by their peers for five years.
No hay una forma de elección perfecta
In this vein, it is noteworthy that it is claimed that the parliamentary election of non-judicial members would be sufficient to democratically legitimize the councils, endow them with pluralism, and prevent judicial corporatism that could arise. However, it obscures that many of the Council’s decisions could be made by the majority held by the judicial members (twelve versus eight by constitutional mandate), which could perpetuate corporatism. Additionally, there is doubt about why it is accepted that jurist members may be elected by the Cortes and, therefore, be susceptible to politicization. If they are part of the CGPJ and share the same voice and vote as the judicial members, one could understand that they might also contaminate the latter.
The fact is that there is no empirical evidence that parliamentary election is the cause of politicization of the judicial system. Politicization, by the way, negatively affects the perceived independence of the judiciary. No international body or organization has ever stated that Spain has an actual problem of independence among the judiciary’s members. Everything hinges on public perception, which can sometimes be somewhat erratic in determining what it means for judges to be independent and in identifying the CGPJ’s role.
“No debe olvidarse que el CGPJ es un órgano de gobierno y que, por tanto, su labor es, en parte, política —que no partidista—”
When drafting our proposal we were aware that we did not follow all of Venice’s indicative parameters, but we did share the intended aim: beyond the system chosen to elect the judicial members, what matters is that the functions assigned to the Council be carried out by its twenty members and its Presidency in an independent, impartial and fully professional manner. One should not forget that the CGPJ is a governing body and, therefore, its work is, to a degree, political —not partisan—. The CGPJ must defend a model of a constitutional judge, and that entails equipping it with a set of powers and obligations to ensure the proper performance of its function. Regarding that model and its scope, there is not always agreement among CGPJ members, and therefore decisions must be made, chosen and prioritized. What matters is that in these decision-making processes the guarantees of the administrative procedure are respected with professionalism and transparency.
The Venice Commission has carried out an analysis of two proposals regarding the election of the judicial members, after the CGPJ fulfilled its mandate and completed its legal term. In due course, it will be the Government or the parliamentary groups that, if deemed appropriate, will trigger the legislative initiative through bills or propositions of law. In either case, the involved actors should open a debate with legal practitioners and other interested parties to determine what is the best system of government for the judiciary in Spain, in accordance with Article 122 of the Constitution.
