I am serializing my latest Notre Dame Law Review piece, “Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press: Some Illustrative Examples”; here is the second installment:
I now turn to a different question, one for which the evidence is intriguing though limited: whether freedom of expression should be understood to include speech that stirs resentment and risks igniting riots. (This issue, of course, has resurfaced more recently in cases like Terminiello v. Chicago (1949) and Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement (1992).) In truth, I had not encountered any such evidence until I came across an early case that seems largely neglected over the last fifty years, perhaps because it isn’t accessible on Westlaw or Lexis.
The case is Commonwealth v. Haines (1824), a ruling by Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice John Gibson (who would later serve as Chief Justice), apparently presiding alone as a trial judge. Haines had been accused of deliberately provoking a riot by “erecting and fixing, a certain figure, resembling a man, commonly called a Paddy, as and for the effigy of St. Patrick … with the accompaniment of a rum bottle and a string of potatoes,” in “a neighborhood inhabited principally by emigrants from Ireland.” “[T]he exhibition of a Paddy was resented as an insult upon the Catholic portion of the Irish….”
The central legal hurdle was that the defendants’ role in displaying the Paddy was contested, but there was no dispute that the defendant had shown a “Shelah”—”a female figure … with several features, besides that of sex, distinguishing it from a Paddy.” Such a Shelah was apparently “often displayed as a retaliatory emblem” to the Paddy.
After deliberating for a time, the jury asked whether it could convict based on evidence that the defendant participated in exhibiting the Shelah rather than the Paddy. Justice Gibson “answered in effect, that, if the characteristics and object of the Shelah were different from those of the Paddy, the variance [from the indictment] was fatal; but that the question of the identity or dissimilarity of the two was for the jury.” (The jury ultimately acquitted.) Indeed, among the sources that cite Haines, a sizable portion does so on this question of how far the proof may diverge from the indictment.
But Justice Gibson also charged the jury thus:
The offence specified in the first count, is clearly indictable at common law. No man has a right to trifle with the feelings of any large class of men, so as to provoke them to a breach of the peace. If it is done by libel, no one doubts it is a misdemeanor; if it is done by effigy is it less so? Suppose the defendant had published a picture of the same character, and with the same tendency as the figure which is the subject of the present offence, would it not be held a libel? The gist of the offence, is its tendency to provoke a breach of the peace. It may be indiscreet in the Irish residents of the district to take notice of acts of the kind; but it is worse than indiscreet in others to provoke them to do so.
So here is a case from the early republic about when speech can be punished. And it is perhaps a case that bears on the original meaning of “the freedom of speech,” if Justice Gibson was correct not merely about Pennsylvania law in 1824 but about the broader “common law.”
In principle, the case could therefore bear on important First Amendment debates. One might ask whether it would, for instance, justify restrictions on flag burning, on the theory that flag burning likewise “trifle[s] with the feelings of [a] large class of men, so as to provoke them to a breach of the peace.”
Or one might wonder how the case bears more broadly on Justice Scalia’s observation in McIntyre that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” (Justice Scalia was explaining there why he thought flag burning was constitutionally protected, despite the presence of a contrary tradition, dating back to 1890 and the following decades, of flag burning bans.) Perhaps such protection for offensive messages, at least when publicly displayed with the intent to offend, is not in fact a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment.
One might also inquire into the scope of the principle that Justice Gibson was invoking. Does it apply only to situations where the action actually provokes a riot, as it apparently did in Haines? Is it enough if it has a tendency to provoke a riot? Is it enough if it provokes or has a tendency to provoke a “breach of the peace,” which might be as modest as a confrontation between one spectator and the provoker?
Is the principle limited to deliberate provocation (which the phrase “trifle with the feelings” may imply), so that well-motivated but offensive speech would not be punishable? Compare Respublica v. Dennie (1805), a Pennsylvania seditious-libel case: the court there held that criticizing the government with the goal of subverting the United States Constitution could be punished as seditious libel—but criticism “honestly meant to inform the public mind, and warn them against supposed dangers in society, though the subject may have been treated erroneously” was constitutionally protected.
The issue is that Haines appears to be the lone case from that era that tackled the matter. I have conducted extensive research into early American cases dealing with speech restrictions, yet I have not found others. Haines does not cite any relevant precedents. I could not locate any cases that, in turn, cited Haines until 1899, and that case plus the few later cases citing Haines did not squarely address the question. {The first case I could locate that cited Haines in dealing with speech alleged to incite a riot was Commonwealth v. Spartaco (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932), which involved a defendant loudly denouncing a visit by Benito Mussolini’s foreign minister, Dino Grandi (who would later be known for introducing the resolution that effectively removed Mussolini from office in 1943). The judge in Spartaco interpreted Haines as covering words spoken “with intent to provoke a riot or with a reckless and willful disregard of their probable outcome in that respect.”}
What can courts make of an isolated case such as this? Perhaps one might view it as connected to the early blasphemy cases, but their rationales are actually quite different: the blasphemy cases, for instance, do not typically rest on any concern about rioting. As it stands, we gain an intriguing glimpse of what the law perhaps was at the time—or perhaps what it never quite was.