A guest post from Professor Arthur Hellman.
I have devoted substantial attention to Judge Ross’s extrajudicial conduct. I have also examined how the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council, with Chief Judge Pryor playing a central role, has dealt with the matter. Last Friday I raised concerns about the way Judge Pryor handled Judge Ross’s apology correspondence:
What gives Chief Judge Pryor the authority to act this way? Did the other, unnamed members of the Council approve this approach? Moreover, it appears that Pryor chose not to pursue further inquiry once Judge Ross transformed a private reprimand into a public one. By what authority could he do that? Judge Ross would have rejected any reprimand that was made public. Pryor’s actions effectively overturned the foundational element of the Judicial Council’s agreement with Judge Ross.
I am grateful that Professor Arthur Hellman tackles some of these questions in the guest post that follows.
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The ongoing judicial-misconduct proceedings involving Federal District Judge Eleanor Ross of Atlanta continue to provoke disagreement, much of it intensified by a high-profile exposé published by the New York Times on June 11. In this guest piece I will call attention to seven (mostly) procedural irregularities and offer ideas for how to repair the mess into which the proceedings have fallen. These points may strike some as technical, and to some extent they are, but they center on a fundamental question: who gets to decide? The post assumes readers are familiar with prior developments, as summarized in the Times article.
A. Bypassing the Judicial Council
The Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council’s February 11, 2026 order (adopting the findings and recommendations of the Council’s Special Committee that investigated the matter) stated: “Any apology issued in connection with the sanction should be sufficiently specific so as to make clear to the recipient the sexual misconduct for which the judge is apologizing.” This order was made public on May 22, when the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability (JC&D Committee) issued its accompanying order affirming it.
On June 8, four of Judge Ross’s former law clerks—who had expressed discomfort about sexual activity occurring in the judge’s chambers and had prompted the initial complaint—wrote to the Judicial Council, stating that they did not believe the three-sentence apology letters they had received met the stated standard. The law clerks sent their letter to Chief Judge William Pryor, who, on June 10, asked Judge Ross to respond to the “allegations” and to indicate whether she had provided adequate apologies to her former law clerks. He warned that if her response failed to satisfy the questions, she could face concerns beyond the private reprimand she had already received. He gave her until June 12 to respond.
On June 11, Judge Ross sent new letters to the law clerks and informed Judge Pryor of her actions. Pryor replied with a second letter, also on June 11, effectively stating that he would take no further action against Judge Ross. With Judge Ross’s consent, Pryor disclosed the new apology letters to The New York Times, which ran a second story on June 12.
Judge Pryor’s brief letter did not specify whether Judge Ross had submitted any responses beyond the new letters. From the public record, it is reasonable to infer that Judge Ross acknowledged, at least implicitly, that her initial apology letters were not adequate.
The procedural problem here is that the apology requirement formed part of the sanctions imposed by the Judicial Council—the sole body authorized to impose sanctions under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (JCDA). By alerting Judge Ross to the potential inadequacy of the first set of apology letters, Judge Pryor effectively invited her to draft a revised set that would be treated as compliant. That is precisely how Judge Ross interpreted the letter. But it seems to me that only the Council could properly determine (a) whether Judge Ross should be given a second chance to comply with the apology provision of the February 11 order and (b) if so, whether the new letters actually complied.
The February 11 Judicial Council order determined that a private reprimand was an adequate sanction, and therefore it did not identify Judge Ross. Chief Judge Pryor’s June 10 and June 11 letters constitute the first official acknowledgment that Judge Ross is the “Subject Judge” referred to in the order. Pryor’s two letters have been posted on the Eleventh Circuit’s website. Yet the February 11 order remains unchanged, and, to our knowledge, the Council has not been afforded an opportunity to reconsider its sanction or how it should be reported. Once again, Pryor chose to bypass the Council.
Chief Judge Pryor’s June 11 letter stated that he had decided not to identify a second complaint against Judge Ross. But under the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings (JC&D Rules) he could, instead, have identified a new complaint and then either dismissed it or concluded the proceeding. The JC&D Rules Commentary (pp. 14–15) notes: “In high-visibility situations, it may be desirable for a chief judge to identify a complaint … (and then, if the circumstances warrant, dismiss or conclude the identified complaint without appointment of a special committee) to assure the public that the allegations have not been ignored.” That may appear to be a distinction without a practical difference, but in fact it matters. Under another provision (Rule 11(g)(3)), if Pryor had identified a complaint and then issued a final disposition, that disposition would have been subject to automatic review by the Judicial Council. By sending a letter rather than issuing a formal order, Pryor bypassed that automatic-review mechanism.
