From Judge Paul Maloney (W.D. Mich.) in Mead v. Rockford Public School Dist.:
Dan and Jennifer Mead are parents of a child named G.M. who attended a middle school within the Rockford Public School District. The Meads contend that the District maintained policies prompting school staff to address students by their chosen names and gender pronouns, even without the parents’ knowledge or consent.
{Plaintiffs Dan and Jennifer Mead hold that every person is born with a fixed biological sex, a “gift from God.” They maintain that using pronouns that do not align with a child’s biological sex communicates a false message about the child. The Meads’ child [seventh-grader G.M.] is biologically female and, consistent with the Meads’ religious beliefs, they refer to their child as their daughter, using female pronouns and a female name.}
G.M. requested that the school refer to G.M. by a different name and by pronouns that did not correspond to G.M.’s sex assigned at birth. The school complied with its policy and honored G.M.’s request. Upon learning of this, the Meads withdrew their child and filed suit against the District and the School Board. The Meads allege that these policies infringe upon the free exercise of their religion, among other claims. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the court granted the motion in part in August 2025, dismissing the free‑exercise claim.
For additional context on the 2025 decision (which also permitted the parents’ parental-rights claim to proceed), see this post. Now turning to today’s ruling:
In March 2026, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Mirabelli v. Bonta (2026) (per curiam), a case with similar facts and a free‑exercise claim. Relying on Mirabelli, the Meads filed a motion for reconsideration. The court concurs that Mirabelli calls into question the court’s reading of the governing law and will grant the motion to reconsider….
In its prior order, the court held that the defendants’ policies did not substantially interfere with the religious development of the Meads’ child for two reasons. First, the policies did not compel either the Meads or their child to perform or to profess anything. The policies function as internal guidelines for school staff. Second, the policies here resemble neither policies that the Supreme Court has found to infringe upon parents’ free‑exercise rights. The District’s contested policies did not relate to attendance, did not compel the Meads, and did not involve instruction or curriculum. The Court thus found the policies neutral, generally applicable, and subject to rational‑basis review, resulting in the dismissal of the Meads’ free‑exercise claim.
This court relied on the reasoning from a then‑recent unpublished Sixth Circuit decision, Doe No.1 v. Bethel Local School District Board of Education (6th Cir. 2025). In that matter, parents challenged a school district over a policy permitting a transgender student to use the communal restroom corresponding to their chosen gender. The panel held that the policy did not trigger strict scrutiny outright because, unlike the policy in Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025), the restroom policy was neither a curricular feature nor did it require religious students to use communal restrooms. The school also provided single‑occupancy restrooms for anyone to use.
As noted above, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam, non‑merits opinion in Mirabelli on March 2, 2026. Mirabelli involved school policies similar to those at issue here. When a student underwent gender transition at school, the policy prevented school personnel from informing the student’s parents about the situation unless the student consented….
The Supreme Court found that the parent‑plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits for the purposes of a stay pending appeal. The Court held that “California’s policies will likely not survive the strict scrutiny that Mahmoud requires.” In a concurrence joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Barrett wrote that the Ninth Circuit had “significantly misunderstood” Mahmoud by following the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Bethel.
Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration asks the court to consider the weight of two non‑binding opinions: (1) an unpublished Sixth Circuit opinion, and (2) a non‑merits interim ruling issued by the United States Supreme Court. “It is well‑established law in this circuit that unpublished cases are not binding precedent.” The Sixth Circuit has offered guidance on using its unpublished opinions. “Although our unpublished case law is valuable insofar as it is persuasive and correctly identifies governing legal principles, when it fails to meet that standard” courts should “not hesitate” to apply the correct law. Similarly, interim orders issued by the Supreme Court “are not conclusive on the merits” but do “inform how a court should exercise its equitable discretion in like cases.” Trump v. Boyle (2025).
Plaintiffs have shown a sufficient basis for this court to revisit its prior ruling. It is likely this court erred in relying on the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning that Mahmoud was a narrow, curriculum‑focused decision. At least three Justices have signaled that Mahmoud should not be read so narrowly. Additionally, Mahmoud and Bethel dealt with free‑expression challenges arising from situations different from those here. By contrast, Mirabelli arose from a challenge to a policy substantially akin to the one at hand. Accordingly, the court finds the rationale in Mirabelli more applicable than that in Bethel or Mahmoud.
Like the policies at issue in Mirabelli, the policies here likely impose a substantial burden on the Meads’ free‑exercise rights. The Meads hold religious beliefs similar to the parents in Mirabelli about the permanence of biological sex and the fixed connection between sex and gender. At the time of the asserted violation, the Meads’ child was roughly the same age as one of the children in Mirabelli (seventh to eighth grade). And similar to the parents in Mirabelli, the Meads had no option to opt their child out of the defendants’ policies.
Accordingly, the defendants’ policies trigger strict scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, a government must demonstrate that its policy advances interests of the highest order and is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. In Mirabelli, the Court held that the school’s policies would unlikely satisfy either prong:
The State contends that its policies advance a compelling interest in student safety and privacy. Yet those policies exclude the very primary guardians of children’s welfare—their parents. See Troxel v. Granville (2000) (plurality). California’s policies also appear to fail the narrow‑tailoring requirement. The State’s safety interest could be served by a policy permitting religious exemptions while prohibiting gender‑identity disclosures to parents who might themselves threaten their child’s welfare.
Defendants provide no basis to treat the policies here differently. In response, Defendants again contend that the school’s discretion to notify parents (consistent with its duty to keep them informed) is narrowly tailored to advance safety and academic success. Yet the discretion exercised here is as narrow as in Mirabelli: the policies disregard parents’ perspectives and, as a result, effectively exclude them. Therefore, under Mirabelli, the Meads have stated a claim for violation of the Free Exercise Clause ….
Representing the plaintiffs are John Bursch, Vincent Wagner, Noel Sterett, Dalton Nichols, David Cortman, and Katherine Anderson (Alliance Defending Freedom).
