For much of the 20th century, Europe stood as the world’s demographic and economic epicenter. In 1900, the nations that now form the European Union accounted for about 25% of the world’s population and more than 40% of global GDP. By the mid-century, after two devastating wars and a reconstruction process that fed a new cycle of prosperity, the continent —even as it yielded to American hegemonic dominance— still carried a decisive weight in population and economy on a planetary scale.
Today, however, that reality has changed radically. In 2025, the EU accounts for barely 5.5% of the planet’s population and around 14% of global GDP. If the current trend continues and we do not pivot our migration policies, by 2100 Europe will be the most aged space in the world, with an average age over 50 and a population that could fall below 400 million inhabitants. In a planet that will exceed 10,000 million people, the European space could definitively become a demographic, economic, and political periphery.
“For the European Union (and Europe) to have a prosperous future, immigration is not only necessary, but indispensable”
In my previous article, “The world is reordering,” hinted at, in broad strokes, some general coordinates of the world’s demographic map. Europe is aging, America is maturing, Africa is growing, and Asia is reorganizing. In light of this demographic perspective, and amid the constant proliferation of anti-immigration discourse within the European project, one asks: Does old Europe have a future? The hypothesis of this article is clear: for the countries of the European Union (and Europe) to have a prosperous future—maintaining welfare states and sustainable development indicators—immigration is not only necessary, but indispensable.
The three demographic blocks of Europe
Recent data confirm this structural dependency. In 2024, Europe’s net population growth—about one million people—was solely due to a positive migration balance. If it weren’t for this, Europe would already be on a trajectory of accelerated decline. The demographic map, however, is not uniform and sketches three large blocks that reveal how deeply the continent’s demographic vulnerability is tied to how each country structures public policies, especially those on welfare, employment, and migration.
In the first block, composed of the oldest countries —Hungary, Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, the Baltic states, and even Italy—, demographic, migratory, identity-related and reactive policies have forged a vicious circle: fewer births, more emigration, and political resistance to immigration that accelerates population contraction. With fertility rates between 1.2 and 1.3 children per woman and a median age above 45, these nations face a shrinking demographic base that jeopardizes growth potential and economic sustainability. Emigration, especially of educated young people, to various Western European countries, worsens internal imbalances.
“In some cases, such as Bulgaria or Lithuania, the total population has fallen by more than 20% since 1990, a figure without precedent in peacetime”
In some cases, like Bulgaria or Lithuania, total population has fallen by more than 20% since 1990, a figure without precedent in peacetime. Yet this scenario finds its most vivid illustration in Italy. Rome has long been one of the EU’s driving engines and the third economy in the eurozone (still above Spain), but today it embodies the demographic crisis with particular intensity. With 1.2 children per woman, its population is aging and shrinking while thousands of highly skilled youths migrate within the EU, especially to Germany (12.8%) and—note this figure—Spain (12.1%). As the magazine Internazionale noted this week: “Italy’s problem is emigration, not immigration.” Reactive immigration policies (such as the emergency stance on immigration, described here by Ruth Ferrero-Turrión) deepen Italian demographic decline, marking demography as a vulnerability for its present and future development and competitiveness.
The second bloc brings together countries that show a certain demographic stability or even slight growth, though almost entirely sustained by immigration —especially Spain, Germany, Portugal, or Belgium—. These economies, with birth rates oscillating around the European mean (1.2–1.4 children per woman), have found in immigration a mechanism of demographic and economic compensation. In the case of Spain, for instance, the population rose from 40.5 million in 1999 to around 50 million by 2025, an increase of nearly 20% in a European context of stagnation. In general, this permeability has allowed them to sustain or even boost their economic growth.
Therefore, Spain offers a notable lesson. Despite a very low birth rate —1.3 children per woman— the country has maintained sustained population growth over the last two decades thanks to immigration. Between 2000 and 2023, the country has welcomed more than seven million migrants, and this has decisively contributed to sustaining employment, tax revenues, and generational renewal across broad sectors. That demographic vitality, coupled with a positive integration process, also helps explain part of Spain’s sustained economic growth compared with other more aging economies. But the challenge does not end there. As we will discuss in the final article in this series, consolidating a fully integrated second generation, securing housing access, and achieving territorial cohesion remain structural challenges of Spain’s demographic process.
The third bloc consists of countries —such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, or France— that maintain relatively higher birth rates (1.6–1.9 children per woman) and a growing population thanks to public policies and migratory flows kept over time. It is clear that some of them face positive integration processes, but beyond the demographic data, the economic figures regarding the contribution of migrant populations are indisputable: while their budgetary impact is very limited, they help sustain the balance between working and non-working people, and their net contribution to the economy and public finances is decisive.
Immigration is positive and necessary
In the face of the advance of identitarian discourses that aim to blame migrants for all social ills, it is necessary to state clearly—from a democratic perspective and oriented toward the common good—the objective value that immigration brings to the dynamic economic and social life of European countries. As Gonzalo Fanjul and Carles Campuzano noted in these pages, “fostering immigration should be a matter for both the left and the right”. It is not only a matter of strict respect for human rights, but of recognizing that, without migrant contributions, Europe would quickly see its economy and its demographic pyramid deteriorate.
