Europe isn’t facing merely another crisis—it is witnessing the weariness of an international order that has shaped the world since 1945. This moment runs deep in history. Major global arrangements do not usually unravel gradually; they collapse when the power structures, the economic hierarchies, and the legitimacy of political authorities no longer reflect reality.
That pattern appeared after the Religious Wars and the Peace of Westphalia, which codified the principle of State sovereignty. It recurred after the Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna, which laid the European balance of powers. And it resurfaced after the two World Wars, when for decades the liberal order steered by the U.S. brought order to the economy, security, and global governance. All these orders emerged from painful ruptures and systemic conflicts that redefined the rules of power.
The distinction today is that the move toward a new order has already commenced, but we still lack a framework capable of stabilizing that shift. The equilibrium that formed after 1945 has quickly eroded. Institutions endure, but they’ve lost their capacity to organize the world. Alliances persist, yet they no longer carry the same certainties. The rules survive, but they’re questioned by actors who didn’t participate in their design, or who regard their legitimacy as depleted.
The historic challenge is therefore to grasp the depth of our current transition and to help construct a new international balance before a major confrontation compels one by force.
“The equilibrium that emerged after 1945 has rapidly eroded. Institutions continue to exist, but they’ve lost their ability to order the world”
That’s the essence of the present moment. We are witnessing not only a change of circumstances but simultaneous transformations of the foundations on which the international system was built. Simultaneously, changes are underway in terms of rules, economic dependencies, power dynamics, technological balances, and forms of political competition. In such a setting, inertia ceases to be prudent and becomes a form of strategic blindness.
For decades, Europe operated within a relatively predictable frame. The international order that emerged after World War II offered a network of institutions, alliances, and balances that—despite their contradictions—facilitated the containment of competition among powers and reduced the risk of direct clash. Globalization was interpreted as a process of gradual integration – economic interdependence as a guarantee of stability, and the expansion of liberal democracy as a practically irreversible trend.
This framework hasn’t vanished overnight, but it has ceased to organize international reality in effective ways. The problem extends beyond the rise of new powers; it touches the erosion of the very foundations of our prior order. The link between economic power, military power, and political legitimacy is again contested, and so the international system enters an unavoidable phase of instability.
“The problem goes beyond the rise of new powers and affects the deterioration of the very foundations of our prior order”
Europe’s central problem lies less in change itself than in the difficulty of fully assimilating such a magnitude of change. Resorting to inherited categories to interpret a radically different environment signals not stability but strategic mismatch. Effective foreign policy always begins with a precise diagnosis. That diagnosis requires us to acknowledge that today’s world is more competitive, more fragmented, and less regulated than Europe would wish.
Defending one’s principles demands a proper understanding of the actual terrain on which those principles must be upheld. If an analysis doesn’t adapt to reality, then politics becomes rhetoric.
Geopolitics of dependency
Geopolitical reconfiguration is the first axis of this shift. The international system is moving toward a visibly multipolar order in which several powers openly vie for influence, access to strategic resources, and the authority to set the rules of the game. Yet this redistribution of power has not been accompanied by a fresh framework for shared governance. On the contrary: it coincides with the gradual weakening of multilateralism and with the return of more direct, transactional, and less institutionalized forms of power.
The current period can thus be seen as a phase of international interregnum. The old order loses its effectiveness, but the new one has not yet emerged. In such moments, gray zones proliferate, as do hybrid rivalries and indirect confrontation dynamics.
“The international system is evolving toward an increasingly evident multipolarity in which several powers openly compete”
In this context, a form of competition is solidifying that echoes imperial dynamics. At times, it takes the classical shape of territorial encroachment, as in Ukraine, but it also operates through the capacity to project power via economic, technological, financial, and regulatory instruments. Dependencies become leverage points, supply chains become tools of influence, and critical technologies become agents of strategic control. Coercion assumes more diffuse but no less potent forms.
Europe is especially exposed to this transformation. On one hand, it faces a direct threat in its eastern neighborhood, where Russian aggression has rekindled conventional warfare on the continent, calling into question the fundamental principles of European security. On the other hand, it observes a drastic reconfiguration of the role of the United States, whose foreign policy has shifted toward a logic of immediate, transactional national interest, often accompanied by a disdain for traditional alliances.
