The crisis in the Middle East, and especially the effects of the war that the United States and Israel have launched against Iran, and which has led Tehran to block the Strait of Hormuz, triggering a severe crisis in energy prices, continues to dominate the European agenda. It will be one of the major topics when the Foreign Ministers meet this Monday in Brussels, and it will be another major topic when the Energy Ministers hold an informal meeting in Cyprus at the end of the week.
Everyone in the European capital is aware of the direct impact the situation has on Europe, which was already facing significant challenges even before the operation against Iran was launched: structurally higher electricity prices than those of its competitors, a competitiveness crisis, an anemic economic growth and a need to allocate a substantial amount of resources to rearmament in anticipation of the return of war to the continent with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The last time Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, offered a figure on the cost generated by the war against Iran, the German explained that Europeans are having to spend 500 million euros more each day to buy the same amount of hydrocarbons as before the crisis. But that economic bill is only the tip of the iceberg.
“As it is evident to all that the United States has failed in its operation against Iran, it is the European Union that faces a much worse situation than before the war.”
Europe is paying a bill that goes far beyond the rise in hydrocarbon prices. It is paying the price of a decision, hampered by its divisions, its dependencies, and its lack of a shared geopolitical vision, to have assumed the role of passive spectator regarding its own direct interests. As it becomes clear to all that the United States has failed in its operation against Iran, the European Union faces a situation much worse than before the war: the aforementioned surging energy prices, the chaotic situation in Lebanon, a key partner that is now far more unstable, the threat of a humanitarian crisis, and a weakening of security across the region.
The latest and saddest chapter of that complacency, a product of the psyche of a history-weary continent with a deep desire to stay out of global events, was lived in the response to the launch of the attack on Iran. With the exception of the Spanish government, which opted for a more frontal message against the actions of the U.S. administration, the other capitals opted for a range of reactions that ranged from a low-key complaint—with France and Italy gradually joining—to full support for the operation, as Germany did, believing that backing would be useful for a real regime change or, at least, would facilitate a short conflict.
Facing the first test of the United States’ role in this new era of brute force unbound by the molds and formalities of the previous global order, Europe has been able to see two things: that all the rhetorical instruments used in the past are useless and that the United States will not take responsibility for the negative consequences for others of projecting its power. When people speak of breaking the transatlantic bond, it is usually reduced to NATO’s survival, but it also includes that lack of interest or sensitivity toward allies that is being seen in the Iran crisis. The United States attacked Iran in coordination with Israel without even informing the Atlantic Council, but immediately afterward the White House wants others to take responsibility for resolving the adverse effects of its unilateral actions.
“The new world of brute force consists of the disappearance of mitigation and checks mechanisms that established theoretical limits which, at least, forced masking”
Of course, the United States has acted outside the legal framework in the past. The new world of brute force does not consist in brushing aside the use of aggression in the past by the great powers, but in the disappearance of the mitigation and checks mechanisms that established theoretical limits which, at least, forced masking. “One could argue that the powerful have always done whatever they pleased, ignoring the constraints of the law. But […] before Trump, U.S. presidents still considered illegality as a problem to be resolved or, at least, disguised. The need to appear legitimate before the world, and especially before the American people,” wrote in mid-April Hans Kribbe, analyst at the Brussels Institute for Geopolitics (BIG) think tank.
Europe should draw three urgent conclusions from this situation. The first and most obvious is that the green transition is a geostrategic priority. Proponents of retreating from the Green Deal spend too much time lamenting that the rest of the competitors outside the EU enjoy lower energy prices and much looser standards and regulations, which means they have lower costs. In the face of that argument one must ask: is Europe America or China? The answer, obvious, is no. Complaining that reality is different from how we would like it to be does not make much sense. If Europe extends its dependence on hydrocarbons that it cannot obtain within its own territory, it exposes itself to new crises like the current one.
The second relates to power. When Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, stated that Europe could not keep defending an “obsolete global order”, the German sought to put on the table a discourse intended to defend a more realistic and hard-edged European vision of international relations. It was an unfortunate intervention in which many interpreted that Von der Leyen was arguing that international law had become obsolete. Although her speech stirred up a huge controversy, there were ideas in it that were solid and had been simmering for some time.
“Medium powers, to which Europe now belongs, must do what they can to protect themselves from the negative effects of this new order”
Europe must understand that in this new world of naked power it needs to be capable and ready to make use of the full range of instruments available to exert power. Not merely to project force, not as a zero-sum game, but as a way precisely of defending a multilateral model and international law, without necessarily that system having to be the same as after 1945 or 1989, clearly surpassed. The great powers are no longer willing to pretend to play by those rules, so the middle powers, to which Europe now belongs, must do what they can to shield themselves from the negative effects of this new order and strive to bring forth a new governance mechanism.
The third is that trying to accommodate the United States, trusting that the consequences will be limited, is naive. European leaders left the Greenland crisis convinced that being blunt and clear with the U.S. administration had prevented an unprecedented crisis. They should apply the same logic to those matters that, while not internal EU issues, also have a direct impact on Europe, as has happened with the Gulf crisis. But they should also take an extra leap: anything that fuels the law of the strongest, that accelerates the process of eroding respect for international law, wherever it occurs, goes directly against European interests, even when the one suffering the direct negative effects is a rival as direct and savage as the regime of the ayatollahs.
