Social Security is on pace to undergo a 22 percent reduction in benefits by 2032, and unlike much of northern Europe, there is no automatic device within the program to avert such a cut.
In the past several weeks, global news has been dominated by scenes of French cities in upheaval as mass demonstrations escalated into riots, clashes with police, and looting. This unrest occurs against a backdrop of a broader fiscal crisis: France’s public debt has climbed to 119 percent of GDP, and the government anticipates this year’s deficit will reach 5.4 percent of GDP. The yield on France’s 10-year government bonds recently surpassed 5 percent for the first time since 2002.
Many protesters are calling for higher public spending, yet the French state has very little room to maneuver. As of 2024, government outlays stood at a staggering 57 percent of GDP, with social spending exceeding 30 percent—both among the highest in the developed world. Crucially, public pensions alone, at roughly 14 percent of GDP, make up nearly half of that social expenditure.
The problem has a pronounced generational edge. On one side sits a sizable, politically potent cohort of retirees; on the other, younger people who want a larger share of the money directed toward their needs. In between stand the working-age taxpayers who shoulder the burden.
By contrast, the United States rests on somewhat firmer fiscal footing. In 2023, U.S. public social spending amounted to 18 percent of GDP, far lower than France. Social Security costs about 5 percent of GDP, and even when counting pensions for government workers, the U.S. public pension bill comes in at roughly 7 percent, below the OECD average.
The principal reason is that the U.S. retirement framework leans heavily on private savings through employer-sponsored plans and vehicles like the 401(k). Private pensions account for 44 percent of all pension payouts in the United States, one of the highest shares in the OECD. In France, they account for only 2 percent. For public finances, the difference is enormous. After adjusting for aging populations, countries with larger private pension systems spend about 80 cents less for every dollar paid out privately. Total pension spending is similar, but the responsibility sits outside the state budget, and retirees are, on average, not worse off.
Americans often—and rightly—point to Europe as a cautionary tale about runaway entitlements. Yet not every European nation is the same. In fact, when it comes to pensions, there are systems in Europe that the United States could look to as models to avoid a fiscal catastrophe.
Denmark has linked its retirement age to life expectancy since 2006, a rule that will push it to 70 by 2040. The Netherlands raises its retirement age by two-thirds of every gain in life expectancy, and its substantial funded occupational pensions must trim benefits when the funds fall short. Sweden goes further still. Each worker’s pension is calculated from what they contributed, divided by how long their generation is expected to live, so longer lifespans automatically mean smaller monthly checks. If the system still runs short, a “break” withholds annual increases until the books balance, as occurred in 2010, 2011, and 2014. Consequently, Sweden and Denmark are projected to spend less on pensions in 2070 than they do today.
These mechanisms demonstrate that a younger population, one of America’s strongest advantages over Europe, isn’t a panacea. Several European countries have more people over 65 per 100 working-age adults than the United States, yet devote a smaller share of GDP to public pensions. The United States has about 31 people over 65 per 100 working-age adults and spends 7.3 percent of GDP on public pensions, or 6.8 percent once pensions taxed away are netted out. The Netherlands (35) and Switzerland (33) spend 6.4 and 6.6 percent before tax and 5.9 and 5.0 percent after. Denmark (36) and Sweden (37) spend more before tax, 7.5 and 8.0 percent, but they tax pensions heavily, so their net costs fall to 5.4 and 6.3 percent, below America’s. Germany, possessing as many seniors per worker as France does today, spends roughly four percentage points of GDP less on public pensions, and projections indicate it will continue doing so in 2050, by which time it will have grown substantially more.
The United States lacks the safeguards that Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden rely on. The full retirement age is fixed at 67 and does not rise with life expectancy, and there is no automatic adjustment of benefits or taxes when funds run low. The sole built-in remedy is a cliff: if Congress does nothing, benefits will fall by 22 percent when the trust fund dries up in 2032. Congress last reformed Social Security’s finances in 1983. Its most recent changes, in 2025, increased benefits for certain public-sector retirees and reduced taxes on seniors’ benefits, but they moved the depletion date closer rather than farther.
This is where the troubling parallel between the United States and France truly lies: in both cases, politicians lack the resolve to pursue painful but necessary reforms that would affect some voters, so the problem keeps getting postponed. The electoral math is clear. Congress is unlikely to permit an overnight drop in benefits in 2032. More likely, it will borrow to cover the shortfall, on top of a federal debt that already stands at about 121 percent of GDP.
In fact, that borrowing is already underway. When Social Security ran surpluses, “instead of saving those funds, the government immediately spent the money,” write Romina Boccia and Ivane Nachkebia of the Cato Institute in their book Reimagining Social Security: Global Lessons for Retirement Policy Changes. Since the program began running cash shortfalls in 2010, the government has borrowed roughly $1.5 trillion to cover them. When interest is included, Social Security is projected to add $5.1 trillion to the debt by 2032, according to Boccia and Nachkebia.
Automatic mechanisms do not guarantee prudent fiscal policy; legislators can repeal them just like any other law. Yet they shift the burden of action: keeping the system solvent requires no vote, while undoing it does.
America should make solvency the default, as much of northern Europe has done: a balancing mechanism that automatically adjusts benefits when the trust fund runs short, a retirement age that rises with life expectancy, and more space for funded private accounts. The reforms the United States needs are far less painful than those France is currently confronting. But every year without such reforms makes them more painful, and one day the United States could find itself in a situation similar to France’s: borrowing at ever-higher rates to meet promises it cannot afford, until bond markets compel the reckoning that politicians would rather avoid.