Continuing with its founding logic, the focus of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is placed on its eastern European flank, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to be at its doors for more than four years. This has not only dramatically shaped the Alliance’s political priorities, restoring collective defense as its principal purpose in the 2022 Strategic Concept after decades of crisis management outside the Euro-Atlantic area, but it has also directly affected its territorial security: several airspace violations, along with other hybrid attacks, have occurred within NATO since the war began.
Last week Moscow again threatened NATO with direct nuclear confrontation, this time over unfounded claims of a potential blockade of Kaliningrad, prompted by allied military exercises routinely conducted in the Baltic region near the Russian enclave, but not aimed at it. This geographic emphasis is further underscored by the number of forecasts warning of a possible Russian attack on an eastern flank country before 2030. Yet NATO’s 360-degree approach makes clear that its deterrence functions extend to all geographies of the Alliance to which it is legally obliged.
“The 360-degree approach of NATO makes clear that its deterrence functions extend to all geographies of the Alliance to which it is legally obliged”
In a striking coincidence of fate, on July 30, 2026, when Poland endured the latest Russian missile incursion onto allied soil, something no less serious happened to one of NATO’s southern members: the Autonomous City of Ceuta was overwhelmed by the arrival of about 80,000 irregular migrants entering from Morocco, triggering one of the most serious political crises in Spain in the last decade and raising questions about the security apparatus protecting the Spanish overseas enclave.
The Alliance’s most explicit stance on the situation came through the involvement of Javier Colomina, NATO’s Special Representative for the Southern Neighborhood, in a security dialogue in Madrid, who chose not to speak extensively about the internal affairs of an ally without Spain first bringing the crisis to the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Nevertheless, he acknowledged the “reality” of the use of irregular migration as a weapon of hybrid warfare and, in a personal vein, stated that he had no doubt that NATO would respond if Spain decided to invoke Article 5 for an attack in Ceuta or Melilla.
First of all, it is important to remember that the coordination and management of migratory and humanitarian crises is not NATO’s raison d’être. Regardless of the magnitude of the crisis and its consequences, asking NATO for cooperation or labeling the incident as an “armed attack” are not the instinctive institutional steps to take. However, the Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, defined what happened as a “violation of Spain’s territorial integrity”, which is one of the reasons to convene all allies in consultation under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
“The coordination and management of migratory and humanitarian crises is not NATO’s raison d’être”
In fact, NATO has previously dealt with episodes of massive border-crossings: in November 2021, the NAC publicly condemned Belarus’s instrumentalization of migratory flows against the borders of its eastern flank. The difference in NATO’s reaction to the two crises does not come from a east-west divide, but from political caution in the absence of a specific attribution of responsibility: while Poland, Latvia and Lithuania accused Lukashenko’s regime of instrumentalizing migrants, the Spanish government has repeatedly refused to attribute the design or the execution of the mass entry into Ceuta to Moroccan authorities, arguing that it lacks concrete evidence to support such a conclusion.
Although a Spanish National Police report has pointed to the involvement of Moroccan gendarmerie in directing large groups toward the Morocco–Ceuta border (Pedro Sánchez confirmed on September 3 in the Congress that the border crossings were temporarily allowed by the Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie), and although the European People’s Party (EPP), the European Parliament’s largest political group, issued a statement asserting that “Moroccan authorities are responsible, whether by action or omission, since the invasion originated from their territory”, the lack of an official attribution of responsibility to a specific actor by the Spanish Government leaves NATO with little room to intervene.
Second, legally speaking, despite Ceuta being a Spanish border and thus part of the European Union (EU), Ceuta does not fall under the remit of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the geographic scope of armed attacks capable of triggering the collective defense under Article 5 includes, among other cases, those directed against “the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or in North America […] or against the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” This explains why the Canary Islands are considered NATO territory, while technically French Guiana is not.
“The lack of an official attribution of responsibility to a specific actor by the Spanish Government leaves NATO with little room to intervene”
Therefore, the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla, located on the African continent, are not technically covered by NATO’s protection umbrella. With Spain not being a founding member in 1949, the specific inclusion of the two Spanish enclaves within the territorial extension of Article 6, as France did with its former Algerian departments (a decision reversed in 1963 by the NAC after Algeria’s independence), was not possible. It is worth noting that, when asked to clarify the Alliance’s position on Ceuta and Melilla during the Madrid Summit, former Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg affirmed that “NATO is there to protect all Allies against any threat.”
To formally extend NATO protection to Ceuta and Melilla, the North Atlantic Treaty would have to be amended or a political agreement reached among the 32 allied nations. Given Rabat’s special relationship with Washington, Paris, and the current Madrid government, it seems unlikely that this will happen. Yet, there are two main incentives that could push NATO to officially signal its support for the territorial integrity, security, and stability of Ceuta and Melilla without finger-pointing.
