A Toluna‑Harris Interactive opinion poll provides rich material on how the French position themselves in the new international context. When asked to evaluate various countries from the perspective of friend‑or‑foe relations with France, their answers allow us to distinguish three categories of countries. First, the European countries. The French largely regard them as allies, whether they belong to the European Union —Italy, Spain, and Germany— or not —Britain—. It is worth noting that, compared with the first wave of the survey conducted in 2021, trust in the United Kingdom has risen by thirty‑one points, as if Brexit had been left behind. To this group can be added Ukraine, which has gained twenty‑five points compared with the period before the Russian “special operation” was launched.
The second group comprises the United States, Israel, Algeria, and China. Responses are spread across the three possible options, but the notion that these countries pose a threat slightly outweighs the idea that they are allies. Relative to the previous wave, the United States has fallen by twenty‑one points. Only a third of the French now regard it as an ally. It is likely that the same decline would have been recorded for Israel if that country had been included in the earlier survey.
“The French have altered their perception of reality in accordance with the evolution of the international situation”
Lastly, the third group includes Russia and Iran, widely regarded as a threat. Russia has lost another nine points compared with 2021. This shows that the French have adjusted their perception of reality according to how the international situation evolves: on one hand, far fewer people view the United States as an ally and, on the other hand, they have clearly taken Ukraine’s side against Russia.
The other important observation is that, despite the differences that exist among respondents based on their party proximity, the most striking phenomenon is that this variable yields only modest differences. In the first group of countries, these differences are minimal: regardless of which party is closest to them, the French overwhelmingly consider European countries their allies. This includes Ukraine, a country that reaches as high as 57% among those close to La France Insoumise (LFI) and 40% among those close to Agrupación Nacional (RN). As for Russia, only 9% of RN‑leaning respondents and 12% of LFI supporters consider it an ally. With regard to the United States, only among RN supporters does the share who see it as an ally reach half.
It is both surprising and comforting to note that, on these fundamental issues and despite everything they may face domestically in terms of politics, the French show broad unity around viewing Europe as their protective space.
We encounter then a contradiction. One might think, indeed, that under these conditions the French would be convinced of the need to continue advancing European integration. Yet, when asked what our foreign‑policy priorities should be, they appear rather restrained about it. Only 19% want to “advance European construction.” Only those close to environmentalists and to the centrists of Ensemble (Macron’s party) express more support in this sense, though they do not overwhelmingly back this proposal.
Should these figures be read as a rejection by the French of strengthening cooperation among European Union member states? Not at all. In fact, they overwhelmingly agree, irrespective of their partisan preferences, with the establishment of a common defense for European countries, which would mark a crucial advance in European construction. It is important to note that 82% of those close to LFI and 62% of those close to RN express this view.
“It seems clear that the French consider the EU to be the most appropriate framework for developing our defense”
Perhaps there are other explanations for this reluctance to “advance European construction.” It is possible that the way the question was posed was interpreted as a reference to continuing EU expansion, and we know the French are not favorable to that. Another explanation could be that this reluctance reflects concerns about the Union as an institution, whose functioning would feel too bureaucratic and whose institutions would seem too distant from the citizens. In any case, it seems clear that the French consider the EU to be the most suitable framework to develop our defense, much to the chagrin of the leaders of La France Insoumise and of Agrupación Nacional. For some time they have shared the same view on the euro and show a strong attachment to it. Thus, regarding the two pillars of sovereignty —defense and currency— they favor a European‑level federalization and do not see a contradiction between national sovereignty and European sovereignty in these matters.
The French and the Defense of the West
The French do not view Europe as the sole geographic framework for their defense. They rely, more broadly, on the Atlantic alliance. Indeed, in the event of a military attack against France, they also expect assistance from NATO and, to a lesser extent, from the United States. Therefore, in their eyes, it is the West itself that constitutes their security framework. Although they no longer consider the United States an ally today, they do not seem to have yet mourned the NATO alliance, as if Trump‑era America were, in their view, an anomaly destined to disappear one day.
These data lead one to think that the parties and political figures who favor European construction and the defense of the Western world are probably mistaken in justifying their prudence, even their timidity, with a view that the French would be attached only to national sovereignty. Perhaps the French themselves are ahead of them, though the EU as it operates today does not satisfy them too much.
© Telos, 2026.
