Javi López and Dave Keating: Europe’s Future Will Be Decided on 29 November

There is a paradox in Brussels that cannot be ignored. The European People’s Party backs Ursula von der Leyen’s governing majority alongside socialists and liberals, while leaning on the radical right to secure votes for certain policies. It is a pattern that is generating mounting tensions and could become even more brittle if the 29 November ballot leaves Pedro Sánchez outside La Moncloa.

To gauge how much longer this arrangement might endure, I traveled to Brussels to talk with Javi López and Dave Keating, two observers who know how European institutions function from distinct vantage points: one participates in the decision-making process, while the other reports on it from the capital. Yet both converge on the notion that the Spanish prime minister wields considerable influence over the European centre-left, even though López stresses that the stakes extend beyond Spain’s leadership: “Europe does not need an institutional crisis right now”.

The balance of power in the European Parliament is merely the starting point. The discussion also traverses the surge of the radical right in Germany, the possibility of a Marine Le Pen presidency in France, trade ties with China, and the implications of US elections for Europe. It also shifts to Ceuta, where the European response has once again revived the debate about solidarity among member states. Keating points to the underlying contradiction: “There is an official majority supporting von der Leyen, and an unofficial right-wing majority used to pass particular measures”.
 

Editor’s note: This interview has been edited for length and clarity. The written version may therefore differ from the video.

Spain is steering toward a general election, and Sánchez has emerged as one of Europe’s most prominent centre-left figures. Given how national politics now shapes decisions in Brussels, what would a change of government in Spain mean for the European Union?

Javi López (J. L.): Pedro Sánchez is arguably the most influential centre-left leader in Europe since Tony Blair. This is partly because he has achieved electoral success in a major European country and partly because his political approach has influenced the broader European centre-left as a whole.

We have demonstrated that economic growth and a robust social model can go hand in hand. You can foster growth without slashing wages or public investment, while pursuing an industrial policy, a green transition, and a credible international stance committed to defending international law.

“Pedro Sánchez is probably the most influential leader of the European centre-left since Tony Blair”

Sánchez has challenged assumptions on Gaza, migration, transatlantic relations, Iran and the green agenda. He has also helped maintain some balance within the European Council, where the progressive camp remains underrepresented. I hope he continues to lead Spain. Otherwise, we risk entrenching centre-right dominance, with an increasing influence from the radical right at the heart of European decision-making.

Dave Keating (D. K.): I share the view that Sánchez is the most important centre-left figure since Tony Blair. But that says more about the beleaguered state of the European left than about Sánchez himself. Who else could lay claim to that role? Olaf Scholz? François Hollande? Sánchez stands almost as the last remaining exponent.

The centre-left wields little clout within the European Council. Mette Frederiksen has shifted markedly to the right on several issues, Malta carries limited political weight, and Sweden may install another centre-left prime minister. But without Sánchez, the traditional centre-left would lose almost its sole conspicuous voice at that table.

“But without Sánchez, the traditional centre-left would lose almost its only prominent voice at that table”

There could also be consequences in the European Parliament. There have been reports that Iratxe García, the S&D leader, intends to withdraw from the centrist coalition backing Ursula von der Leyen. Socialist MEPs are frustrated by the increasing collaboration between the European People’s Party and the radical right to push legislation. Some want a formal agreement with the EPP, including limits on that cooperation.

According to those reports, Sánchez has played a key role in preventing a rupture. So even if he is not particularly enthused about von der Leyen, he may be helping to sustain her parliamentary majority. His departure could alter that.

Javi, conservatives, socialists and liberals have long been the political families driving European integration. But today their relationship appears to be under substantial strain. How fragile is that majority, and what is the main source of tension?

J. L.: Incredibly fragile. We are locked in a precarious equilibrium. Yet the real question is not which country governs, but the direction of European policy. If the agenda fixates on restrictive migration policies, deregulation, and weakening the Green Deal, the Socialist group will withdraw its support.

“If the agenda fixates on restrictive migration policies, deregulation and weakening the Green Deal, the Socialist group will withdraw its support”

I am proud of the previous mandate: common borrowing, NextGenerationEU, our response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the European Green Deal. The current mandate, by contrast, has been disappointing. We repeatedly talk about competitiveness and European sovereignty, yet we do far too little to deliver either.

Our response to the new geopolitical environment has been weak. We have not mustered the political strength to establish a credible European voice in the world. Europe does not need an institutional crisis right now. We want to help, but sustaining a pro-European majority requires an agenda capable of holding it together.

