Federal Court Denies Dismissal in Lawsuit Against SPLC

Some excerpts from a lengthy opinion by Judge Emily Marks (M.D. Ala.) issued Friday in U.S. v. Southern Poverty Law Center, Inc.:

This dispute centers on the Government’s—specifically, the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Alabama’s—decision to bring charges against the Southern Poverty Law Center. The SPLC asserts that it is subjected to vindictive prosecution at the urging of various political actors—including the President—for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment.

To address this alleged constitutional violation, the SPLC seeks dismissal of the indictment or, alternatively, discovery into the Government’s prosecutorial motives. The Government opposes the SPLC’s request in full, contending that “this indictment was secured based on the law and the facts uncovered during a federal investigation.” The briefing, like much contemporary political discourse, is dense with heated rhetoric, more suitable for cable television discussions or podcasts, and it emphasizes rhetoric over substance.

After stripping away the noise, the Court must decide only whether the Government’s choice to prosecute the SPLC was constitutionally improper. On these facts, the SPLC is not entitled to discovery or dismissal of the indictment. It has not produced evidence suggesting animus by the prosecutors involved in this case, nor showing that such animus caused the prosecution—precisely the showing required to obtain discovery. Because it cannot meet that standard, it cannot meet the higher threshold needed for dismissal. Accordingly, the SPLC’s motion must be denied….

A quick summary of the allegations against the SPLC (see here for more):

In 1971, two attorneys established the SPLC as a nonprofit organization whose mission was “to ensure the promise of the Civil Rights Movement became a reality for all.” According to the SPLC, part of its mission is to “track[] and expose[] the existence and activities of hate groups and other domestic extremists.” In pursuit of these “hate groups,” “the SPLC used paid consultants to infiltrate and inform on various white supremacist and other extremist groups.” The Government contends that this “informant program” provides the basis for the SPLC’s criminal liability.

On April 21, 2026, the Government unsealed an eleven-count indictment against the SPLC, charging it with six counts of wire fraud, four counts of false statements to a federally insured bank, and one count of conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering. The superseding indictment, unsealed on June 2, 2026, repeats the same eleven counts.

On May 26, 2026, the SPLC moved to dismiss the indictment on vindictive-prosecution grounds or, in the alternative, for further discovery and an evidentiary hearing. The SPLC contends that President Donald J. Trump’s administration has waged an all-encompassing assault “on civil rights groups in general,” and that the SPLC faces charges solely because it “exercised its First Amendment right to identify, report on, and criticize extremist hate groups.” The SPLC asserts that in this case the Government began with a target—the SPLC—and sought out any crime, any charge, to attach to it….

There is more, but the court provides a concise outline of the legal standards governing vindictive-prosecution claims:

Although prosecutors enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether to initiate charges, the Government may not punish someone merely for exercising his rights. In other words, the Government cannot sanction someone out of “vindictiveness.” “Vindictiveness in this context means the desire to punish a person for exercising his rights.” Accordingly, a criminal defendant may seek dismissal of the indictment on the basis of vindictive prosecution.

There are two avenues through which a defendant may prevail on a vindictive-prosecution claim. He can demonstrate actual vindictiveness, “proving objectively that the prosecutor’s charging decision was driven by a desire to punish him for doing something the law plainly allowed him to do.” “This showing is, of course, exceedingly difficult to make.” To meet this demanding standard, “a defendant must show, through objective evidence, that (1) the prosecutor acted with genuine animus toward the defendant and (2) the defendant would not have been prosecuted but for that animus.”

Alternatively, a defendant may rely on a presumption of vindictiveness, but “only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists.”

If a defendant cannot satisfy either standard, he may nevertheless obtain discovery in support of his claim if he comes forward with “some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of the defense.” In the First Amendment context, a defendant “must offer some evidence tending to show that he would not have been prosecuted but for his protected speech.”

However, even this standard “is a ‘rigorous’ one.” “To obtain discovery, [a defendant] must do more than simply ‘identify a potential motive for prosecutorial animus.’” “He must connect any vindictive animus to those making the challenged charging decisions in his case.” And “to obtain an evidentiary hearing …, ‘the defendant must present facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt about the constitutionality of a prosecution.’” …

[T]he Supreme Court has limited the application of a presumption to situations involving a specific fact pattern or sequence of events that would, regardless of when or where that pattern or sequence appeared, necessarily give rise to a “reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.” See North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) (presumption of vindictiveness exists where a trial judge “imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant” after he “successfully attacked his first conviction”); Blackledge v. Perry (1974) (applying the same presumption where a prosecutor obtained a felony indictment after the defendant appealed his misdemeanor conviction). That is, a presumption must be “applicable in all cases.” “[A] presumption is warranted only when circumstances warrant it for all cases of the type presented.”