B. Other Concerns
The analysis thus far has shown why Chief Judge Pryor’s June 11 letter effectively prevented the Judicial Council from exercising its statutory role and determining whether Judge Ross had complied with its original order. But that is not the only concern raised by the exchange of letters on June 10 and 11.
As noted, Pryor’s June 11 letter has been posted on the court of appeals’ website, which is commendable. However, Judge Ross’s second apology letter is not included as an attachment. The letter itself is embedded in the June 12 New York Times article, but that cannot substitute for its being included in an official document.
Pryor’s June 10 letter mentions Judge Ross’s “admission of misconduct” and “expression of remorse,” asserting that these factors “informed the discipline imposed by the Circuit Judicial Council.” Yet the February 11 order contains no admission of misconduct or expression of remorse, and the June 11 letters address only the harm caused to the law clerks. Neither the February 11 order nor Judge Ross’s June 11 letter to the clerks mentions an “admission of misconduct” or “expression of remorse” about the harm she inflicted on fellow judges and the federal judiciary.
I believe the Council should have demanded broader expressions. Consider, by way of illustration, a 2002 proceeding involving a single violation of the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, in which a judge wrote to another judge urging leniency in sentencing a criminal defendant and then issued a public letter saying: “For this act, I am deeply sorry and I sincerely apologize to the Judicial Council and to my fellow judges in the First Circuit.” I recognize that the Council could not have compelled such an apology from Judge Ross without exposing her identity publicly. But that very fact underscores the Council’s error in withholding her identity.
In explaining why the Council concluded that the private reprimand was adequate, the February 11 order listed three factors, one of which was “the Subject Judge’s otherwise exemplary service to the court.” That assertion was dubious on its face. The order itself provided no concrete examples of “exemplary service”; indeed, the Committee report stated that the Committee was troubled by the judge’s own admission of a lack of engagement in civil cases.
Even if one could defend the premise that the judge offered “otherwise exemplary service” at the time the Council issued its order, the claim collapsed on June 11, when the New York Times published its article. The Times story augmented the committee’s reference to “lack of engagement” in civil cases by quoting clerks who described how it was not unusual for the judge to go for long stretches without substantial communication—apart from a brief email—until a draft order was sent.
The Times piece not only undermines one of the Council’s reasons for preferring a private reprimand; it may also cast doubt on the Council’s conclusion that the “lack of engagement” did not amount to misconduct.
Finally, one sentence in Judge Ross’s second apology letter—mentioned but not quoted in the Times’ June 12 article about the new letters—stands out: “I apologize for my false accusation against you.” There it is, bluntly stated: Judge Ross admits that she falsely accused a subordinate to derail an investigation of her own misconduct. It can be argued that even a single such act is conduct so devoid of integrity that anyone who engages in it is unfit for judicial office, and no apology could suffice to purge the stain.
C. What Can Be Done?
The way the initial complaint was handled by the Eleventh Circuit was problematic, and Pryor’s response to the clerks’ letter has made matters worse. So what, if anything, can be done?
In ordinary circumstances, the most promising route would be for Chief Judge Pryor to identify a new complaint. Yet he has indicated he will not do so. I can see two alternative paths.
First, “any person” could file a complaint alleging that Judge Ross’s second apology letter did not comply with the February 11 order and thus constituted a failure to cooperate that itself amounts to misconduct. The complaint could contend that the initial letters did not meet the standard, and that Pryor lacked authority to grant a second chance. The complainant could request transfer of the matter to a different circuit for consideration. The judges who hear the matter might revisit some of the initial allegations. A precedent for a reopening of issues exists, for example in 2006, when the Special Committee revisited points in a case involving District Judge Manuel Real of Los Angeles.
Second, the JC&D Committee could, sua sponte, reach down to the Judicial Council and direct it to reopen the proceeding in light of the new developments. There is nothing in the statute or the JC&D Rules that explicitly authorizes such a move, but there is also nothing that clearly forbids it. (It could be viewed as a form of rehearing or recall of the mandate.)
If the initiative were taken in this fashion, it could lay the groundwork for the Judicial Conference itself to transmit to the House of Representatives, under section 355 of the Judicial Code, a “determination that impeachment consideration may be warranted.” Two Members of Congress have already introduced impeachment resolutions (see here and here), but it would be preferable for the Judiciary to fulfill the preparatory role Congress anticipated when it enacted the JCDA.
