For a large part of the Ukraine war there has been an asymmetry that is hard to ignore. Russia could strike virtually any point on Ukrainian territory while a substantial portion of its own rear area remained shielded from the direct consequences of the conflict. Moscow, Saint Petersburg, major industrial facilities or energy infrastructures located hundreds or thousands of kilometers from the front formed part of a geography seemingly distant from the war. Now, that is changing.
The intensification of Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory in recent months goes beyond the logic of retaliation. It is not merely about proving that Ukrainian drones can travel 2,000 kilometers and hit targets in Siberia or the Urals. What Kyiv is trying to build is a strategy aimed at shifting part of the cost of the war to Russia’s interior. And the choice of targets helps to understand that strategy quite well.
“What Kyiv is trying to build is a strategy aimed at shifting part of the cost of the war to the interior of Russia”
Refineries have become one of its main targets. During 2026, Ukraine has roughly doubled the frequency of attacks against these facilities, causing full or partial shutdowns and reducing the production of gasoline, diesel and aviation fuel. The campaign has reached facilities as important as Omsk, the largest Russian refinery, located about 2,700 kilometers from the territory controlled by Ukraine, as well as those in Moscow, Saratov, Yaroslavl, Orsk or TANECO. Some have been able to quickly regain part of their activity, but others have remained paralyzed for weeks or months.
Ukraine can hardly destroy the Russian oil industry, but it does not need to. In this sense, the strategy is to introduce enough friction into the system to gradually raise the economic and logistical costs of the war. Some results are beginning to be visible.
The fuel supply difficulties, initially concentrated in Crimea and the southern regions near the front, have this summer spread to other parts of the country, including the capital. Gas stations have faced restrictions, queues and distribution problems. The Russian government has had to intervene to protect the domestic market and has extended the restrictions on gasoline exports until January 2027, while also maintaining limits on diesel. In the latter case, Moscow plans to extend in September the ban affecting producers. In this regard, that one of the world’s leading oil producers must restrict exports of derivatives to guarantee domestic supply constitutes, at the very least, an indicator that the attacks are producing effects.
“The Russian government has had to intervene to protect the domestic market and restrict gasoline and diesel exports”
However, reducing the Ukrainian strategy to oil would be a mistake. The attacks also hit warehouses, logistics centers, factories related to the military industry, airfields, ports and transportation infrastructure. In other words, Ukraine is trying to strike not only the resources with which Russia finances the war, but also the networks that allow it to sustain it. This introduces another particularly important dimension. Russia has a gigantic territory and protecting it is extraordinarily costly. Therefore, every air defense system Moscow has to deploy to shield a refinery or any other strategic infrastructure far from the front is a resource that becomes unavailable elsewhere. Moreover, drones are relatively cheap and force the use of far more expensive defensive systems and, above all, to disperse them.
The war of attrition reaches the Russian rear
The war is set in a classic logic of attrition, albeit adapted to 21st-century technologies. It is not necessarily about permanently destroying infrastructure. It may be sufficient to compel the adversary to repair it, defend it, disperse resources, alter logistics routes and continually bear new costs.
To this is added a political dimension. Since the start of the invasion, the Kremlin has sought to maintain a certain separation between the war and the daily life of a large portion of the Russian population. The partial mobilization of 2022 briefly broke that barrier, but the implicit contract continued to function: the war could go on as long as its consequences remained comparatively distant from the main urban centers. But drones are also eroding that distance.
The closures of airports, disruptions in transport, fuel restrictions and the recurrent arrival of drones to the Moscow region make the conflict increasingly tangible for a part of Russian society. Ukraine aims to bring the war into the homes of those who until now could observe it from afar.
“Since the start of the invasion, the Kremlin has sought to maintain a certain separation between the war and the daily life of a large part of the Russian population”
Here, however, the results are much harder to measure. Nothing suggests that the attacks are generating a significant backlash against Vladimir Putin. They could even have the opposite effect and reinforce the Kremlin’s narrative that Russia is not waging a war of choice against Ukraine, but defending itself from external aggression. And this leads to the main limitation of the Ukrainian strategy. Inflicting costs does not necessarily alter the adversary’s political behavior.
So far, Russia has shown considerable adaptability. During the course of the war, it has shifted production among refineries, reorganized logistics chains, increased protection for certain facilities, and borne significant economic costs without decisively altering its military strategy. In this regard, there are also no signs that Putin is willing to substantially modify his terms for negotiations as a result of these attacks.
That is precisely why its reaction is so important. On 22 August, the Russian president accused Ukraine of having opened a Pandora’s box through attacks on economic targets and warned that Russia would respond by striking the most sensitive sectors of the Ukrainian economy. Beyond rhetoric, the statement reveals that Moscow perceives the Ukrainian campaign has entered a terrain that could produce strategic costs.
“There are no signs that Putin is willing to substantially alter his terms for a negotiation as a consequence of these attacks”
This means that Ukraine is not using deep strikes solely to improve its military position, but is also trying to build negotiating leverage. In a war where Russia controls part of Ukrainian territory and maintains significant material advantages, Kyiv needs tools that allow it to impose costs beyond the front line. The ability to threaten Russian energy, industrial and logistical infrastructure in a sustained way constitutes one of those tools. It does not substitute territory, but provides a form of pressure that Ukraine can activate, intensify, or potentially limit in a negotiation.
Here the question is not whether Ukraine is capable of defeating Russia by attacking its refineries, because it is clear that it cannot. But one must ask how much economic, logistical and political damage Russia can absorb before continuing the war becomes progressively more costly. For now, the answer remains uncertain.
The Ukrainians are achieving evident tactical results and some important operational effects. They have shown that Russia’s strategic depth no longer guarantees security, have compelled Moscow to redistribute defensive resources and are generating real disturbances in the energy market. But Ukraine is still far from turning those successes into a strategic shift by the Kremlin. We are, therefore, looking at a race of endurance. On one side, Ukraine’s ability to systematically raise the costs of the war. On the other, Russia’s ability to absorb them, adapt, and continue fighting.
“Ukraine is still far from turning those successes into a strategic shift by the Kremlin. We are, therefore, facing a race of endurance”
Taking another step, there is reason for concern that this dynamic could be opening a new phase of the conflict. If Moscow fulfills its threat to respond systematically against Ukraine’s most sensitive economic sectors, the war of attrition will cease to be fought primarily on the battlefield. Energy infrastructure, logistics networks, exports, industries and, ultimately, the everyday functioning of both states will become an increasingly explicit part of the battlefield.
Thus, after four and a half years of war, it is no longer about who can advance a few more kilometers, but about who can endure the cost of continuing it for longer.