No presumption is warranted here. The SPLC points to the “pattern of Executive Branch conduct” in this case—that is, the alleged opening, closing, and reopening of a “moribund” investigation into the SPLC—as producing the requisite “realistic likelihood” of vindictiveness. Yet the Supreme Court has cautioned against inferring vindictiveness from pretrial conduct. Goodwin (noting that, prior to trial, “the prosecutor’s assessment of the proper extent of prosecution may not have crystallized”)….

Even if a presumption of vindictiveness could apply before trial, the facts here do not justify one. [The SPLC argues that] “After some investigative activity in 2019 or 2020, the Biden administration reviewed the SPLC’s field program, and despite financial-records access, interviews of those involved, and even a review by [the] DOJ and the IRS, no charges were brought. Then, as part of President Trump’s targeted approach to civil-rights groups and the focus of his officials on the SPLC, a dormant or closed investigation was revived, and charges were filed.”

As the Government notes, investigations are routinely opened, closed, and reopened for a variety of legitimate reasons. Indeed, the fact that the closing and reopening of the SPLC investigation aligns with changes in presidential administrations could have a benign explanation just as readily as an improper one, since different administrations pursue different enforcement priorities. Therefore, it would be improper to presume vindictiveness simply because an indictment followed the reopening of an investigation; such a connection alone does not establish “a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness.”

And showing that the defendant is a political foe of the prosecuting administration is not enough to prove vindictiveness:

Nor does the fact that the SPLC was indicted after engaging in protected activity alone warrant a presumption. It is true that the SPLC publicly criticized the Trump administration prior to indictment. But if that were sufficient to justify a presumption, then an entity could immunize itself from prosecution merely by engaging in protected speech, such as criticizing political figures and their policies….

The court’s conclusion:

The question before this Court is not whether the Government should prosecute the SPLC. It is a foundational constitutional principle that the decision to prosecute lies entirely within the Executive’s domain. The separation of powers prevents this Court from intruding into “the business of prosecution.” The Court does not overlook the fact that this prosecution has provoked strong reactions—some supportive, some outraged—among observers.

But as the Court noted at the outset, the sole issue before it is narrow: whether the Government’s decision to prosecute the SPLC was constitutionally impermissible. Because the SPLC has not presented evidence tending to show the essential elements of vindictive prosecution, the Court denies the SPLC’s motion in full.

While the Government is entitled to the presumption of regularity, courts are not obligated to ignore constitutionally questionable conduct. In the rare instance that warrants closer scrutiny, courts may compel the Government to produce discovery into a prosecutor’s motives to safeguard the defendant’s due-process rights.

But this case does not meet that exceptional standard. The SPLC’s filings stack conjecture upon speculation, relying on hypothetical links in assumed chains to demonstrate prosecutorial vindictiveness. Once again, the bar for obtaining discovery is stringent, and the Court finds that it has not been met here.

This case epitomizes contemporary American discourse. It is unsurprising that the parties’ positions mostly consist of ad hominem attacks through press releases, interviews, and social media posts. Critics across administrations may loudly contest decisions of those in power. Yet the Republic expects different avenues for redressing grievances; federal courts are not the proper forum to air political complaints.

For that reason, vindictive-prosecution doctrine imposes a heavy burden on the accused, and decades of precedent advise against applying it here. It is possible to acknowledge that critics may voice concerns without granting immunity from prosecution merely for speaking, and that prosecutorial decisions can be scrutinized when there is demonstrable animus. What is missing here is the objective evidence needed to show that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Alabama (acting on its own or at the direction of others) pursued the SPLC for exercising its First Amendment rights.

The SPLC has failed to produce evidence of prosecutorial animus or causation, making discovery inappropriate. And because it cannot demonstrate vindictiveness, the Court will not grant the extraordinary relief of dismissing the indictment. The SPLC’s motion is therefore denied in full….

Read the full opinion for more.

Kevin P. Davidson, Joel Feil, and Russell Turner Duraski represent the government.