As a reminder of the ongoing divisions among courts on a broad spectrum of questions within the realm of pseudonymous litigation, Judge Kent Wetherell of the Northern District of Florida cited Doe v. Apple, Inc. this Wednesday.
The case is before the court on the plaintiff’s request to proceed under a pseudonym. No response from the defendant is necessary. Even if the defendant does not oppose the motion—which appears likely—the court is not required to grant it.
The plaintiff has brought several claims against Apple, Inc., related to the design, production, and marketing of the Apple AirTag. The claims stem from an alleged use of an AirTag by a former partner to stalk the plaintiff.
The plaintiff seeks permission to proceed anonymously because the litigation will necessitate exposing intimate aspects of her life connected to the stalking (for example, instances of domestic violence or sexual harassment). She is also worried that revealing her identity could enable her stalker to locate her, thereby creating a safety risk for her and her minor child.
“A party may proceed anonymously in federal court by establishing ‘a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.'” …
“[C]ourts have, however, often denied anonymity in cases where plaintiffs allege sexual assault, even when revealing the plaintiff’s identity may cause her some personal embarrassment.” … [T]he underlying facts of the complaint have also apparently already been aired in a state restraining-order proceeding….
The plaintiff’s speculative concern that identifying herself in this action will give her stalker “a direct avenue … to confirm her location, continue his surveillance, and further interfere with her safety” can be addressed through a protective order or by sealing specific documents filed in this case. Indeed, courts have denied permission to proceed anonymously in the face of more substantial threats of harm. See, e.g., In re Chiquita Brands Int’l Inc. (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming the district court’s denial of anonymity even after paramilitary actors “threatened and attacked a named bellwether plaintiff and her family four months after her deposition”).
[Moreover,] “[d]efendants have the right to know who their accusers are, as they may face embarrassment or fundamental unfairness if they do not.” “[I]f the complaint’s allegations cannot be substantiated, then anonymity provides a shield behind which defamatory charges may be launched without shame or liability, and it will be the [Defendant], not the Plaintiff, who bears the disgrace.”
The court did not overlook the fact that another district court granted the plaintiff leave to proceed anonymously in a substantially similar suit. Doe v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. (E.D. Pa. 2024). That decision is not binding and not even persuasive because it was decided under Third Circuit law rather than Eleventh Circuit law. Additionally, in giving substantial weight to the plaintiff’s “heightened fear for her personal safety if her stalker were to learn her home address or whereabouts,” the court apparently did not consider whether those concerns could be mitigated by a protective order or by sealing documents containing that information.
The Court also recognizes that plaintiffs in other cases brought against Apple by AirTag stalking victims in the E.D. Va., D. Nev., E.D.N.Y., and D. Ariz. have been allowed to proceed anonymously, but those decisions were textual-only orders that offered no analysis. Also, those rulings were presumably not based on Eleventh Circuit law. There also appear to be numerous other cases in which alleged AirTag stalking victims do not proceed anonymously, as reflected in the docket of the unsuccessful class action against Apple.
