The entry of tens of thousands of people into Ceuta coincided with incursions by Moroccan warships into Spanish waters. The simultaneity invites the notion of a hybrid operation: a combination of migratory pressure and a display of military force that would have tested Spain’s response without leading to an open confrontation.
However, this interpretation assumes that the Moroccan state acted like a coordinated machine, with all of its institutions responding to a single will and that the events were part of a strategy designed from the apex of power. Perhaps that reading says more about our way of interpreting Morocco than about the actual functioning of its regime.
A crisis five times larger than the 2021 one
The comparison with May 2021 is inevitable. Back then, between 8,000 and 10,000 people crossed the Ceuta border amid the diplomatic crisis over Spain’s reception of Brahim Gali, leader of the Polisario Front. There was an open dispute between the two countries and a sequence of events that allowed interpreting migratory pressure as a form of coercion.
Five years later, the magnitude would have been very different. Initial estimates from July 2026 placed the number of people entering Ceuta at between 50,000 and 60,000. Some later reports have cited higher figures, still pending verification and conditioned by methodological differences. In any case, it would amount to a crisis several times larger than in 2021.
The bilateral context had also changed. Spain had shifted its position on Western Sahara in 2022 and, since then, Morocco and Spain had rebuilt their relationship. The two countries cooperate on migration matters and share the organization of the 2030 World Cup with Portugal. For Rabat, the tournament is a long-term bet and an opportunity to reinforce its international profile.
What was Morocco seeking to achieve with a crisis of a scale far greater than 2021? If the objective was to pressure Spain, one would need to explain why Rabat took on such a high risk precisely when it had important interests in maintaining cooperation with Madrid.
Infantino’s paradox
There is one detail worth noting: Gianni Infantino, president of FIFA, was in Morocco for the Throne Day celebrations when the crisis occurred. The visit coincided with a significant moment for the country’s sports diplomacy. The 2030 World Cup, organized jointly with Spain and Portugal, represents one of Mohamed VI’s major international bets. Morocco aspires to host the final and has turned football into a tool for projection and prestige.
“If the objective was to pressure Spain, one would have to explain why Rabat took on such a high risk precisely”
While the monarchy sought to project an image of stability to one of its most prominent guests, footage of thousands of citizens attempting to reach Ceuta conveyed the opposite. What could Morocco gain by provoking a crisis that damaged that image and complicated relations with a partner essential to organizing the World Cup?
States may accept reputational costs when they expect to obtain a strategic benefit in return. But that explanation needs to identify what the benefit was and why it justified taking such a risk. The hypothesis of a deliberate operation is not ruled out; it simply is not the only way to interpret what happened.
When masses escape control
Political systems with a strong concentration of power tend to invest resources in monitoring public spaces and preventing mobilizations that could overwhelm security forces. Maintaining order is not merely a policing issue: it also demonstrates that the State retains the capacity to exercise its authority.
“The hypothesis of a deliberate operation is not ruled out; it simply is not the only way to interpret what happened”
From that perspective, the march of tens of thousands toward Ceuta presents a contradiction. One thing is that a government temporarily relaxes border controls to pressure a neighbor. Another is allowing a crowd of extraordinary size to mobilize in what appears to be an out-of-control manner, with unpredictable consequences and under the gaze of international media.
In the first case, the State uses the mobility of people as an instrument of pressure. In the second, it risks that that mobility reveals its own limits. The coincidence with Throne Day made that tension more visible. While Mohamed VI was hosting Infantino and Morocco sought to project stability, thousands of citizens headed toward a border the State was supposed to control.
The images did not only reflect the frustration of those who wanted to leave the country. They could also raise doubts about the capacity of Moroccan institutions to anticipate and manage a mobilization of that magnitude. For a system that bases much of its authority on preserving order, the scene could be particularly damaging.
“While Mohamed VI received Infantino and Morocco sought to project stability, thousands of citizens headed toward a border the State was supposed to control”
Authoritarian regimes can also organize massive mobilizations when they believe they serve their interests. Therefore it is worth distinguishing between a crowd directed and contained by the State and another whose evolution escapes its control. In the Ceuta case, we still do not know who allowed so many people to reach the border or what capacity there was to stop them. It is also not clear whether the outcome matched what those who made the decisions expected.
Concentration of power does not guarantee absolute control. A State can appear very powerful from the outside and, at the same time, encounter difficulties in governing the social dynamics that unfold within its own borders.
