Northern District of Texas Holds that Registration Rules for Untaxed NFA Firearms No Longer Rely on Congress’s Tax-Power
On August 5, U.S. District Judge James Wesley Hendrix of the Northern District of Texas issued a ruling in Silencer Shop Foundation v. Bureau of ATF holding that the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which repealed the taxes on manufacturing and transferring certain firearms under the National Firearms Act (NFA), left the statute with no constitutional basis for registration requirements grounded in Congress’s authority to lay and collect Taxes. Citing the definitional scope of the affected items—which include short-barreled rifles, short-barreled shotguns, silencers, and “any other weapon[s]” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845—while confirming that machineguns and destructive devices continue to bear a $200 tax, the court found the tax repeal undermines the registration regime tied to that revenue power.
This conclusion aligns with long-standing legal doctrine, given that Congress crafted the NFA as a revenue statute within the Internal Revenue Code, a characterization affirmed by the Supreme Court in Sonzinsky v. United States (1937) and reaffirmed later in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012). The district court observed, drawing on this author’s prior analysis, that the NFA was Congress’s attempt to regulate the so‑called “gangster weapons” linked to Prohibition-era violence. The registration requirement served the purpose of identifying who paid the tax; once the tax is repealed, the underpinning for registration collapses.
Silencer Shop then analyzed the government’s contention that the regulatory framework governing the making and transfer taxes also underpins the collection of the NFA’s special occupational taxes (SOTs), which are due annually from those engaged in producing, importing, or dealing in NFA firearms. The court noted, however, that the SOT regime is administered through business registrations and penalties for noncompliance, and that the SOT framework operates independently from the registration provisions tied to the making and transfer taxes.
Turning to the government’s reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause—the “last, best hope” for upholding expansive congressional action—the court invoked Printz v. United States (1997) to scrutinize the claim. It found that the challenged registration provisions were not indispensable for administering the SOT regime, nor were they a proper exercise of federal power, as Congress lacks a general police power akin to that possessed by the States.
ATF argued that the challenged registration requirements facilitate the collection and enforcement of the SOTs. Yet registration data are barred from use in criminal prosecutions under 26 U.S.C. § 5848(a) and are protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as established in United States v. Freed (1971).
The government then pressed the Commerce Clause theory, contending that the NFA provisions could be sustained under that clause. The court acknowledged respect for Congress’s commerce authority but warned that this case does not provide a universal permission slip for unbounded regulation. From the statute’s text, the NFA is fundamentally a taxing statute, with no explicit reference to interstate or foreign commerce in the provisions at issue; by contrast, Title I of the Gun Control Act (GCA) anchors its reach to commerce in nearly every provision, with one notable exception.
The sole exception concerns the prohibition on possession of post-1986 machineguns, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). The Fifth Circuit at one point suggested in dicta in United States v. Ardoin (1994) that, although the ATF would not collect NFA taxes for new machineguns due to § 922(o), that portion of the NFA might nonetheless be sustained under the Commerce Clause. The Silencer Shop decision notes, however, that Ardoin preceded the Supreme Court’s Lopez and Morrison rulings, which invalidated federal statutes like the Gun-Free Schools Act and the Violence Against Women Act as lacking a valid Commerce Clause basis.
That left only a potential Second Amendment challenge, but at oral argument all parties agreed that this issue need not be decided if the court concluded that the NFA provisions exceeded Congress’s powers. Consequently, the Second Amendment argument was deemed forfeited.
With these considerations, the court issued a permanent injunction barring the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives from enforcing the challenged NFA provisions as to untaxed firearms against the plaintiffs and, where applicable, the plaintiffs’ agencies, political subdivisions, members, and customers—both current and future. The plaintiffs encompass individuals, nonprofit associations, and businesses dealing in NFA firearms, alongside Texas and thirteen other states. The injunction’s reach is broad with respect to business activities, allowing sales to both current and prospective customers, but its reach is narrower for the fourteen state plaintiffs, who are not subject to the NFA requirements when the state itself and its political subdivisions acquire NFA firearms, though their citizens remain outside the injunction’s scope.
The contested firearms in Silencer Shop include short-barreled rifles, short-barreled shotguns, silencers, and “any other weapon[s]” (AOWs). The case was consolidated with Jensen v. ATF, and the court’s ruling largely applies to both actions, except that the Jensen plaintiffs did not raise an AOW claim, so the injunction does not extend to AOWs for those plaintiffs.
It is important to note that this is not a universal, nationwide injunction, a point precluded by the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. CASA (2025). Moreover, imposing a universal injunction would bypass ongoing challenges in the Eastern Districts of Missouri and Kentucky.
The court stayed the injunction for seven days to allow the government an opportunity to seek a stay from the Fifth Circuit, which is anticipated to grant a stay pending appeal. The underlying challenges could eventually reach the Supreme Court. Given the NFA’s historic rooting in the taxing power, plaintiffs may have reasons for measured optimism about a favorable outcome in the long run—even if it does not herald an immediate upheaval. It’s worth recalling that the Senate had been prepared to strike the affected firearms from the NFA entirely, but the Byrd Rule in reconciliation measures prevented that step, leaving the tax but removing the tax rate itself. See the author’s prior discussion for context.
As Winston Churchill remarked after the Allied victory at El Alamein, “This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is perhaps the end of the beginning.”