Dave, at a moment when Europe requires greater unity, the alliance that has long underpinned European integration is under pressure. What would it signify if the Socialists broke with the centrist majority backing Ursula von der Leyen?

D. K.: The first question is what form the opposition would take in practice. If it culminated in a successful no-confidence vote, the entire Commission would have to be replaced. That would take time, there is no obvious successor to von der Leyen, and the Socialists could lose their most important commissioner, Teresa Ribera. Those are significant risks.

“If it ultimately led to a successful vote of no confidence, the entire Commission would have to be replaced”

But the EPP has dominated European politics for more than twenty years. There has been no centre-left Commission president since 2004, and the EPP has been the largest group in Parliament since 1999. The Parliament is now the institution where S&D has its strongest leverage, because it remains the second-largest group.
 

You have described the European Parliament as the Socialist movement’s main remaining leverage. Is this because the European Council is politically unbalanced, or does it reflect simply the governments that voters choose?

D. K.: European voters continue to elect centre-right governments. That is democracy. The European Council mirrors the governments voters opt for, though I am not sure citizens always grasp how consistently that has kept the centre-right in control at the EU level.

The European Parliament is more evenly balanced politically. That is why some Socialists think they should use their leverage: at least threaten to withdraw support unless the EPP commits to a more stable coalition agreement and ceases collaborating with the radical right. That is the argument I hear.

J. L.: Precisely. No parliament can function sustainably with two competing governing majorities. Yet the EPP seeks to work with the radical right on deregulation and migration while relying on the pro-European majority for institutional appointments and the EU budget. That arrangement cannot endure indefinitely. Sooner or later, it will trigger a major political accident.

“No parliament can function sustainably with two competing governing majorities”

The midterm negotiations in Parliament present an opportunity to reconstruct a stable majority. What matters is not merely who gets which post, but whether a political program can be agreed upon: investment, industrial policy, the green transition, and greater sovereignty in security and digital technology. That requires resources, appropriate rules, and above all, political will.

D. K.: And the contradiction is striking. After the 2024 European elections, the EPP vowed to maintain the cordon sanitaire and cooperate with liberals and the centre-left. Yet it has increasingly allied with the radical right in individual votes. There is an official majority backing von der Leyen, and an unofficial right-wing majority used to pass particular measures.

In Germany, Friedrich Merz’s CDU/CSU still refuses to govern with the AfD and instead collaborates with the centre-left. In Brussels, the same political family collaborates with parties further to the right. I do not believe the public fully understands that inconsistency.

In Germany, the CDU continues to refuse cooperation with the AfD, but that separation appears less assured elsewhere and even at the European level. Could the pattern we are observing in Brussels eventually extend to a German federal government?

D. K.: Germany is increasingly the exception. Elsewhere, centre-right forces have already made accommodations with the radical right. In Sweden, the centre-right has depended on the Sweden Democrats. In Italy, Forza Italia governs with Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy. There are similar examples in Finland.

J. L.: I agree. Cooperation with the radical right has become, for much of the European centre-right, a normal practice, even in Brussels. I think it undermines the democratic consensus that underpinned European integration, and it can damage traditional conservative parties themselves. Look at what happened to them in countries like Italy and France.

But does that mean the cordon sanitaire is enough to defeat the radical right? Not at all. It can limit these parties’ influence over core political decisions, but it does not answer why people vote for them. We must understand the fear and insecurity they exploit, and offer protection, stability, confidence in our institutions, and a credible sense of hope.

D. K.: There is a counterargument to the cordon sanitaire: parties permanently barred from government can criticise everything without ever bearing responsibility. The Netherlands provides an interesting test case. Geert Wilders’s party joined a government, that government collapsed, and the party subsequently lost support — but it did not disappear.

“Governing may expose a party’s limitations, but there is no guarantee it will weaken it”

I imagine some in Spain share a similar view about granting Vox ministerial power and letting voters see the difference between rhetoric and governance. The risk is real: governing could reveal a party’s limits, yet it does not guarantee a loss of support. Wilders’s party nevertheless finished second.

J. L.: I remain a proponent of the cordon sanitaire. It protects an essential democratic consensus, even if it cannot be the sole electoral strategy. That is another reason the Spanish election matters: it will affect both the centre-left’s voice in Europe and the balance among political forces in European institutions.
 

Let us imagine that the AfD becomes Germany’s largest party at the next federal election, as some polls suggest. Even if it cannot govern alone, could its influence alter Berlin’s posture toward Russia or its support for Ukraine? How realistic is that scenario?