Similarly, it is clear that public policies must ensure solid processes of social and labor integration. But there should be no room, whether from defending fundamental rights or from the responsibility toward the country’s economic and social development, for discourses that fuel hatred with a single aim: to raise their percentage of the vote by concealing that their proposals would sink the demographic and economic future of their own country.
“No developed country, whether Western or Eastern in cultural origin, has managed to sustainably reverse demographic decline through pro-natalist policies”
It is important to emphasize, in the face of ultraconservative identitarian promises, that no developed country, whether Western or Eastern in cultural roots, has managed to sustain a reversal of demographic decline through natalist policies. Temporary mitigating effects can be achieved with incentives, but all cases —from Hungary to South Korea, from Poland to Japan, from France to Singapore or China— show that rebounds are fleeting, extremely costly, and structurally insufficient. Advanced societies have not found a way to restore birth rates without turning to immigration.
On the map of European demography, clear conclusions emerge. First, there is a direct link between reactive migration policies and demographic crisis. Countries that have chosen restrictive or hostile migration policies —Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, the Baltic states, or Italy in its recent turn— are compromising their own future. In the electoral heat of identity politics, they are renouncing the most effective instruments of demographic and economic sustainability: openness, integration, and the consolidation of dynamic societies with a sustainable population pyramid that offers better life prospects for all residents.
Secondly, the rural-urban demographic gap accelerates the disconnect between urban areas and rural regions in economic, cultural, social, and electoral terms. Capitals and metropolitan areas concentrate people and opportunities, while vast rural zones and interior regions lose inhabitants, services, and productive capacity. The territorial gap—and its political and electoral expression, which sits at the heart of the rise of the radical right—is, in truth, the starkest expression of the demographic rift. A truly smart demographic policy must also be territorially balanced. It is not enough to attract population: one must create opportunities for a better territorial distribution.
In this sense, there is also a particularly perversely crafted paradox: the less dynamic a society is, the more susceptible it becomes to hate speech; hate speech leads to reactive public policies on immigration; demographic stagnation amplifies the economic crisis, and all of this pushes us toward the consolidation of authoritarian parties. The demographic decline therefore becomes not only a negative social phenomenon but a political accelerant for the most conservative ultra-nationalist forces.
And finally, a positive note. Efficient demographic management — balancing the working-age population, robust welfare states, integrating migrant flows, and active aging policies — is closely tied to good economic outcomes. A larger share of working-age people boosts long-term GDP growth, immigration acts as a motor of economic convergence, the strength of the welfare state provides life opportunities, and healthy aging together with policies that extend active life balance public spending and the demographic pyramid.
“Europe was for two centuries a continent of migrants: between 1850 and 1950, more than 70 million Europeans migrated to the Americas, Oceania, or Africa”
It is also worth remembering that Europe was a continent of migrants for two centuries. Between 1850 and 1950, more than 70 million Europeans migrated to the Americas, Oceania, or Africa, altering the social, economic, and cultural fabric of large parts of the world. Millions of Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Irish, or Germans found opportunities in welcoming and integrating countries. Europe prospered thanks to the opening of other territories when hunger or poverty expelled entire generations. Today the mirror has flipped. And many people now seek to prosper in our societies.
The demographic challenges and political realities
In light of this context, one may ask: Can an aging Europe with demographic decline sustain its social model and its advanced economies? Does it make sense to believe the welfare state can survive without immigration in a setting of structural population decline? Can we tolerate hate speech and anti-immigration policies when economic and social realities demand exactly the opposite? And above all, would those who promote xenophobic rhetoric dare to explain the real consequences their proposals would have on employment, growth, and the sustainability of the welfare state itself?
Without migration, Eurostat projects a population decline of up to 34% by 2100, with devastating effects on employment, pensions, innovation, and Europe’s geopolitical weight. By contrast, projections that envision a Europe capable of dynamic integration show that only active immigration policies can sustain the labor base, productive capacity, and the viability of welfare states. Closing borders, as some irresponsibly advocate, would not eliminate the problem: it would worsen it. A smart policy — streamlined visas, circular mobility, recognition of qualifications, territorial redistribution, an end to hate speech, and investment in integration — turns migration into a driver of growth, cohesion, and fiscal sustainability.
Zygmunt Bauman, a philosopher and migrant who was born in Poland, lived in the Soviet Union, and died in the United Kingdom, reminded us: “Humanity has always moved. What we call migration is not an anomaly but the very condition of our history.” In his last book, The Wasteland, Robert Kaplan observes: “The territorial order of the world is disintegrating. States no longer control their borders or their populations.” And in recent weeks London filled with posters bearing the slogan Thank God for Immigrants—alongside images of Freddie Mercury, Dua Lipa, and other icons of British culture—highlighting the role of immigrants in British society.
It seems evident that the question is inescapable: what future do we want for Europe? Integrate and grow, or expel and shrink? In the geopolitics of demography, Europe must clearly map its strategy and recognize that constructively shaping demographics is essential for enduring vitality.
