Matt Zwolinski is correct in pointing out that democracy generally performs better than authoritarian systems, yet he errs in making democracy a central libertarian objective. In addition, recent developments reaffirm how pertinent and influential long-standing libertarian critiques of democracy’s weaknesses remain.
Ask someone what a classical liberal believes, and you’ll get a familiar list. Classical liberals stand for private property. They stand for free markets and limited government. They believe in the rule of law, free trade, free speech, and religious toleration. Give or take an item or two, you’ll find something like this list in any textbook summary, or on the “about” page of most classical liberal think tanks. And it’s a good list, as far as it goes. Each of those commitments has a long history in the tradition, and each has been defended by some of its best minds.
The problem with the list is what’s not on it: democracy. It’s not that classical liberals oppose democracy, exactly. Most of us don’t. And almost none of us would trade it for any of the alternatives actually on offer. But democracy isn’t what classical liberals are known for. It’s not part of the brand. Indeed, if you spend much time in classical liberal circles, you’re much more likely to hear about democracy’s defects than about its accomplishments. We might tolerate democracy, but we rarely sing its praises.
My goal in this essay is to argue that democracy belongs on the list, and that it belongs there for the same reason the other items do: because it is a way of keeping power in check. Democracy’s distinctive function is to keep power contestable, so that the people who hold it can be removed without violence.
I agree in part, but also differ on some key points. Libertarians should generally prefer democracy to other forms of government. But democracy should not be a first-order libertarian priority. And recent events make libertarian critiques of democracy even more important and timely than in the past. There is also a question of comparative advantage. Most libertarian scholars and policy analysts are better-positioned to do the work of explaining why democracy needs to be constrained than to extol its virtues relative to authoritarianism. Others can do the latter task as well or better than we can.
To avoid terminological confusion, I should note that I prefer to use “libertarian,” whereas Zwolinski uses “classical liberal” to denote essentially the same ideology. But nothing of significance hinges on this terminological difference. Elsewhere, I have argued that there is no meaningful distinction between “libertarian” and “classical liberal”; I prefer the former for largely esthetic reasons. But I have no beef with people who prefer “classical liberal.” My reservations about Zwolinski’s position lie elsewhere.
Why Democracy Is (Generally) Superior to Authoritarian Rule
First, a few points of agreement. A vast amount of empirical evidence shows that people living under democratic regimes enjoy greater freedom and higher living standards than those under autocratic systems. Moreover, Zwolinski is right to note that democracy can serve as a meaningful brake on power. In particular, democratic governance makes it harder for leaders to harm the majority in stark, conspicuous ways. As a dramatic illustration, economist Amartya Sen famously observed that famines are virtually unheard of in democracies, whereas they are not uncommon under dictatorships. Even voters without much information tend to notice a famine, assign blame to incumbents, and punish them at the ballot box. The same pattern applies to other large-scale disasters.
Few libertarians dispute these observations. I have echoed them in several works that scrutinize democracy, including my own Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government Is Smarter. Yet some would argue these points deserve greater emphasis.
Democracy as a Secondary, Instrumental Value
At the same time, this does not entail that democracy should be treated as a foundational libertarian goal on par with liberty itself, coercion restraint, property rights, or the broad aim of increasing human flourishing. Once you recognize (as most libertarians and many other liberals do) that democratic government is not truly consensual, and that democratically enacted policies are not above moral scrutiny, it becomes harder to claim democracy is valuable in and of itself. Rather, democracy should be viewed as an institutional instrument that, when properly harnessed, can help secure genuine, foundational values. In this sense it resembles other structural arrangements—federalism, the separation of powers, and judicial review—which can be immensely useful without being valuable simply because they exist. If a unitary state without checks and balances or without judicial oversight could advance liberty and happiness better than available alternatives, libertarians should back it. The same logic applies to a hypothetical non-democratic regime capable of achieving similar outcomes.
Zwolinski criticizes F.A. Hayek for stating in a 1981 interview that he would “prefer a liberal dictator to a democratic government lacking liberalism.” To the extent Zwolinski means that a dictatorship is unlikely to be liberal, he is correct. Yet Hayek did not claim such a liberal dictatorship was likely. Quite the opposite, as Zwolinski notes elsewhere in his essay, Hayek recognized that liberal values are generally best served under democracy rather than under rule by a dictatorship, even writing that “the consistent application of liberal principles… leads to democracy.”
Nevertheless, in a hypothetical scenario where a dictatorship truly embodies more liberal aims than any feasible democratic alternative, the former would indeed be a lesser evil than the latter. There are almost no historical examples of regimes that fully safeguard liberal values, even when compared to comparatively well-functioning liberal democracies. Yet there are exceptional circumstances in which a non-democratic government could be less illiberal than democracy would be in the same situation.
Notable illustrations include the Allied occupation of Germany and Japan following World War II. In both cases, the occupying authorities were non-democratic and governed for several years. Given the deeply illiberal mood of German and Japanese publics at the time, an immediate transition to democracy might well have given rise to another fascist restoration. Even after democracy was established, the new governments restricted the range of parties that could contest elections. For instance, West Germany long barred both Nazi and Communist candidates from holding elected office.