D. K.: For now, the mainstream parties say they would keep the AfD out of government even if it finished first. Germany’s electoral system also makes a clear AfD majority unlikely.

Could the CDU/CSU eventually shift course and bring it into a coalition? It is imaginable. It might hope that governing responsibilities reveal the AfD’s weaknesses. Yet I find it hard to picture the CDU entrusting it with the Foreign or Defence ministries, which would involve direct dealings with Russia and support for Ukraine. Its influence would hinge on the role it played in government. I do not currently see a realistic scenario with an AfD chancellor. Javi, do you share this view?

J. L.: In broad terms, yes. I think Germany still has sufficient institutional safeguards. The AfD is among the most extreme parties on the European radical right. I strongly disagree with Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, but they are not the same as the AfD.

D. K.: And Meloni is pro-Ukraine.

J. L.: Exactly. She also broadly respects the existing EU institutional framework. An AfD-led Germany could signify something fundamentally different — perhaps even the end of the European Union as we know it.

“An AfD-led Germany could represent something fundamentally different — even the end of the European Union as we know it”

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But the question that interests me most is how to prevent that scenario. Germany has endured years of economic stagnation. The radical right blames migration, EU regulation, China and other external forces, but the deeper problem is that Germany’s traditional economic model no longer works.

Javi has just outlined the challenges facing Germany’s economic framework and the need for a stronger European industrial policy. Dave, France and Germany have now issued a joint stance on China. Why is Berlin’s shift meaningful, and how might other member states respond?

D. K.: It marks a significant shift for Germany. France has long advocated for stronger protections for European industry against Chinese competition. Germany resisted, partly because its economy is tightly interwoven with China. That is why Merz’s support for the joint letter surprised Brussels. The French position was anticipated; the German one was not.

There is growing concern about Europe’s economic dependence on China, though the Nordic countries and others remain skeptical about protectionist measures. But we must be realistic. China is deeply embedded in European markets and supply chains.

The idea of an economic “kill switch” raises a fundamental question: if Europe cut China off from its market, how would our economy withstand the shock? I do not think that question has been thoroughly answered, and without an answer I am not convinced the strategy is credible.

J. L.: First, it is good news when France and Germany agree. That has not happened often enough, and the lack of alignment between Paris and Berlin has been a persistent problem for Europe. But leadership means bringing other member states along, not imposing a position on them.

Second, our trade imbalance with China is enormous — roughly €1 trillion per year. Europe needs industrial policy again, and we must rebuild strategic industrial capacity. After decades of minimizing the public sector’s role, it is encouraging to see that debate shift.

“I would not recommend opening a third geopolitical front with China”

But threatening to sever China from the European market is not a credible strategy in my view. We should pursue a rebalancing that benefits both sides. China has shown remarkable adaptability in responding to economic challenges, and Europe needs to be equally imaginative.

Our relationship with the United States is evolving, and we must become a stronger power to remain a credible ally. Russia is already a direct, existential threat after its invasion of Ukraine. I would not advocate opening a third geopolitical front with China.
 

The US midterm elections are another major uncertainty for Europe. Many in Brussels hope a Democratic victory would curb Donald Trump’s room for action. Would that really alter the transatlantic relationship, or could it have the opposite effect?

D. K.: I worry it could have the latter outcome. Even if Democrats win both houses and assume power, Trump might concentrate more on areas where the president has considerable freedom: foreign policy and tariffs.

“Trump could concentrate more on areas where the president enjoys considerable freedom: foreign policy and tariffs”

Many in Brussels seem to be waiting for the “good Americans” to rescue Europe. Yet the imperial presidency has expanded for decades, especially in foreign policy. Congress can constrain tariff policy, but its ability to rein in the White House on matters most important to Europe is limited.

So I do not see how a Democratic victory would fundamentally transform the transatlantic relationship. Europeans are seeking solutions in the wrong place.

J. L.: That is precisely the mistake we made during Trump’s first term. We waited for the situation in Washington to change, hoping to return to the international order we once knew. It was a disastrous strategy. We wasted a decade waiting for a different political outcome in Washington.

Javi, Keating warns against waiting for US politics to solve Europe’s problems. Yet at times it appears Ursula von der Leyen’s Commission is doing just that. How do you assess its approach?

J. L.: I would describe its approach as appeasement, and I am deeply critical of it. I recognize the Commission’s good intentions. In Brussels, we applaud Mark Carney’s speeches and rarely translate them into action. That contradiction should prompt reflection.

