A few days into its course, it is premature to forecast the end of the Iran conflict, if indeed there is one. There are too many known unknowns, things we know we do not know, in the expression (2002) of Rumsfeld, and others that we know, but are ignored. We must consider scenarios or at least possibilities. They have already produced some perceptible and worrying ripple effects. The longer it lasts, the worse it will be. The spiral of escalation could widen, destabilizing the region even further if the ayatollah regime endures. And if it “collapses” —“thinned out,” as Trump is now suggesting (but without clearly explaining his objectives) with a policy of ignoring lessons from the invasion of Iraq—, chaos could take hold of the region, and of the world for a long time.
Military dominance of Israel and the United StatesThey have secured dominance and impunity over airspace. Although it is not everything, since no war is won solely from the air with “strategic bombings.” Decapitations of regimes, as political scientist Francis Fukuyama notes, are very unpredictable and almost never achieve the political end sought, unlike the seizure of Maduro in Venezuela. General Dan Caine, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had warned before February 28 that an attack on Iran could prove problematic due to its complexity, the lack of munitions on the U.S. side (because of the volume sent to and spent in Ukraine), the lack of allied support, and potential American casualties.
“Is this Trump’s war, or Netanyahu’s that has dragged Trump into it? Who is the superpower, the one who arms, or the one who decides?”
Trump’s war or Netanyahu’s? The Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, acknowledged that the United States had launched its strike when it did because Israel had precipitated its own. As happened in the June attacks. Is this Trump’s war, or Netanyahu’s that has dragged Trump into it? Which is the superpower—the one who arms, or the one who decides? For Israel, Iran is the boogeyman that since the 1979 revolution poses an existential threat with its attempts to obtain a nuclear weapon (which Israel possesses). Also for certain sectors in the United States. According to Ilan Pappe, author of The Zionist Lobby. A History on Both Sides of the Atlantic, Dick Cheney, then Vice President of the United States, who was part of the milieu that argued for the Iraq war, was also one of the drivers of a similar action against Iran. The neoconservatives are back, behind the scenes.
Since Hamas’s brutal terrorist attack on October 7, 2023 (what was the real objective?), Netanyahu and his followers have been pursuing a strategy to decimate their immediate enemies (Iran and its aides Hamas, Hezbollah, and Yemen’s Houthis), to build a Greater Israel (with settlements that prevent a two-state solution) and seek a security, a calm, that will probably never arrive through this route, but perhaps through negotiation. The attack on Iran, at least in the short term, has left in limbo the so-called Abraham Accords with several Arab countries, which had been promoted by the first Trump administration, and which Saudi Arabia, the principal one, was close to joining; that step thwarted Hamas’s attack, and now this war.
The end of the war. Israel and the United States began the war. The question of whether Israel dragged the United States into it also points to who will decide, in their realm, the war’s end—Trump or Netanyahu? Do they know how it will end? Even if the American insists that it has already won, by that point their visions, interests and criteria may clash.
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Trump demands the regime’s “unconditional surrender,” ignoring that with either regime you are dealing with Persia, a country with a great past and great pride“If the regime endures. Although preparations for such an attack have been underway for months, if not years, the ayatollah regime’s aim is to resist and survive both outwardly and inwardly. The designation of Mojtaba Jameneí as the new Supreme Leader, after the death of his father in an Israeli bombing on the first day of the war, is a message of resistance outwardly and inwardly. Regarding the exterior, the exact military capacity that the bombardments aim to destroy is unknown. Concerning its society, it is the one that is armed, as evidenced by the bloody crackdowns in January. There is fear. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — about 250,000 men—, which controls a significant part of the economy, and other paramilitary groups like the Basij, present throughout the country, will not yield easily, even though they are a top target of American and Israeli precision strikes. Trump’s demand for the regime’s “unconditional surrender” ignores that with either regime you are dealing with Persia, a country with a great past and great pride. Paradoxically, despite Trump’s refusal, Mojtaba Jameneí may be the most suitable leader to negotiate something: the end of this war.
