A constitutional major-questions claim does not exist.
From the Supreme Court’s unsigned ruling issued today in Mullin v. Friends of the Ruidosa Church, with Justice Jackson largely dissenting:
Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) entrusts the Secretary of Homeland Security with broad power to erect border barriers and accompanying roads “to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United States.” The same provision expressly authorizes the Secretary “‘to waive all legal requirements'” as “‘necessary to ensure expeditious construction'” of those barriers and roads, and it sharply restricts judicial review of all claims arising from such waiver determinations. Specifically, the statute provides that “‘[a] cause of action or claim may only be brought alleging a violation of the Constitution of the United States'” and courts “‘shall not have jurisdiction'” over nonconstitutional claims. §102(c)(2)(A).
Earlier this year, the Secretary invoked Section 102’s waiver authority to commence a border-construction project at the U.S.–Mexico boundary, in a region labeled the “Big Bend Sector” by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The Secretary found that the Big Bend Sector “is an area of high illegal entry” requiring additional border barriers, and waived the application of a range of environmental and conservation laws to facilitate expeditious construction.
Shortly thereafter, the respondents—a river guide, an environmental nonprofit, and a Texas nonprofit dedicated to preserving a historic church in Ruidosa—challenged those waiver determinations by filing suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Respondents asserted, among other things, that the Secretary’s waiver determinations “violat[ed] the major questions doctrine under the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 1.” Although framed as a constitutional issue, the claim fundamentally contended that the Secretary had exceeded his statutory authority in issuing the waivers.
On October 2, 2026, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction blocking the Secretary’s waivers and stopping all related construction. The court acknowledged that its jurisdiction was limited to constitutional claims. Yet it nevertheless concluded that respondents’ “major questions doctrine claim” qualified because, in the court’s view, the “major questions doctrine is a constitutional clear statement rule grounded in separation of powers.” The court also held that respondents’ “major questions doctrine claim” would likely succeed on the merits because the Secretary lacked “‘clear congressional authorization’ to issue” the waivers. Because the Fifth Circuit lacks jurisdiction to hear this case, IIRIRA §102(c)(2)(C), the Solicitor General filed a motion seeking either summary reversal or a stay of the District Court’s preliminary injunction.
We grant the requested stay. The Government is highly likely to prevail on its argument that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate respondents’ so-called major-questions-doctrine claim. However it is labeled, the claim does not “‘alleg[e] a violation of the Constitution of the United States,'” the sole type of claim the statute permits district courts to adjudicate. IIRIRA §102(c)(2)(A). Instead, it asserts that the Secretary exceeded his statutory authority. And we have long held that “claims simply alleging” that the Executive Branch has overstepped its “statutory authority are not ‘constitutional’ claims.” Dalton v. Specter (1994).
That conclusion does not alter when, as here, a plaintiff invokes the major-questions doctrine. Many canons and rules of statutory interpretation embody constitutional principles, including “constitutional avoidance, the clear-statement federalism rules, and the presumption against retroactivity.” When courts invoke those canons, they do so to adjudicate statutory claims, not constitutional ones. The same principle applies when a court invokes “the major questions canon of statutory interpretation.” There is no such thing as a “constitutional” major-questions claim….
Respondents contend that construction in the Big Bend Sector will diminish their ability to use and enjoy the area. Yet Congress’s enactment of IIRIRA §102(c)—which authorizes the Secretary to waive environmental-protection and other conservation requirements—reflects a clear preference for expeditious border construction over the harms respondents allege. And equity courts cannot, in their discretion, reject the balance that Congress has struck in a statute. The Government’s interest therefore outweighs any aesthetic, recreational, and environmental harms asserted by respondents….