I won’t go into exhaustive detail. But analogous measures may be necessary to effect a transition to liberal democracy in some of today’s deeply illiberal states, such as Russia and China. Hayek’s intuition that “a dictatorship may be a necessary system during a transitional period” was not entirely unfounded.
Zwolinski correctly warns that even a seemingly liberal dictatorship can become oppressive. Yet the same risk also exists in a democracy where majority opinion is deeply illiberal and where institutional constraints on power are weak. Which danger is greater will depend on the circumstances. In most cases, democracy poses a smaller danger than despotic rule, but exceptions do arise.
The Ongoing—and Growing—Relevance of Libertarian Critiques of Democracy
An electorate of well-informed, impartial voters committed to liberal principles would not elevate communists, fascists, or other illiberal ideologies to power. But, as I recently argued in my Liberalism.Org contribution (which Zwolinski cites in his piece), real-world voters are frequently systematically ignorant, often misjudge the information they encounter, and sometimes hold deeply illiberal values.
These weaknesses of democracy—voter ignorance and bias, the tyranny of the majority, and openings for illiberal movements to seize control through democratic channels—are persistent vulnerabilities that libertarian scholars have long studied. As explained in my Liberalism.Org article and elsewhere, these concerns are especially salient in the current era of resurgent right-wing nationalist movements in Europe and North America. Where these movements have gained traction, it is largely by exploiting voter ignorance and bias and by leveraging expansive government to push through oppressive agendas. Libertarians have historically, and rightly, warned that broad regulatory authority and emergency powers can be subverted for illiberal ends, and that voter ignorance magnifies these threats. The recent rise of figures like Donald Trump and comparable leaders abroad has underscored the plausibility of these fears more vividly than almost any other development in recent memory.
New developments also reinforce the merit of libertarian solutions to democracy’s flaws, which emphasize limiting and decentralizing governmental power rather than hoping for the “right” people to ascend to office. James Madison famously warned that “[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.” A credibly informed and unprejudiced electorate is not guaranteed, and those voters who lack enlightenment will often propel the unenlightened into power.
Powers that cannot be entrusted to those who are unacquainted with truth and justice must be eliminated or at least tightly constrained. And many powers cannot be wielded justly even by well-meaning leaders. Accordingly, I have argued that agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission and Immigration and Customs Enforcement should be terminated, not merely reformed. The Trump era demonstrates how leaders with an authoritarian bent can misuse such agencies, yet the same injustices occur under more conventional administrations, partly because voters still fail to recognize and curb abuses.
Ironically, the revival of right-wing nationalist authoritarianism is one of the key factors driving Zwolinski and others to advocate greater praise for democracy. In reality, this trend highlights why our critiques of democracy’s failings matter more than ever. If these weaknesses go unaddressed, they can foster policies that are profoundly oppressive and, in the worst scenarios, erode democracy itself.
Non-libertarian liberals should acknowledge that the libertarian critique of democracy has more merit than many previously supposed, even if they still disagree with us on other issues. Libertarians, in turn, should recognize that in many parts of the world today, the rise of right-wing nationalists poses a greater threat to libertarian values and priorities than does the political left. Our analyses of democracy remain relevant to these right-wing challenges as much as to left-wing ones, perhaps even more so. Accepting this may require a difficult shift in mindset for some, but it is a necessary step.
Finally, there is the question of comparative advantage. Libertarians are a small faction with finite resources. With that in mind, we should concentrate our efforts where they can yield the greatest gains for freedom. In that light, libertarian scholars and policy analysts are especially well-placed to identify and address the principal weaknesses of democracy, including voter ignorance and bias and the tyranny of the majority, among others. Libertarian thinkers have already made substantial contributions to examining these issues and proposing viable remedies (I outline some of these in my recent Liberalism.Org piece, and here).
By contrast, more often than not we lack any unique edge when it comes to praising democracy relative to authoritarianism. Other strands of liberal thought can undertake this task with equal or greater effectiveness. Where necessary, we can and should remind people that, on the whole, democracy fares better than authoritarianism. We should also distance ourselves from the handful of self-described libertarians who view authoritarian rule as generally favorable (Zwolinski rightly criticizes Hans-Hermann Hoppe on this point). Still, in most circumstances, that should not be the principal focus of our work.
In a society dominated by libertarian ideas, it might seem sensible for a sizable share of libertarians to devote nearly all their efforts to explaining why democracy outperforms authoritarianism and to keeping fellow libertarians from taking democracy-skepticism too far. But that is not the world we inhabit, and it is unlikely to become so anytime soon.
In the actual situation we face, most libertarians can best advance the cause of freedom by sharpening and expanding our critiques of democracy’s weaknesses. This approach not only reinforces liberal values more broadly but also offers the most effective defense of democracy itself against its own vulnerabilities that can empower authoritarian forces capable of dismantling it.
