In the life of a parliament, while the moment of decision is defined by the majority, control always belongs to the opposition. These classic roles have been complemented by the so‑called political-impulse powers, which cluster the instruments through which cooperation between the parliament and the Government is articulated and in which the Government, with its majority, retains decision-making capacity. The Constitution, unlike the statutes of autonomy that many regions already use, does not assign the impulse function to the Congress and the Senate; yet the rules of both chambers have gradually introduced a series of instruments with a low level of parliamentary oversight and a strong propositional content.
The reminder of such simple rules becomes a necessity to shed light on the conflict staged in these past days in the Congress of Deputies. It all originates in an urgent interpellation (an instrument of parliamentary control) directed at the vice president regarding his assessment of the Government’s state of extreme weakness, which gave rise to a motion (an instrument of parliamentary impulse) in which the questioning group took a stand, and which was ultimately voted on point by point on June 25. To this motion, amendments were submitted by the proposing group and by the Junts group, to push for elections in response to the Government’s weakness. The Bureau rejected the amendments, as well as the reconsideration petition, arguing, according to press reports, that both amendments invaded “constitutional competencies reserved to the Presidency of the Government.” In other words, for them, in our parliamentary system, the premature dissolution of one or both chambers (Article 115 of the Constitution) is the exclusive prerogative of the Prime Minister, and asking for it through a formalized route constitutes “an unconstitutional limitation” of that prerogative.
With this decision, the essences of rationalized parliamentarism and a potential abuse of the functions of rating and admitting initiatives by the Congress’s Bureau have been mixed together.
“The regulations of both chambers have introduced a series of instruments with a low level of parliamentary control and a strong propositional content”
The model of rationalized parliamentarism that the Constitution has consecrated forbids certain things, such as, for example, that the president can be dismissed without a no-confidence motion or that the Senate processes a no-confidence motion. But anything that is not expressly regulated with concrete legal effects by the constitutional norm is not prohibited and must remain in the fluidity of the relations between the Government and parliament. The constituent regulated the relations between them as he wished and to the extent he wished to make it almost impossible to end the mandate of a Government.
This is not a new dilemma and it was reasonably resolved in the first legislature in the context of the toxic-oil health crisis. After an interpellation, motions of censure against several Government members for their poor management were presented. In response, it was argued that our parliamentary regime had provided only one instrument for demanding governmental accountability—the no-confidence motion—because the political responsibility of the Government was solidary. Against this reductive interpretation, another, more flexible one prevailed that maximized the mandates of Article 98.2 of the Constitution, which states that “the president directs the Government’s action and coordinates the functions of the other members of the same, ‘without prejudice to the competence and direct responsibility of these in their management’.” The Congress’s competence was grounded on the assertion that instruments for demanding political responsibility did not exhaust themselves with the no-confidence motion. The effects of this were clearly specified in the Constitution; while in the rest of the cases the constitutional silence prevented the automatic removal of a Government member. The message of the reproach is directed at the Prime Minister, who is the only one who, under Article 100 of the Constitution, can appoint and dismiss ministers. The power to reproach extended to the Senate, and in this chamber it was there that an individual reproach against a Government member first prevailed.
“The constituent regulated the relations between both as he wished and to the extent he wished to ensure that ending a Government’s term would be almost impossible”
The behavior of the Congress’s Bureau reiterates an important trend that, over the last twenty years, has led it to assume an increasingly prominent role in permitting or blocking the processing of matters. Focusing on the argument offered in this case, up to 1990 (STC 205/1990), the Constitutional Court held that the power of admissibility of matters was a strictly regulated power and its basic function was to allow matters to flow so as not to impede public debate and parliamentary decision-making. That year, it accepted that when internal norms granted it discretionary power, it should decide if denial was reasoned and reasonable, and at the same time it accepted that the unconstitutionality of the initiative, its mismatch with its regulatory nature, or the failure to meet a formal requirement could be a sufficient reason to impede processing, provided there was motivation.
It also warned that, if a conflict were raised, it would evaluate the suitability of the organ’s decision. Although cases of inadmissibility have become more frequent, the basic rule remains that the Bureau must keep the procedure open if there is no clearly prohibitive rule. In this case there is no express constitutional or regulatory rule preventing the processing of motions with this content. Moreover, since this concerns a proposal originating from the opposition, even if approved by the chamber’s majority, it would not bind the Government or the majority, because the political direction of the State is decided by the Government and the Prime Minister’s power to dissolve and call elections is not legally conditioned.
Each day, through different channels, the opposition requests early dissolution and the calling of elections; so this would have been just another such instance if the Bureau, with its questionable action, had not blocked the processing of the amendments, thereby making the Government’s weakness even more evident.