The consequence is the erosion of Europe’s strategic reflexes. Although we should avoid a sharp rupture that would multiply risks, the transatlantic relationship has irreversibly changed. The strategic convergence forged during the latter half of the 20th century, aligned by the Cold War, has come to an end. Shared interests will persist, but they’ll be more conditional, more negotiated, and less permanent than in previous decades.
In this new landscape, strategic dependence is no longer sustainable, for simple realism rather than ideology. Europe needs its own capacity to act, precisely when other actors choose not to move in the same direction.
“Russian aggression has reanimated conventional warfare on the continent, calling into question the fundamental principles of European security”
The temptation to read this new environment through a lens of closed blocs—the West against the rest—is both tempting and limiting. That framing oversimplifies a far more intricate reality, and it unnecessarily narrows Europe’s maneuvering space. A growing share of the world does not identify with that division and refuses to be trapped by its binary alignment. For the middle powers, insisting on that framework fails to widen alliances: it constrains them.
Moreover, this evolution intertwines with a profound economic transformation. Globalization no longer follows the depoliticized efficiency script of recent decades. Today it is intersected by security concerns, technological rivalry, and strategic competition. Trade, energy, infrastructure, and data have ceased to be only economic domains and have become central instruments of power.
This dramatically alters the premises on which Europe built much of its economic model. For years, it was assumed that trade liberalization and global integration would yield shared prosperity and political stability. Now it’s clear that interdependence also creates vulnerability. Critical dependencies can be exploited, supply chains can be disrupted, and competitive advantages can be redefined through policy choices.
Economic neutrality has faded away.
In this new milieu, the dominant European economic paradigm shows increasing signs of fatigue. The notion that the market alone can guarantee efficient allocation in any situation becomes hollow in a setting where other powers actively deploy industrial policy, technological dominance, massive subsidies, and strategic intervention to shape outcomes.
The debate can no longer be reduced to intervention versus non-intervention. The crucial question is whether Europe possesses a coherent strategy for effective intervention.
European sovereignty in a multipolar world
This diagnosis demands redefining the balance between openness and protection, competition and resilience, markets and public capacity. Rather than mimicking others’ models, Europe must craft its own strategy, tailored to its distinctive traits. Economic autonomy doesn’t mean isolation; it means the capacity to decide within an environment of conflictual interdependence.
“The idea that the market alone can guarantee efficient allocation in whatever circumstance becomes meaningless”
To this double transformation we can add a third: the core of Europe’s democratic systems is being reshaped by tensions stemming from economic, technological, and cultural shifts that alter traditional modes of political mediation in profound ways. The rise of large digital platforms capable of shaping public discourse introduces an unprecedented dimension to democratic competition.
Simultaneously, authoritarian movements and illiberal forces are increasingly operating across borders. They pool resources, narratives, and strategies, leveraging a transnational digital ecosystem. Democracy is being undermined not only from external pressures but also from internal currents.
All of these forces converge in a fourth transformation: the West’s relative centrality is slipping. The international system is being reorganized around new centers of power that do not necessarily share Europe’s priorities, interests, or historical references. This does not automatically render Europe irrelevant, but it does demand deep adaptation.
Europe has ceased to be the organizing hub of the international system and has become one actor among several with meaningful influence.
“Regulatory capacity is still an important asset, but it depends more and more on our ability to project economic, technological, and geopolitical power”Here arises one of the West’s key strategic difficulties: the persistence of a world view that remains overly self-referential. Regulatory power remains valuable, but its impact increasingly hinges on Europe’s ability to project economic, technological, and geopolitical capacity. Without influence, rules and norms lose their bite.
The response cannot be withdrawal. It must be a strategic redefinition.
First, our response should revolve around the notion of effective European sovereignty. Sovereignty isn’t about reclaiming national competences in isolation; it is about building a shared capacity for decision-making. In a world ruled by major powers, scale matters. And the only scale capable of maintaining a genuine capacity to influence for Europe’s citizens is continental scale.
