From today’s decision by Judge Rebecca Brady Jennings (W.D. Ky.) in Doe v. Blanche:
Plaintiff has not offered facts or circumstances that set this case apart from routine discrimination claims based on the same or similar medical conditions alleged by the plaintiff, nor has Doe demonstrated why the confidentiality of Doe’s medical information cannot be safeguarded by a standard protective order. While the court recognizes that stigma persists around this medical condition, it is evident that a number of comparable cases have proceeded without the use of a pseudonym, as shown by several precedents.
Doe contends that the information likely to be disclosed in the suit would be extremely private and could subject him to reputational harm and collateral consequences stemming from sensitive personal history, such as prior substance abuse. However, he fails to explain how these matters warrant the highest privacy protections or why they could not be fully or at least partially shielded by a protective order or anonymity. Multiple courts have explained that information of the utmost privacy concerns includes matters of a highly intimate nature, such as birth control, abortion, homosexuality, or the welfare rights of illegitimate children or abandoned families. The topics raised by Plaintiff do not fit within any of those described categories.
Doe’s arguments about a general risk of harm to his professional reputation likewise fail to justify anonymity. Courts, as a general rule, consistently hold that fears of social embarrassment, humiliation, or damage to one’s reputation, standing alone, are not sufficient to permit a plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym.
Similarly, concerns about future employment background checks or corporate scrutiny do not meet the standard of “utmost intimacy.” Instead, these financial risks embody the types of concerns harbored by other similarly situated employees who file retaliation lawsuits under their real names.
Court decisions are all over the map on whether someone can sue pseudonymously to avoid disclosure of various mental conditions, see The Law of Pseudonymous Litigation pp. 1437-41 (Appendices 3a & 3b).
