A few brief passages from Thursday’s extensive ruling in Social Media Cases (San Diego Unified School Dist. v. Meta Platforms, Inc.), authored by California Court of Appeal Justice Anne Richardson and joined by Justices Elwood Lui and Stephen Goorvitch, are reproduced here:
In recent years, a number of plaintiffs have asserted a wide range of claims against social-media platforms. In this opinion we focus on only two theories—negligence and public nuisance—under the laws of California, Florida, Washington, and Rhode Island, brought by school districts. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants’ platforms fomented a mental-health crisis among students that hindered the plaintiffs’ educational mission, compelled them to devote more money and staff time to address student mental health and discipline, and led to vandalism of school property….
We recognize the serious allegations of mental-health harms endured by many students and the resulting impact on the plaintiffs’ schools and their student bodies. … [But the relevant precedents] show that these plaintiffs cannot proceed under the legal theories and factual pledges they have offered….
Negligence Causes of Action
Here, the Plaintiffs claim three broad harms: (1) substantial financial costs incurred to confront the youth mental-health crisis allegedly generated by the Defendants’ platforms; (2) frustrated pedagogical aims as staff time and resources are diverted from education to counter the crisis; and (3) property damage inflicted by students. In Part V, we hold that the allegations that the plaintiffs’ educational missions were frustrated do not state a cognizable negligence claim, and in Part VI, we hold that the Defendants enjoy immunity from liability for the alleged property damage. {The Plaintiffs do not allege that the Defendants directly damaged property; instead they contend that the Defendants’ platforms influenced students to vandalize school property by showing them third-party “challenge videos” that encouraged such acts. The trial court determined [47 U.S.C. § 230] that the Defendants enjoy immunity from liability related to the challenge videos. We agree.}
That leaves the Plaintiffs with only asserted financial harms. The core of the negligence claims rests on the so‑called “economic loss rule.” … “In general, tort law does not provide recovery for negligently inflicted ‘purely economic losses,’ i.e., financial harm without accompanying physical injury or property damage” [even for foreseeable economic losses]. … “[A]ssume a defendant negligently causes an automobile accident that blocks a major traffic artery such as a bridge or tunnel. Although the defendant would be liable for personal injuries and property damage arising from such an accident, it seems unlikely that courts would permit recovery by the multitude of third parties who might claim economic losses because the bridge or tunnel was impassable.”
Public Nuisance Causes of Action
Nuisance claims are typically categorized as public or private. A “private nuisance” concerns a violation of land rights, whereas a “public nuisance” involves interference with the rights of the community at large.
Nuisance has been described as an “impenetrable jungle” that can mean many different things to many people and thus lacks a precise, comprehensive definition. As a result, although nuisance often has broad descriptions, many courts practically narrow its scope. For instance, the Washington Supreme Court restricts nuisance claims to property infringement and threats to health and safety. Several appellate courts have barred bringing products-liability claims under the banner of public nuisance.
These restrictions arise from concern that nuisance could “become a monster that would swallow the entire law of tort” in one bite. In the context of products liability, “‘All a creative mind would need to do is draft a scenario describing a known or perceived harm … that somehow can be connected to the way a company … produces, markets, and/or sells its non-defective, lawful product or service, and a public nuisance claim would be conceived and born.’”
The trial court found that the plaintiffs failed to plead a public-nuisance claim adequately because the harms alleged to individual student users of the defendants’ platforms did not amount to a public nuisance, even when viewed collectively. While our analysis may differ from the trial court’s in certain particulars, we ultimately agree that the plaintiffs’ efforts to plead a public-nuisance cause of action fail under California, Washington, and Florida law….
Under California law, nuisance is broadly defined as “anything injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.”
Public nuisance is defined by statute as “one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” “[P]ublic nuisances are offenses against, or interferences with, the exercise of rights common to the public.” “It is the community aspect of the public nuisance … that distinguishes it from its private cousin,” and makes it appropriate “to protect the quality of organized social life.”
Perhaps because these definitions are so broad, the Legislature has delineated who may have standing to bring a public-nuisance action. Some individuals may sue for public nuisance when it is “specially injurious” to them or when their property is “injuriously affected or [their] personal enjoyment is lessened.”
By contrast, a “public body or officer authorized thereto” can sue to abate a public nuisance. The State or designated county or city officials, acting in a representative capacity, may sue for abatement under Code of Civil Procedure section 731. San Diego’s action, however, is not limited to abatement; it seeks damages for harms allegedly caused by the nuisance. The sole recognized exception to the remedy limitation is that a public entity may seek damages when it sues as a property owner.
Although San Diego advances several arguments related to its public-nuisance theory—some of which have divided the appellate courts—we need not dissect them in detail because San Diego failed to plead its standing to pursue a public-nuisance claim adequately….
San Diego first contends it has standing under Civil Code section 3493. That statute expressly authorizes “a private person” to bring a public-nuisance action. [G]overnment entities are not “private person[s]” for purposes of section 3493….
Alternatively, San Diego argues it may bring a public-nuisance claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 731. That statute provides that “an action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by a nuisance, as defined in Section 3479 of the Civil Code,” and that damages may be recovered. …
San Diego’s complaint did not adequately plead that its property was “injuriously affected” or that its “personal enjoyment [was] lessened” by the alleged nuisance of the defendants’ platforms. Rather, the complaint’s emphasis over its 286 pages is on the “unprecedented mental-health crisis” among students and the resulting disruption to schools’ public educational mission. Any connection to property here is at best abstract.
To accept San Diego’s view would convert almost any personal injury affecting a property owner into a nuisance claim. For instance, consider a homeowner whose son breaks his leg in a car crash with a negligent driver, rendering him unable to navigate the stairs at home. Even if the homeowner must spend time and resources to assist her son in moving about the house, she would have no nuisance claim against the driver on the ground that the driver interfered with her use and enjoyment of her property….
* * *
Because all of the Plaintiffs’ causes of action fail for the reasons stated, we need not determine whether they are entirely barred by § 230 and by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution….
Jonathan H. Blavin and Victoria A. Degtyareva (Munger, Tolles & Olson), Paul J. Watford, Bailey J. Langner, David P. Mattern and Geoffrey M. Drake (King & Spalding), Mark W. Mosier, Ashley M. Simonsen and Christian J. Pistilli (Covington & Burling), and Ashley W. Hardin, George A. Borden and Neelum J. Wadhwani (Williams & Connolly) represent the defendants.
