From Judge Virginia Kendall (N.D. Ill.) in U.S. v. Holmes:
Following the Government’s initiation of a Criminal Complaint against Holmes on March 13, 2026, a grand jury issued an Indictment charging him with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) on April 7, 2026. The Indictment contends that Holmes operated the X account bearing the handle “@MapleStCapital,” which carried an American flag emoji and the caption “END The Fed.” It further asserts that Holmes posted multiple statements targeting the Jewish community and Israel from that account, including: “The jew will be destroyed and discarded,” “From the river to the sea every Jew will die,” “You inbred people will all die,” and “Die Jew.”
Circa March 3, the State of Israel posted a video on the account “@Israel” showing a billboard bearing Ali Khamenei’s image with the caption: “The world is a better place without Khamenei.” The post added: “It’s a first step towards a better world.” Holmes answered this Israeli post with the remark: “I’m going to shoot up a synagogue.” It is this statement that the Government asserts violated 18 U.S.C. § 875(c)….
The Indictment states that:
TIMOTHY HOLMES, the defendant herein, knowingly transmitted in interstate commerce a communication containing a threat to injure the person of another, namely, a post on X in which he wrote, in response to a post from “@Israel”, “I’m going to shoot up a synagogue”, and the defendant transmitted the communication for the purpose of making a threat, knowing that the communication would be viewed as a threat, and recklessly disregarding a substantial risk that others would regard the communication as a threat….
Holmes argues that his declaration “I’m going to shoot up a synagogue” does not constitute a true threat because it lacks adequate specificity. He maintains that his post was merely a “generalized, albeit offensive, statement directed at an institution or building” that fails to meet the threshold of a true threat because it “does not identify a particular individual or group of individuals” and it also fails to “specify a location, a time, or any target beyond the generic category of ‘a synagogue.'”
This stance is not presented as an argument about the indictment’s validity under the First Amendment, but rather as a dispute about the interpretation and the inferences that can be drawn from the facts. The Court has rejected such arguments for more than ten years because they are improper to resolve on a motion to dismiss. Since Holmes’ contentions concern the substantive merits of the Government’s case—not the sufficiency of the Indictment—the Court rejects them.
Holmes’ assertion that his post constitutes protected political hyperbole fails for the same reasons. Citing Watts v. United States (1969), Holmes contends that his posts “were responsive to foreign policy events and government statements.” The Court interprets Holmes’ position as claiming that the First Amendment shields his post as political speech, and thus the Court should dismiss the Indictment because the post does not violate 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). To begin with, this position—like many others Holmes raises—combines and confuses multiple procedural and substantive issues into a single, tangled argument.
To the extent Holmes contends that, on its face, the Indictment could not, as a matter of law, satisfy § 875(c) even if all allegations are accepted as true, that argument fails. The Court cannot embrace such a premise.
This is not a case where the Court could simply accept the Government’s allegations as true and find that Rule 7(c)(1) is unmet. Holmes is not accused of posting a routine political stance such as “Taxes are too high!” Nor did he post a provocative but generally understandable non-threatening remark such as, “Slow drivers should go to hell!”
He posted: “I’m going to shoot up a synagogue” in reply to a post from the State of Israel after disseminating statements such as: “Die Jew,” “You inbred people will all die,” “The jew will be destroyed and discarded,” and “From the river to the sea every Jew will die.” Holmes is free to explain to a jury that his post amounted to mere political commentary; but at this stage, the Court finds that the Government has sufficiently alleged that this statement is a “serious expression[ ] conveying that a speaker means to commit an act of unlawful violence.” …
Holmes then pivots to three statutory challenges to the Government’s position. He first argues that the Indictment should fail because his statement “I’m going to shoot up a synagogue” does not meet 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) since it “refers to a building or institution, not to ‘the person of another,'” “does not identify any individual or individuals,” and “does not threaten bodily harm to any specific person.” In substance, these challenges question whether Holmes’ remark qualifies as a true threat and are again rejected for the reasons stated above. Holmes’ next argument—that the Government did not allege sufficient mens rea—is duplicative and rejected for the same reasons….
In his fourth and final argument, Holmes raises two constitutional objections. He starts by contending that the Government’s prosecution of him constitutes an impermissible content-based limitation on political speech. The precise framing of Holmes’ argument is not entirely clear, but its main thrust is that the Government violated 34 U.S.C. § 30506 and the Constitution. Indeed, § 30506(4) provides that “[n]othing in this division shall be construed to allow prosecution based solely upon an individual’s expression of racial, religious, political, or other beliefs[.]” This language, however, must be interpreted in its purpose: to provide interpretive safeguards for the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act and its amendments.
Holmes offers no authority showing that prosecuting someone under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for threatening to shoot up a synagogue would violate 18 U.S.C. § 249 or 34 U.S.C. § 30506. In fact, § 30506 expressly limits its applicability to “this division” of the code—the division that encompasses the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, which is where the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C. § 249, was enacted. Put plainly, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) is not part of that equation.
Anyway, the face of the Indictment provides no support for Holmes’ position: the Government charged him under § 875(c) for making a threat in interstate commerce; no reasonable inference suggests the Indictment targets political speech. Holmes remains free to present his legal theories to the jury, including the notion that posts about killing Jews constitute protected political speech.
Holmes’ final argument is that the Indictment violates the Due Process Clause because “[a]pplying § 875(c) to prosecute the posting of publicly available information and ambiguous statements about travel—where the defendant’s actual conduct was entirely lawful and disclosed to law enforcement—creates intolerable ambiguity.” This view shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the Indictment and ignores the grand jury’s charge. Holmes is not charged with violating § 875(c) for posting content about travel or traveling to Florida. The grand jury charged him with violating § 875(c) because he replied to a post from the State of Israel by stating: “I’m going to shoot up a synagogue.” The Court has already indicated that Holmes is free to challenge any evidence concerning travel to Florida if the Government relies on it.
For cases allowing threats prosecutions over similarly broad threats to kill Jews, “Zionists,” “MAGA,” “blacks,” and “Christians,” see General Threats to Kill Jews and “Zionists” Can Be Punished and “See MAGA, Shoot MAGA” in TikTok Video Was Criminally Punishable Threat.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Quinn Ford represents the government.
