On Tuesday and Wednesday, NATO leaders gather in Ankara (Turkey) under the ever-lengthening shadow of Donald Trump, the president of the United States. The allies hope to leave the meeting with the fewest possible reproaches and with the alliance safeguarded. The summits have become a pure exercise in damage control. This, however, is a direct continuation of the gathering the leaders held in The Hague last year, when, with the exception of Spain, all members pledged to raise defense spending to 5% of GDP. The Spanish government continues to argue that it will be able to meet its capability commitments with the current 2.1% of GDP allocated to these goals, while other allies begin to encounter fiscal problems in meeting the expectations set a year ago.
In any case, the evolution of NATO from 2024 to 2026 can be read through two English terms: burden sharing, i.e., sharing the load, and burden shifting, which translates as shifting the weight. In The Hague, it all amounted to a new distribution of the economic burden, with European allies having to commit to a much larger defense investment to balance the Alliance’s finances and prevent it from relying so heavily on American money. According to U.S. data, European allies have committed investments of €120 billion in the last year, half of which went into American equipment.
The natural next step was for that shift in who pays what within NATO to translate into a change in who does what. The burden shifting, the new distribution of responsibilities. This is what the Pentagon has come to describe as “NATO 3.0,” an alliance in which European members and Canada take charge of conventional defense in the Euro-Atlantic space, while the United States maintains its core commitment to the central element of its participation in NATO, which is nuclear deterrence.
“NATO 3.0 is an alliance in which European members and Canada take charge of conventional defense of the Euro-Atlantic space”
That transition was expected inside and outside the Alliance, and it is already underway. But it is happening even faster than anticipated. Both at the personnel level and in terms of capabilities. On the personnel front, the United States has ceded leadership of the Joint Headquarters in Norfolk (Virginia, United States) and in Naples (Italy). The Joint Headquarters in Brunssum (Netherlands) had already been led by a European. However, the Americans have not abandoned other key leadership positions, such as the commands of the air forces (AIRCOM) or ground forces (LANDCOM). Of course, the key piece remains the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The barometer that everyone watches closely and that would constitute a tangible sign of an enduring loss of interest by the United States in the Alliance would be an early resignation from the post of SACEUR, something that has not happened.
In terms of capabilities, which amount to the inventory of military materiel available for NATO’s defense, the United States has also proceeded with a reshuffle of the Alliance’s so-called “Force Model,” withdrawing capabilities that will be redirected to other priorities, while European partners and Canada fill those needs. It is, according to all sources consulted, a coordinated process in which Washington remains loyal to its European partners.
“The United States has also proceeded with a reshuffle in the Alliance’s so-called ‘Force Model,’ pulling capabilities toward other priorities”
The Ankara summit serves to politically seal this process that is already taking place. Although that is the central issue, there are other matters on the table that are not minor, such as burden sharing among the rest of the allies in backing Ukraine after the United States ceased donating military material to Kyiv since 2025. Nordic and Eastern allies want a fairer distribution of the burden, although attempts by Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary General, to find a mechanism that guarantees a better distribution of Ukraine contributions have so far failed due to strong opposition from Western and Southern partners.
Attacks and Threats
But one thing is the day-to-day functioning of the Alliance, which continues to operate smoothly, and another is the political arena. The entire summit will be overshadowed by the threat of Trump’s recriminations. The American delegation at NATO has already made clear that the president feels “disappointed” by what he regards as a lack of support from his European allies during Operation Epic Fury against Iran, something the occupant of the White House has publicly stated, pointing to all the traditional partners, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and, of course, Spain.
“The American delegation at NATO has already made clear that the president feels ‘disappointed’ by what he sees as a lack of support from his European allies”
Nothing erases the damage that Trump and some members of his Administration, such as Pete Hegseth, secretary of the Department of Defense, are inflicting on the trust among allies. All of this despite others, beneath that surface, at technical levels, or even Elbridge Colby, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, having delivered a less confrontational speech. The threat to Denmark to take Greenland has not been forgotten, nor the still-recent statements in which Trump floated the possibility of pulling the United States out of NATO, although that decision has safeguards that would make it very difficult to execute. But the Alliance’s objective now, as in Trump’s first term, is to endure, to survive. And in the meantime, it is, as has long been known, adapting the military bloc to a reality: the need for a more European NATO.
For the Spanish government, the summit rests on two fundamental issues. One is that the final communique properly reflects its idea of an Alliance with a vision also oriented toward the south, and the other is to dodge as much as possible direct attacks by Trump, who does not forgive Madrid for not committing to raising its defense spending to 5% and for not cooperating in the American operations against Iran.