Strengthening NATO’s Europeanization
After decades of overreliance on American security guarantees, Europe is assuming more responsibility for its own defense. This rebalancing of burdens within the transatlantic bond has materialized in the budgetary sphere through the La Haya Summit Declaration of 2025, raising allied defense spending commitments to 5% of GDP by 2035, and militarily via “NATO 3.0,” the redefinition of the U.S. Department of War’s European presence, which implies that Europe takes a lead role in finally shaping NATO.
“After decades of overreliance on American security guarantees, Europe is taking more responsibility for its own defense”
According to the NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte, “to stay transatlantic, NATO is becoming more European,” a trend already visible in the interinstitutional framework linking NATO and the EU. For the first time in history, the U.S. General Alexus Grynkewich, SACEUR of NATO, addressed the European Parliament’s Committee on Security and Defense last week, marking a milestone in EU-NATO relations. This enhanced cooperation has also extended to jointly addressing Russian hybrid threats, such as the drone attack attempt at Leipzig Airport, which prompted a meeting between Rutte and the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen.
During the State of the Union Address (SOTEU) in 2026, President von der Leyen conveyed the EU’s full solidarity with the people of Ceuta and reaffirmed the city’s Spanish and European identity. The following day, the European Parliament approved a resolution denouncing “the instrumentalization of irregular migration as a tool of hybrid warfare”. It has become clear that, just as in the EU’s eastern border crisis in 2021, part of the solution to the Ceuta situation must—and will—come from Brussels.
The assessment offered by NATO’s Special Representative for the Southern Neighborhood does not differ substantially from that of the European Parliament, and if NATO is truly becoming more European, then it has a vital strategic interest in strengthening EU unity and protecting the external borders of the territories that belong to both organizations, including Ceuta and Melilla.
“If NATO is really becoming more European, then it has a vital strategic interest in strengthening EU unity and protecting its external borders”
The political consequences of some European countries’ responses to the Ceuta crisis have sparked accusations of a lack of European solidarity and have rekindled old north-south fractures in the EU’s migratory crisis management. These splits only embolden the Alliance’s adversaries and undermine the unity needed to bolster European defense industry and bring transatlantic defense markets closer together.
In an increasingly complex geopolitical environment, NATO must address all threats directed at its allies, regardless of who perpetrates them or where they occur. If a small city can become such a bottleneck for European cohesion, the future of Ceuta and Melilla should matter to a NATO that is becoming more European.
Reigniting defense ties with Spain
Spain’s accession to NATO is a complex tale. Officially a member since 1982, that same year the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, originally opposed to membership under the slogan “NATO no, bases out,” won the elections. Once in power, Prime Minister Felipe González changed his mind, deeming Spain’s continued presence in the organization a strategic necessity, but fulfilled his promise to give the Spanish people a voice in a referendum. In 1986, under the tagline “In Spain’s interest, vote yes,” 56.85% of voters supported the government’s decision to remain in the Euro-Atlantic alliance, much to the discontent of numerous anti-NATO sociopolitical organizations that emerged at the time.
Despite proving to be a loyal and reliable ally, and despite the 85% of Spaniards supporting remaining in NATO, the legacy of this history still has consequences today, reflected in the defense spending debate. Since Spain challenged the 5% requirement and capped its defense spending at 2.1% of GDP, Pedro Sánchez and Mark Rutte have been entangled in a tacit disagreement over Spain’s ability to meet its capability goals with fewer financial resources.
Spain’s relationship with NATO has also been affected by disagreements between Pedro Sánchez and Donald Trump regarding Spain’s defense investments and the Spanish government’s decision to not allow U.S. ships to resupply in transit to Iran at Spain’s bases in Rota and Morón, which host a significant number of American forces and assets. All in all, this has generated some friction between NATO leadership and the Spanish government.
Now that Spain faces a critical security challenge, the Ceuta crisis could be an opportunity to revive NATO-Spain relations. Expressing solidarity with Ceuta in the face of challenges to its sovereignty and territorial integrity could boost confidence in the Alliance among the Spanish public, 55% of whom view Morocco as Spain’s greatest external threat, by addressing one of Spain’s most urgent security concerns.
“Now that Spain is facing a critical security challenge, the Ceuta crisis could be an opportunity to reignite NATO-Spain relations”
That same logic could apply to the Spanish government, which would see the Alliance more engaged in defending its national security interests. Indeed, in the past Spain has been very receptive to NATO efforts to give greater attention to threats emanating from the Alliance’s southern flank: during the 2024 Washington Summit, Pedro Sánchez celebrated the adoption of NATO’s first Southern Neighborhood Action Plan, noting that jointly tackling challenges from the south—whether stemming from terrorism, disinformation campaigns, or climate change—is of strategic importance to Spain.
Spain is an essential NATO member due to its participation in some of the Alliance’s most important initiatives and its cultural and political ties that connect not only Europe and North America but also Ibero-America and North Africa. The key to repairing NATO-Spain relations may lie in the Alliance’s recognition of Spain’s legitimate security interests in Ceuta and Melilla, which could also provide a more constructive turn to the debate on defense spending in Spain.