The problem of who really commands
Morocco is not a parliamentary democracy in which the fundamental decisions on national security depend exclusively on a Government subjected to the control of a legislative majority. The monarchy maintains a central role in the architecture of the State, especially in military, diplomatic, and intelligence spheres.
“A State can appear very powerful from the outside and, at the same time, encounter difficulties in governing the social dynamics that unfold within its own borders”
However, concentration of authority does not mean perfect coordination. Security apparatuses have hierarchical structures, institutional interests, and their own degrees of maneuver. In highly personalized political systems, competition for proximity to the center of power can influence decisions. If there is also uncertainty about the continuity of leadership, these dynamics can gain weight.
That is why the succession issue deserves attention. The stability of a regime also depends on the expectations its elites have about the future. Mohamed VI’s succession does not seem imminent, but preparing a future dynastic transition raises questions about the relationships among the Palace, the Armed Forces, and the intelligence services.
In this context, there is a question that often remains outside the Spanish debate: who made each decision and how far did their authority extend?
Frigates are a different story
The naval episode requires separate analysis. President Pedro Sánchez confirmed the entry of Moroccan warships into Spanish waters. According to published reports, at least one frigate and several patrol boats penetrated Ceuta’s waters without authorization, prompting a response from the Spanish Navy.
A warship operates within a chain of command. Its movements can be reconstructed from records, communications, and operational orders. Public information does not allow us to know what directives the commanders received or who authorized the incursions. It also does not clarify whether the naval movements were related to the arrival of migrants or if they followed another operational logic.
The doctrine of hybrid warfare helps analyze how military and non-military instruments can be combined. But it should not become an automatic explanation for any coincidence. To speak of a hybrid operation, indications of coordination, an identifiable strategic purpose, and some form of joint direction are needed. Without them, there is a risk of retrospectively building a strategy from events that may have had different origins.
Sánchez’s dilemma
Pedro Sánchez defended the crisis management through dialogue with Morocco, while the Navy acted to protect Spanish waters. The combination of communication and deterrence aims to convey resolve without ruling out a diplomatic exit.
“To talk about a hybrid operation, there must be indications of coordination, an identifiable strategic purpose, and some form of common direction”
Firmness does not require making public all the details of a confrontation. If Spain accused Morocco of organizing a coordinated aggression, it would increase political pressure to take retaliatory measures. If Rabat believed its prestige was at stake, it could respond in a way that would exacerbate the confrontation.
That does not mean the Spanish government should conceal what happened indefinitely. Democratic accountability requires explaining sovereignty violations and the measures taken. It would also have been relevant to invite the main opposition party to brief them on the situation.
There is, however, a difference between explaining the military response and publicly attributing a strategic intention. Publicly attributing a strategic intention requires much stronger evidence.
A doctrine for Spain
For too long, the Spanish debate has oscillated between two simplistic images. One presents Morocco as an indispensable partner whose cooperation must be preserved almost at any cost; the other, as an adversary that systematically uses all its instruments against Spain.
Neither suffices to understand a complex political system. Morocco maintains shared economic interests with Spain, but also territorial disputes. Migratory interdependence coexists with a power structure whose evolution directly affects Spanish security.
Spain needs to defend its sovereignty and attribute responsibilities with verified information. To do so well, it must better understand how decisions are made in Morocco. That means knowing the relationships between institutions and the incentives of those who lead them, without assuming that all act under a single will.
“Spain needs to defend its sovereignty and attribute responsibilities with verified information. To do so well, it must better understand how decisions are made in Morocco”
There is also a need for closer coordination between intelligence, diplomacy, and defense. A migratory crisis cannot be analyzed solely as a border problem; a naval incursion cannot be understood only as a military incident.
The question we still have not answered
The Ceuta problem is that Spain has not yet publicly provided a convincing explanation of what happened. The hypothesis of a coordinated operation against the country remains possible, but the scale difference with 2021, Infantino’s visit, and the cost the crisis could have for Morocco advise considering other options.
Perhaps Rabat intended to pressure Spain and miscalculated the consequences. It is also possible that some sectors of the state apparatus acted with a degree of autonomy we do not know about, or that the migratory crisis coincided with naval decisions that followed a different logic.
There are not enough elements to choose among these explanations. Spain needs to determine who made the decisions and whether the mobilization and the naval movements were part of the same strategy. Attributing to Morocco a control that it perhaps did not exercise could lead to the wrong response; discarding a deliberate operation without investigating it would also be a mistake.
The open question is whether Ceuta was a demonstration of Morocco’s power over Spain or whether it exposed the limits of Moroccan control over its own society. That distinction matters before concluding the crisis interpretation.
