Spain Needs a New Defense Strategy

November 18, 2026

Defense issues occupy a marginal place in electoral campaigns. However, they should figure among the priorities of the government that emerges from the upcoming general elections. Spain has accumulated five years of indecision in its strategic defense documents, and such public policy is not sustainable in a volatile international context without clear and coherent guidelines.

In theory, defense planning follows a descending sequence. The National Security Strategy (NSS) defines the general framework; the National Defense Directive (NDD) sets the main lines of defense policy; the Defense Policy Directive (DPD) develops them, and the Concept for the Employment of the Armed Forces (CEFAS) translates them into military strategy. The recent practice does not obey that logic. The latest NDD and DPD date from 2020, while the NSS and the CEFAS are from 2021. But more striking than that inverted sequence was the strategic silence that followed. The Government formed after the 2023 elections has not produced any of the documents that establish the guidelines of Spain’s defense strategy.

“The government formed after the 2023 elections has not produced any of the documents that establish the guidelines of Spain’s defense strategy”

The anomaly is doubly jarring when contrasted with the transformation of the international environment during that same period: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the wars in the Middle East, the weakening of the transatlantic bond, the escalation of Russia’s hybrid strategies against Europe, and the growing pressure from Morocco in the gray zone around Ceuta. And this misalignment between a deeply changed environment and documents that remain immobile has generated paradoxical situations. For example, the deployment of the Spanish Armed Forces on NATO’s eastern flank has increased significantly since the start of the Ukraine war and, yet, if we adhere to the guiding documents, it lacks explanation within the national strategic framework. The same can be said of the new—and substantial—investments in modernization programs.

Spain needs, therefore, a new defense strategy. Every strategy articulates ends, ways, and means, and what has happened since the last iteration of the strategic documents obliges a reassessment of the premises of each of those three elements. Regarding ends, the new strategy should spell out and prioritize the objectives. These depend, on the one hand, on the interests to be defended in light of the threat assessment and, on the other, on the alignment of defense policy with foreign policy, since both constitute an essential part of Spain’s external action.

The means mainly refer to military capabilities. A military capability is an integrated system that yields certain effects. In Spanish doctrine, that system consists of equipment, infrastructure, human resources, training, doctrine, organization, and interoperability. The first question is what capabilities we need based on the objectives. From the answer also derive the force structure and the industrial policy.

The defense industrial base is an essential component of the means, but industrial policy must be subordinated to defense policy and not the other way around. The premise revision is therefore unavoidable. The procurement commitments the Government is taking on, counted in tens of billions of euros, respond to a paradigm centered on large platforms (aircraft, ships, land vehicles, etc.). That paradigm is ill-suited to an operating space shaped by megatrends pointing to increasing automation, transparency, lethality, mass, and speed. It is another perverse consequence of the fact that defense spending growth and large investment announcements occur within a strategic framework set by documents from 2020 and 2021.

“The defense industrial base is an essential component of the means, but industrial policy must be subordinate to defense policy and not the reverse”

On the matter of modes, a key aspect to review is Spain’s role in NATO and in the European Union. Alliances are multiplier of relative power. No middle power can cover the full spectrum of threats by itself, and membership in an alliance gives access to capabilities, intelligence, and deterrence far superior to what it could generate with its own resources. However, that benefit is not automatic. Within an alliance, the ability of a member to influence collective priorities depends on what it contributes and the credibility of its commitments. For Spain, the involvement is direct. Allied attention today is focused on the eastern flank, while a substantial portion of Spain’s security interests lies on the southern flank, particularly Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands. Spain’s contribution to the eastern flank can be seen as an investment in allied solidarity that earns political credit for partners to also address Spain’s concerns, but that logic of reciprocity should be formulated explicitly in strategic documents and not inferred retrospectively. The same applies to the European Union, whose development of defense and industrial instruments opens opportunities and, at the same time, obliges to define what role Spain wants to play in building a European strategic autonomy compatible with NATO.

At the beginning of this century, the Government drove the first Strategic Review of Defense. It was a process of almost two years in which politicians, officials, and representatives of civil society participated. It translated into a State-wide agreement among the main parliamentary forces of that time and into a book of more than three hundred pages in which, in a rare exercise of strategic self-awareness, the national interests were explicit and prioritized. The 2003 Review established the guidelines of defense policy through 2015. Although the 2012 National Defense Directive proposed the need for a new one, no government has embarked on the process again.

One of the main tasks of the new Government in defense will be to reactivate the NSS-NDD-DPD-CEFAS sequence. But, if the ambition is raised, the context also counsels to launch a new Strategic Defense Review. It would also be an opportunity to repair the consensus on foreign action and to ensure that the major lines of defense policy endure beyond changes of government.

Natalie Foster

I’m a political writer focused on making complex issues clear, accessible, and worth engaging with. From local dynamics to national debates, I aim to connect facts with context so readers can form their own informed views. I believe strong journalism should challenge, question, and open space for thoughtful discussion rather than amplify noise.