Many readers feel a healthy skepticism toward judges, and it’s reasonable to treat statements by government figures, including jurists, with a touch of caution. After all, judges are human beings who can err, carry biases, and have blind spots.
Still, judges are typically highly trained attorneys who possess substantial knowledge about the subjects they address. The prevailing view is that federal judges, in particular, are exceptionally well qualified (with the usual caveat that every institution has its exceptions). They also tend to work with highly capable law clerks who shoulder much of the research and the drafting of initial opinions.
Thus, despite the potential for error and ideological tilt, judges generally (though not always) know what they are talking about in their legal reasoning. They usually have more expertise than non-lawyers, and often more than lawyers who do not specialize in the specific area. You might picture a judge as “woke” or “Trumpy” or any other label, yet there remains a strong likelihood that the judge’s legal analysis is sound.
This discussion was sparked by a comment I encountered on the Eric Coomer (of Dominion Voting) libel suit over The Deep Rig, though it serves merely as one instance of a wider pattern. The comment quotes an excerpt from the judge’s opinion excerpt in the post:
In short, if the law did not require “clear and convincing evidence” that the defendant subjectively doubted or disbelieved the published statements, it is likely that Byrne’s motion for summary judgment would have been denied, and a jury would have had the opportunity to weigh in on this matter. However, under the law as it currently stands, Coomer’s evidence is insufficient to meet these standards and summary judgment for Byrne is therefore required….
The comment then asserts, “A Trumpy judge who apparently didn’t bother to read Sullivan, which states” (emphasis added by the commenter),
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with “actual malice” — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
And the comment continues, “Seems like this is ripe for appeal. This Trumpy judge seems to think the current precedent requires that the defendant ‘subjectively doubted or disbelieved the published statements,’ when Sullivan has a looser standard.”
The fault in the commenter’s analysis is that Sullivan was, of course, not the final word on the matter—as the judge himself knew. Indeed, if one searches for “subjective” in the judge’s opinion, one finds a fairly lengthy passage citing authority that supports the judge’s interpretation:
Actual malice requires proof that the defendant published the challenged statement with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for whether it was false. See id. [Coomer v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 552 P.3d 562, 581 (Colo. App. 2024)]; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). The test for actual malice is a subjective one. Thus, the issue is not whether “a reasonably prudent [person] would have published, or would have investigated before publishing,” but rather whether the defendant “in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication, or was highly aware of its probable falsity[.]” Coomer, 552 P.3d at 591; Diversified Mgmt., Inc. v. The Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103. 1105-10 (Colo. 1982) (en banc); Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686, 703 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e ask whether the defendant, instead of acting in good faith, actually entertained serious doubts as to the veracity of the published account, or was highly aware that the account was probably false.”); Dershowitz v. Cable News Network, Inc., 153 F.4th 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2025) (“[A]ll that matters are the speakers’ subjective beliefs about the truth of their own statements.”).
St. Amant, cited by the court, indeed states,
[The precedents] are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) expressly quotes this passage as the Court having “equated reckless disregard of the truth with subjective awareness of probable falsity.” The judge in the Coomer / Deep Rig case, whether one regards him as “Trumpy” or not, understood the governing law, and the commenter (who had elsewhere said he wasn’t a lawyer) did not appear to.
So, again, it is wise to view judges’ work with a critical eye and to feel free to challenge it. But avoid assuming that knowing a single precedent in the field automatically makes you more knowledgeable than the judge. Don’t assume that detecting ideological bias automatically equates to legal error. And if you remain doubtful about the judge’s analysis, verify the sources cited in the full opinion; my posts typically excerpt only portions of the opinion and rarely include the full citations, yet they usually link to the complete document so readers can examine it directly.