Turning to Ceuta as a European border. When Poland faced pressure at its eastern frontier, other EU governments spoke of solidarity and defending Europe’s borders. Why was the initial European response to the Ceuta crisis so different?

J. L.: I think the explanation is political. Governments from the European People’s Party used the Ceuta crisis to attack Spain’s progressive government rather than defending Europe’s broader interest.
 

Are you suggesting that the Spanish Partido Popular leveraged its influence within the European People’s Party to transform the Ceuta crisis into a political attack on Sánchez’s government?

J. L.: Of course. The PP is a significant force within the EPP, and the crisis was exploited in a highly partisan manner. What we witnessed was an assault on Spanish and European sovereignty, with implications for strategic autonomy and the security of the Strait of Gibraltar.

“Governments from the European People’s Party used the Ceuta crisis to attack Spain’s progressive government”

After several days, the matter reached the European Council and a more institutional response began to emerge. But the delay mattered. Episodes like this test European unity, and I believe we failed that test.

There is another factor: migration has become a poisonous political issue. Fear and electoral anxiety shape the response in a way that was not the case a decade ago, when many Syrian refugees were arriving in Greece and Italy. Both partisan confrontation and the toxicity of the migration debate played a role.

D. K.: I see two factors as well. The EPP was upset about Spain’s regularisation of migrants and attempted to portray the crisis as a consequence of that policy, although the evidence does not confirm that link.

But Spain also complicated its position by not publicly acknowledging the possibility of a hybrid attack. Poland explicitly accused Belarus of deliberately pressuring its border. Spain did not publicly attribute what happened in Ceuta to Morocco.

There are legitimate questions. Why were so many people able to cross? Why were so many of them Moroccan nationals? But I understand the government’s reluctance to accuse Rabat: Spain depends heavily on Moroccan cooperation to manage migration, and a diplomatic confrontation would come at a high price.

“Spain depends heavily on Moroccan cooperation to manage migration”

That caution left a political vacuum. Leaders such as Meloni advanced their own explanation, tying the crossings to Spanish migration policies. More broadly, the EU’s dependence on Morocco makes even discussing deliberate pressure diplomatically difficult.

In Poland’s case, the EU could openly discuss Belarus’s role. With Ceuta, Europe’s dependence on Morocco seems to make any such accusation more challenging. Could the Commission even prefer that Sánchez avoid publicly attributing the events to Rabat?

D. K.: Yes. That aligns with what I have heard.

J. L.: I understand the point. But a state can only publicly attribute an operation when it has sufficiently reliable evidence. Spanish authorities have not publicly identified who may have been behind the unusual migration flows or the activity observed on social media. There may simply not be enough evidence to make a formal accusation.

Spanish and European authorities also acknowledged good cooperation with Morocco in the days after the incident. The situation may be more intricate than the Belarus-Poland case.

What troubles me most is the initial lack of solidarity and the political instrumentalisation. It was a sad moment for Europe. European unity was tested, and we did not pass the test.
 

Spain is heading toward the polls, and France, Poland, and Italy are also facing pivotal elections. Taken together, these contests could shift the political balance across Europe. What kind of European Union do you envision emerging from this electoral cycle?

J. L.: In the end, citizens will decide. That is the beauty of democracy: the future remains unwritten. Europe’s trajectory will be determined on 29 November as well.

I see two possible directions. One is a Europe where conservatives and the radical right cooperate not only in parliamentary votes but also in national governments. That could freeze European integration and undermine our ability to safeguard prosperity, democracy, and our social model in a much more hostile world.

The alternative is to construct a new pro-European consensus, as Sánchez is attempting in Spain: strengthen European sovereignty, defend our social model, and build collective power to act effectively. Individual member states cannot achieve all of that alone. Europe needs strength and a shared voice.

D. K.: I don’t want to end on too pessimistic a note, but I do not see any scenario in which the European Union as we know it survives Marine Le Pen becoming president of France. She may have abandoned Frexit, but her project would roll back integration to a pre-Maastricht era: little more than a free-trade zone.

“I don’t see any scenario in which the European Union as we know it survives Marine Le Pen becoming president of France”

The institutions might endure on paper, but real powers would return to national capitals. That would mean abandoning the aspiration of European sovereignty. Le Pen tells French voters that France can be autonomous on its own, but even France cannot attain genuine strategic autonomy in isolation.

Some expect her to govern pragmatically, like Meloni. Yet Meloni has moderated her approach within the current European balance of power. A Le Pen presidency would alter that balance and give Meloni less incentive to accommodate the European centre. If Le Pen wins, I think it would be game over for the European Union as we know it.

Thank you both.