The DC Circuit Upheld an Injunction Blocking the Removal of VOA Chief Michael Abramowicz. Will the Justices See the Case the Same Way?
Trump v. Slaughter affirmed the President’s presumptive authority to remove principal officers (other than members of the Federal Reserve Board). But does this power extend to inferior officers as well? And is it constitutional for Congress to effectively shield certain inferior officers from presidential removal?
Today, in Abramowitz v. Lake, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed a district court injunction that barred the removal of Michael Abramowitz, the head of Voice of America. In doing so, the court rejected the Department of Justice’s arguments that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter and held that Congress, as a practical matter, can insulate inferior officers by vesting the removal authority in an agency head who requires Senate confirmation.
Judge Pillard authored the opinion for the panel, joined by Judges Srinivasan and Pan. Here is a paraphrase of the key conclusions she reached.
To safeguard the journalistic independence of the U.S. Agency for Global Media’s broadcasters, Congress created a distinct entity—the International Broadcasting Advisory Board (IBAB)—to have final say over the hiring and firing of the networks’ leaders. When the principals of the Agency for Global Media moved to fire Michael Abramowitz without consulting IBAB, Abramowitz sued. The district court then issued a permanent injunction preventing the Agency for Global Media from removing Abramowitz without IBAB’s assent.
The panel affirms that injunction. The district court had jurisdiction to enforce the statutory framework governing the VOA’s leadership, and those statutory requirements align with the Constitution’s Article II. The district court also had the equitable power to prevent the unlawful termination from taking effect.
Though the panel acknowledged, as a general matter, that Congress channels disputes about allegedly improper removals of government personnel to the Merit Systems Protection Board under the Civil Service Reform Act, it held that this default rule does not apply to the VOA. The panel explained that Congress did not suggest, when it updated the VOA statute in 2021, that district courts should be deprived of jurisdiction in cases like this. The VOA head’s removal protection is not a matter of ordinary employment law; it is, instead, a robust safeguard for the VOA’s journalistic integrity. As Judge Pillard put it, Congress had no reason to route Abramowitz’s claim through the CSRA, and every reason not to.
On the merits, the panel concluded that Congress validly insulated the VOA head—an inferior officer—from removal by the President by vesting the appointment and removal authority in the IBAB, a seven-member “separate independent agency.” The IBAB members must be bipartisan and require Senate confirmation. The IBAB serves as the relevant department head, even though it does not supervise the VOA directly—the VOA’s oversight falls to the U.S. Agency for Global Media—a structure the panel found permissible under Morrison v. Olson.
The Department of Justice had urged that this arrangement unlawfully narrows the President’s removal power, but the court was not persuaded.
As Judge Pillard explained, as long as the President retains sufficient control over the department head and that head can oversee the inferior officer, the President maintains effective indirect control over the inferior officer. The head’s supervision preserves the Article II chain of command. This reasoning cites the precedent in Braidwood and otherwise situates the control within a transitive framework.
Yet the practical consequence of the court’s ruling is striking: there is nothing the President can do to replace the VOA’s head at the moment. Six of the seven IBAB seats are currently vacant, having been removed by President Trump in 2025. With a bare or nearly empty board, the IBAB is inquorate and cannot remove the VOA leader or take substantial action. If Congress declines to confirm new IBAB members, Abramowitz would remain in place. The district court may be said to have ensured the President retains “adequate control” over the Board, but that control is functionally inert if the Board cannot act.
It seems likely the Administration will seek further review, potentially reaching the Supreme Court. The central question is whether to file a petition for certiorari immediately or to pursue rehearing en banc first. Although it is unlikely that the full D.C. Circuit will overturn the panel decision, a petition for rehearing en banc could yield a dissenting view that may catch the justices’ attention. The case would also give the Court another occasion to revisit Morrison v. Olson and to elaborate on how far inferior officers may, in practice, be insulated from presidential removal.
