The civic association +Democracia awarded in Valencia its “+Demo 2026 prize for civic and democratic commitment” to Professor Daniel Innerarity. This is a recognition of reflection on democracy and the various elements that affect it. In his (so far) latest book, The Future of Democracy, Innerarity analyzes its strengths and weaknesses, the crisis that erodes it, polarization, identity, technology, the radical right and, above all, he speaks to us about the future of democracy in a text rich with relevant ideas.
I believe it is useful to focus on some aspects of this analysis in order to face squarely this turbulent time (pardon the euphemism) in which there has been for some time a progressive erosion of the functioning of democracies within the context of a rising wave of growing acrimony, in which some implicit norms, some shared assumptions about the acceptable conduct within a democracy have been shattered. In his How Democracies Die, Levitsky and Ziblatt concentrate on three of these implicit norms: mutual tolerance, restraint in the instrumentalization of institutions, and acceptance of the legitimacy of the rival. In his Fire and Ashes, Michael Ignatieff points to the right to be heard.
In The Future of Democracy, Innerarity correctly tells us that the analysis must differentiate between the “bad” and the “evils” of democracy. The bads, depending on who you ask, are populisms, fascisms, illiberalisms, conspiracists, even social networks that give rise to endless hoaxes and that lie at the base of what Sánchez-Cuenca identified as the phenomenon of disintermediation. The evils are crucial, they are “more relevant and more harmful” (p. 27) because they depend on the design of institutions. A defective design opens gaps for the opportunistic conduct of political actors, so Innerarity differentiates between design pathologies and pathologies of use. The combination of both is disastrous, as seen in the blockage of renewing the General Council of the Judiciary or the attenuated or non-existent function of territorial representation of the Senate. From here follows that a robust democracy rests on strengthened institutions capable of anticipating their own faults and protecting themselves from them rather than relying on the goodwill or judgment of the actors who occupy them.
“A defective design opens gaps for opportunistic behavior by political actors, which is why Innerarity differentiates between design pathologies and pathologies of use”
But no matter how well designed, Innerarity tells us, democracy never makes everyone happy, since it is a system of government that generates continual disappointment whose success lies in “distributing that disappointment with the greatest possible fairness” (p. 34). These disappointments (or frustrations in Hofstadter’s terminology) arise because no political actor achieves the totality of their objectives. This is the essence of democracy. Democracy implies plurality, and majority rule does not exempt cooperation with minorities. And to cooperate implies concessions from all sides. We cooperate with rivals, with adversaries, but not with enemies, whom we annihilate (symbolically in democracy) and do not confer legitimacy as political actors. Therefore it is worrying the abundant perception among political elites that those who do not think politically like me are my enemies.
This is one of the erosion elements of democracies that has its inverse spearhead in the idea of the “consent of the losers” (pp. 47, 351). Innerarity tells us that democracy requires loyalty anchored in the notion that minorities (those who do not govern) consider the decisions of the majorities binding and legitimate. But for that a certain degree of inclusion of the minority positions (the opposition) in the majority decisions that back government action is required.
And here we may have a problem. In Spanish institutional politics the tradition of cooperating with rivals, of making an effort to incorporate some of the adversaries’ proposals gradually fades, so that everyone ends up somewhat equally disappointed, not necessarily and strictly victorious. Yet, as shown in several studies, the capacity of the actors who support governments to bring the opposition on board (even in the most unfavorable scenarios) is high, though it declines across legislative terms and especially in the most recent one. Therefore, facing an uncertain future, it is prudent to reflect on defending democracy: “Defending democracy requires that no one be excluded, it requires forms of conversation and deliberation that assume the opponent’s willingness to confront alternative viewpoints” (p. 43). But, above all, in the face of some of the “bad guys” with electoral appeal, Innerarity proposes the “recovery of those who vote for those troubling options” who enter the democratic political game breaking the implicit norms, not believing in democracy and seeking simple solutions to complex problems. It is urgent to bring back to democracy those who have already disbelieved in it or lend it only weak support. And these are concentrated in certain political formations.
“It is urgent to recover for democracy those who have already disbelieved in it or lend it weak support”
One of the strategies that can be gleaned from Innerarity’s text is the emergence of a leadership mindful of kindness. Innerarity tells us (p. 115) that kindness does not deny conflict, but accepts it and redirects it to collaboratively build, also modulating the duration and intensity of its negative consequences. There play a crucial role both the ability to acknowledge mistakes (how many times do we see a political leader admit they were wrong?) and the sense of humor that reduces drama and, when intelligent, helps to combat fanaticism and extremism, as Innerarity suggests. Cooperation is a survival mechanism in successful species that face diverse conflicts and engage in competitive dynamics. Antagonistic cooperation requires mutual trust derived from frequent interactions and, also, from the establishment of personal relationships prior to recognizing the other’s legitimacy. When neither is present, building trust is difficult and cooperation suffers.
The climate of visible politics in Spain seems so degraded that it will be difficult from the next elections onward to maintain a minimum level of trust necessary for that antagonistic cooperation that is the pillar of a robust democracy to be built. It harms us all.