If it endures, and despite his base’s rejection, Trump could be tempted to intervene with ground troops—beyond special units for targeted actions—, which would complicate the situation even further.
An important weapon that the regime will have is not only to close, as now, but to mine every traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, worsening the consequences already starting to be felt in the global economy.
State Terrorism as a Weapon. To endure, Iran could widen the reach of its attacks to Europe. Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Tajt-Ravanchi has stated clearly: “If any country joins the aggression against Iran, it joins the United States and Israel in their aggression against Iran, and undoubtedly will also be legitimate targets of Iranian retaliation.” It is predictable that the regime has prepared, with sleeper agents or not, for terrorist attacks against people or interests of the United States, and, if possible, of Israel. In any case, and despite greater control by Western intelligence services, in the short and long term such attacks are to be expected. Sunni terrorism has historically been more global and apocalyptic (Al-Qaeda, ISIS), more decentralized and conducted through suicide attacks. Shiite terrorism tends to be more integrated into state-driven regional strategies, especially linked to Iran. But they sometimes mix. Hamas is Sunni, though primarily identity-national; Hezbollah is Shiite. Many young people in Gaza and Lebanon are growing up in the hatred generated by Israel’s responses, which will yield future terrorists.
Collapse of the regime. If the regime collapses, it is hard to imagine a peaceful transition toward a new stability, given the country’s complexity. Some compare it, in regional terms, to the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), although that one was peaceful, without Trump or Netanyahu. The opposition is poorly organized. And although there is fear after January’s events, the country could slide into a civil war.
“The end of the regime, without weapons against its neighbors and with the little that remains of its nuclear research, would vindicate Netanyahu, who could continue to govern after the elections.”
Between 60% and 70% of Iran’s 90 million inhabitants were not born when the Khomeini Revolution began. They have known nothing else in their lives, which does not mean the regime lacks support, especially in conservative rural areas. Many Lebanese tired of Hezbollah could breathe easier. Some ethnic minorities might rise up to claim autonomy or even independence. Could collapse come from the periphery rather than the center? It is Persia, but not everyone feels Persian. The group with the greatest capacity for territorial destabilization are the Kurds, the people who have never achieved a state because that would have disrupted the regional balance at various times and under various circumstances. Hindered by geography and history. Kurdistan was divided among four states after the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and the treaties of 1920-1923. The Kurds number about 8–10 million in Iran, about 10% of the population; 15–20 million (18–20%) in Turkey, which will never permit the emergence of a Kurdish state; 6–7 million (15–20%) in Iraq, and 2–3 million (10%) in Syria. A total estimated at 30–35 million Kurds. Although the United States has always protected and helped them to avoid a rising nationalist claim. For now, Iran’s Kurds are sending messages of calm. There are also Azeris, Lurs, Arabs, Baluchis and Turkmen who feel less Persian but live in strategic places.
The end of the regime, without weapons against its neighbors and with the little that remains of its nuclear research, would vindicate Netanyahu, who could continue to govern after the elections and, now without obstacles, advance toward his project of a Greater Jewish State. The surprising, thunderous silence of the Jews who oppose him is striking. The “Peace Camp,” vanished for years, is reduced to a few commentators and a handful of politicians. It would be destabilizing. Will the United States, even Trump, permit it?
Chinese Discretion. China’s response, beyond verbal criticism, has been, so far, discreet, despite the oil that Iran has stopped delivering and the large investments it has made in the country. Displacing the Chinese factor in the region and wherever else in the world, its real obsession, may have weighed on Washington’s calculations, as in its actions in Venezuela, and more broadly in the so-called Western Hemisphere. There is a Xi Jinping–Trump summit planned from March 31 to April 2. It may explain China’s prudence.
Impact on Ukraine? On the other hand, U.S.-Russia relations will be strained if Russian intelligence assistance to Iranian missile and drone attacks on Western bases in the region is confirmed and prolonged. That could derail any halt to hostilities in Ukraine and diminish arms supplies to Kyiv. But Trump has been cautious about this.
Too many things we know we do not know. That does not excuse us from considering them so we do not get caught by surprise, out of ignorance. We will continue