This means advancing integration and the single market where our real power is found: defense, energy, industry, finance, artificial intelligence, critical technologies, and strategic infrastructure. It also entails the creation of common financial instruments able to sustain long-term investments and lessen structural dependencies.
Sovereignty isn’t a slogan but the cumulative outcome of strategic decisions pursued over time.
Furthermore, Europe must redefine its role in geopolitics and the global economy. Diversifying ties has become an urgent structural imperative, to reduce vulnerabilities and broaden maneuvering room. In a world of asymmetric interdependencies, reducing reliance on any single actor is a fundamental element of autonomy.
Here Europe must abandon both naivety and the binary logic of automatic alignment. The emerging world won’t be organized around two closed blocs— it will be a terrain of variable balances, flexible partnerships, and relationships that are simultaneously competitive and cooperative.
“This architecture for strategic diversification will allow Europe to broaden its room for maneuver in an increasingly competitive and fragmented world”
It is sensible for Europe to pursue a repositioning strategy grounded in its internal connections and in cooperation with other actors capable of safeguarding our shared interests and contributing to the emergence of a new multilateralism: Brazil, Mexico, India, and China. More than a simple alternative bloc or formal alliance, this architecture for strategic diversification will enable Europe to widen its room for maneuver in a world that is increasingly competitive and fragmented.
Brazil stands as a key partner for Europe in the global reorganization of energy, industry, and climate action and in rebuilding multilateralism. Ratification of the EU-Mercosur accord will deepen our ties with South America’s leading nation and consolidate bonds with a region crucial to the green transition, critical minerals, and food security—all amid growing geopolitical competition over influence and investment.
Mexico occupies a distinctive position thanks to its industrial integration with North America and its growing geoeconomic weight. The modernization of the EU-Mexico Global Agreement offers Europe a chance to reinforce strategic, economic, and technological ties and to access new transatlantic value chains within a framework of industrial diversification and reduced dependency.
India embodies the multipolar-autonomy logic typical of rising great powers: cooperation, but without automatic alignment. The prospect of finalizing the EU-India association agreement swiftly signals India’s growing importance as a premier economic, technological, and geopolitical partner; it also highlights Europe’s need to bolster its presence in the Indo-Pacific.
Relations with China will be the true benchmark of Europe’s strategic autonomy. Europe must chart its approach to Beijing in line with its own interests, not in service of others’ priorities. This will require pairing cooperation with firmness, demanding reciprocity, ensuring fair competition, and maintaining stable channels of dialogue while managing disagreements pragmatically.
Europe cannot afford to approach China with naïveté, nor can it pursue systemic confrontation. Europe’s interest lies in promoting its industrial base and defending its economic engagement, while pursuing cooperation on major global challenges that can only be tackled through collaboration between Europe and China.
This approach will be particularly crucial given the risk of Europe ending up caught between two simultaneous pressures: the eastern threat from Russia and the prospect of increasingly transactional policies from a United States less invested in European stability. In that light, expanding relationships and diversifying interdependencies are not just tactical options; they are strategic necessities of the highest order.
Because in a multipolar world, having multiple options amounts to geopolitical insurance.
But no foreign policy will be credible if Europe first resolves its internal constraints. The European Union still faces tremendous challenges when it comes to timely decision-making, coordinating positions, and turning its economic heft into real political leverage. Institutional fragmentation weakens its effectiveness exactly when the international context requires greater agility and strategic clarity.
Europe must make decisions faster, accept greater political risk, and discard the illusion that permanent ambiguity can be a sustainable strategy. In international politics, indecision is not neutral—it has consequences.
Europe still possesses exceptional assets: its economic scale, technological prowess, regulatory influence, institutional stability, and its unique historical experience with the costs of conflict. But assets aren’t safeguarded by inertia; they depend on the ability to read the historical moment in which they operate.
Because the great transition is already underway. The balance that emerged after 1945 has ceased to impose order on the world; simultaneously, the new order has not yet crystallized. In such a vacuum, powers reposition themselves, dependencies become weapons, and wars no longer seem impossible.
Europe thus confronts a singular and historic responsibility: to help construct a new international balance without waiting for a fresh catastrophe to compel it.
