The court correctly held that the executive branch lacks the authority to limit mail-in voting.
I recently discussed how Donald Trump’s executive order aimed at reducing mail-in voting amounts to an assault on federalism and the separation of powers. The Constitution assigns states the primary role in election administration, though Congress may modify that arrangement through legislation. Today, in League of Women Voters v. Trump, the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in a unanimous decision, denied the Trump Administration’s request to stay the district court’s injunction that blocks the Postal Service rule implementing the order. Here is a central passage from the ruling:
Appellants have not shown they deserve a stay. Most prominently, appellants have not demonstrated a strong showing that the district court erred in concluding that the Final Rule is likely unlawful. The district court held, and we agree, that the Final Rule appears to regulate how federal elections are conducted for members of Congress, a matter the Elections Clause of the Constitution assigns to the States and Congress, not to an executive agency such as the Postal Service acting without congressional authorization.2 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. Appellants attempt to avoid the constitutional issue by contending that the Final Rule does not regulate the manner of holding elections. The district court fairly remarked that “[t]his denial rings hollow.” League of Women Voters of Mass. v. Trump, Nos. 26-cv-11549, 26-cv-13917, 2026 WL 2620871, at *14 (D. Mass. Sep. 4, 2026). The Final Rule is titled “Ballot Mail for Federal Elections,” and it explicitly and exclusively regulates election mail. 91 Fed. Reg. at 54966, 54990-92. It calls for action by the States’ chief election officials, and its justification centers on “protect[ing] the integrity of federal elections….”
To the extent that appellants argue we should read statutes authorizing the Postal Service to issue general postal regulations as supplying the necessary congressional authorization for the Final Rule, see 39 U.S.C. § 401(2) (authorizing USPS to make “such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this title, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions”); id. § 401(10) (authorizing USPS to exercise “all other powers incidental, necessary, or appropriate to the carrying on of its functions or the exercise of its specific powers”); id. § 404(a)(1) (conferring on USPS the power “to provide for the collection, handling, transportation, delivery, forwarding, returning, and holding of mail, and for the disposition of undeliverable mail”), their argument likely fails. Appellants have not convinced us that it is likely that Congress would delegate constitutionally assigned tasks relevant to maintaining our electoral system to the Postal Service through the “wafer-thin reed” of a general grant of authority to manage the postal system. Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 499 (2023). As appellees point out, Congress historically has been explicit in its exercise of authority under the Elections Clause when it seeks to displace the background assumption that the States will act as the primary regulator of elections. The general authority on which appellants rely here is far removed from that sort of specific congressional action.
I believe this assessment is precisely correct. It is also notable that the court invoked the major-questions doctrine from Biden v. Nebraska, which rightfully blocked President Biden’s attempt to use vague statutory language to forgive hundreds of billions of dollars in federal student loan debt. As explained in my earlier discussion on this matter, and by the district court, Trump’s claim that he could leverage the Postal Service authorization statute to impose sweeping changes to state mail-in ballot rules also triggers a major-questions concern, since control over the rules governing tens of millions of ballots is undeniably of vast political significance and (as Chief Justice John Roberts described in the recent Learning Resources tariff case) a “highly consequential power.”
When the executive asserts that Congress has granted it such extensive power, the major-questions doctrine requires clear authorization in the relevant statute. Here, nothing of that kind exists.
Trump has also asked the Supreme Court to pause the district court ruling, and the district court would have the final say if it chooses to grant that request. It is hopeful that the justices will recognize that both the district court and the First Circuit properly resolved this issue.
Although recent developments have led me and other scholars (notably election-law expert Rick Hasen) to view election-law federalism with greater optimism, there are still plausible arguments for increasing federal involvement in certain aspects of election administration. Yet any such expansion must be enacted by Congress, not imposed unilaterally by the executive. The Constitution provides good reason for rejecting the notion that a single individual should possess sweeping power to alter electoral rules—especially so close to a major federal election.
