Beginning in the summer of 2020, the private Charlotte Latin School began altering its curriculum to foreground contentious debates surrounding race and gender identity. At some point, the Turpin family learned that their sixth-grade child was being exposed to provocative, polarized notions, and that the material included statements such as Republicans being white supremacists. The school also required younger students to engage with books on sexuality and gender identity that many observers would deem inappropriate for their age.
Some excerpts from the long Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc., decided today by the N.C. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Richard Dietz, joined by Chief Justice Paul Newby and Justices Philip Berger Jr., Tamara Barringer, and Trey Allen:
According to the complaint in this case, Doug and Nicole Turpin enrolled their children at Charlotte Latin School, a private institution. Beginning in the summer of 2020, the school shifted its curriculum to emphasize politically charged topics about race and gender identity. At a point, the Turpins learned that the school was teaching their sixth-grader controversial ideas such as the notion that Republicans are white supremacists. The school also required young students to read books dealing with sexuality and gender identity that many deemed unsuitable for their age.
In 2021, the Turpins began organizing with other parents to express concerns about the school’s curriculum. After several steps, they arranged a meeting with school leadership. The meeting did not involve a sincere discussion of the Turpins’ concerns. Instead, the school terminated the Turpins’ enrollment contracts and expelled their children without any prior notice. The school also accused the Turpins of making racist remarks about non-white students and staff. In response, the Turpins filed this lawsuit, asserting a number of claims, including breach of contract, fraud, unfair or deceptive trade practices, and defamation.
While the subject matter of this dispute clearly touches on hot-button issues in today’s public discourse, none of those topics bear on the court’s legal questions. The central task is to assess whether the Turpins’ complaint satisfies the civil-court standard known as “notice pleading.” That standard requires a complaint to contain a concise and straightforward statement that informs the defendants about the events or transactions giving rise to the claim. When evaluating a complaint under this standard, courts accept the allegations as true and will not dismiss the case unless it is apparent that no set of facts could entitle the plaintiffs to relief.
There is a substantial amount of material in the 16,000-word set of opinions, but the essential point that allows the Turpins’ breach-of-contract claim to proceed is this:
The core of the contract claim centers on a termination clause that gives Charlotte Latin the authority to end enrollment if one of two contractual conditions is met…. The clause allows the School to “discontinue enrollment” whenever it determines that one of the two criteria is satisfied: (1) the parent’s actions make a constructive, cooperative relationship with the school impossible, or (2) the parent’s actions “seriously interfere” with the school’s mission:
A constructive, cooperative relationship between the School and a student’s parents/guardians is essential to fulfilling the School’s mission. Therefore, the School reserves the right to discontinue enrollment if it concludes that the actions of a parent/guardian render such a relationship impossible or seriously interfere with the School’s mission.
The Turpins contend that the school violated this termination provision and thus breached the contract. Their factual allegations are straightforward: Charlotte Latin asserted that it was terminating the students under this clause because the Turpins had made a cooperative relationship impossible or were seriously interfering with the school’s mission. Yet, according to the complaint, the school did not actually believe that to be true. The Turpins claim that the school chose to expel their children for reasons not permitted by the contract and then used the contractual grounds as a pretext.
Importantly, Charlotte Latin itself acknowledges that if the pretext were true—that is, if the school acted on a false premise—it would amount to a breach of contract. In its briefing, the school conceded that the Turpins could plausibly assert a claim based on “allegations of some improper pretext on Latin’s part—such as an attempt to escape a bad deal.” And at oral argument, Charlotte Latin again conceded that the termination clause “may not be invoked with a pretext or in bad faith.”
This is the precise theory the Turpins advance. They allege that the school operated under a false pretext and knew that the termination criteria were not actually satisfied. That is the central factual thread of the Turpins’ lengthy complaint: they maintain that Charlotte Latin recognized the Turpins were cooperative and respectful and understood that their views did not obstruct the school’s mission, a mission that — by its name and heritage — emphasizes classical discourse, rationality, and critical thinking. Yet the Turpins claim the school sought retaliation for unrelated reasons and used the contractual grounds as a pretext to do so.
Consequently, under the notice-pleading standard described above, the Turpins have presented a claim that survives the pleadings stage.
Of course, the Turpins cannot yet know the exact motive behind the pretext. How could they? They are not mind-readers. This is why, in cases like this, the kind of fact-centered assertions about a party’s state of mind cannot be completely worked out at the pleading stage. Instead, a party may generally allege intent, knowledge, and other mental states.
The complaint also sketches numerous alternative explanations for the alleged pretext. For example, the Turpins claim the school was harmed by what some describe as “cancel culture” in American society. They say they chose to resist that movement by establishing the Refocus Latin group to challenge it. The complaint hints that one possible motive for the school’s pretext was fear that, if they did not cancel the Turpins, the school’s own position might be canceled.
Justice Allison Riggs, joined by Justice Anita Earls, dissented in relevant part. In a lengthy opinion, the dissent argued that the school’s contracts with parents granted it broad, nearly unfettered discretion to terminate a student’s enrollment:
The Enrollment Agreement (EA) states that attending the School is a privilege, not a right, and that, in all cases, the School retains sole discretion to decide whether to admit or re-enroll a student. The Parent-School Partnership, incorporated into the EA, allows Charlotte Latin to terminate a student’s enrollment at any time, at its discretion, based on parental behavior. The termination clause reads:
A positive, collaborative working relationship between the School and a student’s parent/guardians is essential to the fulfillment of the School’s mission. Therefore, the School reserves the right to discontinue enrollment if it concludes that the actions of a parent/guardian make such a relationship impossible or seriously interfere with the School’s mission.
Under both provisions, Charlotte Latin is endowed with broad, indeed near-absolute, authority to terminate a student’s enrollment. Private schools negotiate these terms at the outset, and parents may choose other schools if they dislike the terms. Private schools, rooted in the freedom to contract and associate, are permitted to reject voices that differ from their own or to enforce contractual terms in a manner that may exclude independent thought, so long as they comply with applicable law. If the complaint argues that any stated reason for termination was a mere pretext—such as citing “cancel culture”—the dissent notes that the contract would still permit such action.
The PSP and EA expressly authorize unilateral termination at Charlotte Latin’s sole discretion whenever the school determines that the parent–school relationship has become untenable. The plain language of both instruments makes clear that the school alone decides when the relationship has become untenable, regardless of the majority’s attempt to distinguish Canteen. The Turpins chose to enroll their children and therefore accepted the broad discretion embedded in the termination clause, including the power to terminate for reasons they may not approve. They could have negotiated a clause narrowing the school’s unilateral termination power but did not. Consequently, Charlotte Latin retained the unilateral right to terminate enrollment whenever it decided the relationship was no longer tenable—whether the stated reason was even legitimate or merely pretext for disagreeing with the Turpins’ political views.
Whether the school terminated the children’s enrollment because of dissatisfaction with how the Turpins interacted with the school, disagreement over curriculum aligned with their political beliefs, or for any other reason not barred by anti-discrimination laws, the EA and PSP provided authority for the school to terminate unilaterally based on its own assessment of the future viability of the parent–school relationship. The school was entitled to decide that one or both grounds sufficed to end enrollment, irrespective of whether the stated rationale was a pretext designed to express disapproval of the Turpins’ views.
Separate posts on the fraud and defamation claims discussed in the opinions are anticipated.
Christopher S. Edwards, Alex C. Dale, and Alexandra E. Ferri (Ward and Smith, P.A.) and Jonathan A. Vogel (Vogel Law Firm PLLC) represented the Turpins.
