At this stage of the case, the plaintiff plausibly pleads that the university discriminated against her by disregarding her medical records to conclude that she had used AI, even though the style and organization of her course papers could be a manifestation of her disabilities.
From Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., decided yesterday by Judge Laurie J. Michelson (E.D. Mich.):
Plaintiff Jane Doe filed this lawsuit against the University of Michigan and several individual defendants after she was disciplined for her alleged use of AI to write course papers. Doe, who has generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), contends that the distinctive tone, meticulous structure, and stylistic consistency of her writing could be misread as AI-generated. The defendants, however, were not persuaded and imposed disciplinary probation on Doe, requiring her to rewrite those papers and to compose a reflective essay. After she challenged the discipline without success, Doe brought suit, asserting claims under the due process clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act (RA). …
The dispute arose last fall when Doe was an undergraduate in Great Books 191, a classical studies course at the University of Michigan. The class was taught by Theo Nash, the course’s graduate student instructor, and Basil Duffalo, the lead instructor. According to Doe, Nash publicly voiced a predisposition to assume AI misuse by students and to treat AI-related concerns as a core academic “values” issue.
The heart of the issues began when Nash filed an academic misconduct accusation with the Office of Student Academic Affairs (OSAA), saying he was “immediately suspicious” that Doe had used AI to write a course paper. Doe denied the accusation, explaining that her disability-related writing traits could be misinterpreted as AI and should not be treated as proof of misconduct.
Doe participated in a conference with OSAA and submitted materials supporting that position. Not long after, Nash filed a second misconduct accusation based on another paper written by Doe. He attached “AI-generated comparison outputs created by prompting AI with [Doe’s] own outline and with instructor feedback.” Before OSAA became involved in the second accusation, Nash asked Doe to meet. Doe declined. In her telling, Nash interpreted her refusal as “self-destructive” and a rejection of help. Doe then went through the same OSAA proceeding for the second accusation. OSAA found Doe responsible for both accusations and sanctioned her with disciplinary probation (noted on her unofficial transcript) and also required her to write a reflective essay.
Five days later, Nash filed a third misconduct accusation with OSAA for another paper written by Doe. Doe again submitted materials to OSAA, including “written notices” explaining that an NR grade was blocking degree requirements and graduation and that her transcript and future educational opportunities were being harmed immediately.
Before OSAA adjudicated the third accusation, Doe filed a complaint with the Dean of the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts, and with the University President’s Office, “about disability discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and lack of procedural neutrality in the OSAA process.” The University responded that Doe could appeal OSAA’s findings, which she promptly did. That same day, Doe filed complaints with the U.S. Department of Education and the University’s Equity, Civil Rights, and Title IX Office (ECRT). OSAA, in turn, paused Doe’s appeal pending ECRT’s review.
ECRT dismissed Doe’s complaint given her approved accommodations. With that decision complete, OSAA then issued the same misconduct finding for the third accusation. Doe was also required to rewrite course papers for Great Books 191.
In Doe’s view, Defendants “treated disability-related traits and limitations as evidence of guilt and failed to apply disability-informed modifications in the academic integrity process.” That led Doe to file this lawsuit. She brings her claims against the Regents of the University of Michigan (“the University”) and several individual defendants in their official and individual capacities, including Nash and Duffalo, and Sean Edgerton and Christine O’Neil from OSAA. …
The court held the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to the due process claim, since any alleged constitutional violation wouldn’t be “clear to a reasonable” government official; an excerpt:
Based on the allegations in the complaint, Nash (and Duffalo) were faced with course papers that resembled the use of AI. Doe has provided no case suggesting it would be “clear to a reasonable” university instructor that using AI-detection software to analyze that writing and bring an academic misconduct allegation as a result of that analysis would violate a student’s procedural due process rights….
And the court rejected the due process claim against the institution:
[Doe] was advised of the accusations that she used AI to write course papers. Her sanctions included disciplinary probation notated on her unofficial transcript, a requirement to write a reflective essay, and rewriting course papers. But before they were imposed, Doe was given opportunities to provide her side of the story, including that her GAD and OCD caused writing traits that could be mistaken for AI. She provided medical documentation to OSAA, and OSAA expressly considered that information in its decision. In effect, Doe “admits that [s]he received exactly the due process [s]he requested.”
Pivoting from the process provided, Doe maintains that OSAA’s sanctions “rested on Nash’s self-confirming AI comparison outputs.” That argument is unsupported by Doe’s allegations and exhibits. Again, they show that OSAA considered Nash’s conclusions against Doe’s explanations. And when forming its decision, OSAA even credited information Doe provided that sufficiently disputed one of Nash’s conclusions … (“In your evidence you indicated that the idea of the ‘rat king’ was something talked about in your discussion section which we were able to confirm.”)….
All told, “[w]hen assessing whether an academic dismissal constituted a due process violation, ‘[a] court must ‘show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment’ and may not ‘override’ that judgment ‘unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the … committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.’” The parties rely on this academic-dismissal standard even though this case involves assessing whether a disciplinary probation notation on an unofficial transcript and a requirement to write a reflective essay and rewrite course papers constitute a due process violation. But based on the allegations in the complaint and attached exhibits, the Court cannot find that Defendants departed from accepted academic norms or failed to exercise professional judgment.
The court also rejected Doe’s claims that the university failed to accommodate her disability, and that the university retaliated against her for asserting rights related to her disability. But it allowed Doe’s intentional disability discrimination claim to go forward:
[Doe] describes the discrimination theory in her response brief as follows:
Nash’s public statements reflecting a “paranoid” predisposition to find AI everywhere, combined with his decision to file three successive accusations grounded in the very writing traits Doe’s clinicians had warned would be misinterpreted, and OSAA’s decision to sustain those findings while disregarding the clinical record, collectively support an inference of intentional discrimination.
For their part, Defendants do not advance significant argument on this claim[, arguing instead that] … “With respect to the denominated claims of ‘discrimination,’ the Complaint does not actually contain any allegations of direct (i.e., intentional) discrimination. For that reason and to that extent, Claims I and II should be dismissed.” … Yet Doe maintains that her discrimination claims “are supported by allegations of intentional … discrimination.” …
There can be no dispute that Doe pleads Nash’s “paranoid’ predisposition” to find AI, and her submission of clinical evidence explaining why, given her disabilities, her writing style might be misinterpreted as coming from the use of AI. It is also true that the exhibits Doe attached to her response brief that the parties are treating as integral to the allegations in the complaint, show that OSAA reviewed her clinical record.
But at this stage of the case, the Court must accept as true Doe’s allegation that OSAA disregarded the medical evidence. In other words, although Defendants considered and/or reviewed Doe’s medical records, she plausibly pleads that they discriminated against her by disregarding them to find that she used AI when the writing style of the course papers could have resulted from her disabilities.
Doe further alleges that she provided Nash and Duffalo with information about her disability accommodations such that they were on notice of her disabilities. She pleads that she rejected Nash’s request to meet with him outside of OSAA. Taking these allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences in Doe’s favor, that rejection likely resulted from the effects of her disabilities, including difficulty with “live verbal defense, rapid processing, and adversarial questioning.”
Indeed, that is seemingly why “Doe requested that OSAA permit her to present her defenses in writing rather than through additional live Zoom proceedings, consistent with her disability-related limitations.” But Nash, according to the allegations, interpreted Doe’s rejection of his request to meet as “self-destructive” and then followed up with another misconduct accusation to OSAA. Accepting these allegations as true, combined with Doe’s allegations about Nash’s “‘paranoid’ predisposition” to find AI, Doe plausibly pleads a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA/RA.
