In a new controversial essay that aims to become a manifesto for our time, economists Julia Cagé, from Sciences Po, and Thomas Piketty, from the Paris School of Economics, turn to the last two centuries and a half of French history to analyze the impact of economic inequality on politics and society, and to propose what should be done about it. Originally published in French in 2023, A History of Political Conflict. Elections and Social Inequality in France, 1789-2022 remains strikingly timely, now that rising interest rates have turned public debt into an ever heavier burden, less sustainable and politically more explosive.
At the heart of their study lies a meticulous geographic analysis of France that does not follow the division into 96 administrative departments created by the French Revolution, but distinguishes 36,000 smaller units: metropolises, urban peripheries, cities and towns. The somewhat repetitive manner in which they present their argument across the book’s 848 pages is not the most effective, but it does not diminish the importance of their main conclusions, which deserve far more attention.
Forms of Polarization
Cagé and Piketty split political responses to inequality into two categories, each with its own chronology. They label them bipartition — a polarization between left and right — and tripartition — a center confronted by a nationalist right and a redistributive or ecological left. The traditional left-right divide reflects a social and economic polarization around the left’s redistributive program, while identity issues ultimately sustain the tripartite split.
“The rise in interest rates has made public debt an ever heavier burden, less sustainable and politically more explosive”
The first tripartition occurred between 1848 and 1910 and dissolved just as the European international system began to disintegrate and the likelihood of a world conflict grew. A second tripartition began in the late twentieth century, with debates over the Maastricht Treaty — which created the European Union — and the establishment of a monetary union and a single currency. It was also then that two referendums, held in 1992 and 2005, altered French politics in a novel way. Since the mid-nineteenth century, when Napoleon III adeptly used plebiscites for his own benefit, referendums had not played a central role in French political life.
In 1992, the governing center-left, led by Socialist President François Mitterrand, and much of the center-right supported European integration. However, the Maastricht Treaty was approved by a narrow margin, 51% to 49%. In 2005, a proposed European Constitution drafted by a convention chaired by former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was decisively rejected, by 55% to 45%. The greater share of negative votes came from rural France.
These results generated a dynamic of detachment and political disillusionment. The 2005 decision to reject a European Constitution had little practical consequences for France’s orientation toward Europe and the rest of the world, because the Lisbon Treaty already offered an alternative framework that did not require another referendum. Supporters of the “no” felt, therefore, that they had been ignored. Their resentment grew after the 2008 financial crisis and ended up mobilizing against the political center.
“The supporters of the ‘no’ to the Lisbon Treaty felt they had been ignored. Their resentment grew after the 2008 financial crisis and ended up mobilizing against the political center”
The 2008 crisis fueled harsh criticisms of financial capitalism from both a right-wing president, Nicolas Sarkozy, and his left successor. During the campaign that would lead him to the presidency in 2012, the socialist François Hollande declared that “my enemy is finance”. But rhetoric is not policy, and France would ultimately elect Emmanuel Macron, who had served as Minister of Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs under Hollande and achieved a concentration of votes among high earners greater than that of any other French president in history.
There are two plausible interpretations of these swings between bipartition and tripartition, and only one of them would be unequivocally endorsed by Cagé and Piketty. Both identify structural economic factors behind the left–right divide, especially industrialization and the wage-labor process that also spread into rural areas.
Moreover, one of the book’s aims is to rescue rural France from posterity’s condescension and, in particular, from the contempt often shown by the left. The authors show that the pays profond — deep France — did not merely drive France’s political evolution in the past but continues to do so. It was these voters who played a major role in opposing Macron’s early plans to promote the ecological transition through higher fuel taxes and strict speed limits, measures that disproportionately affected rural areas.
Globalization and Its Discontents
An alternative interpretation holds that the move toward tripartition was a logical response to globalization, which limits the scope of any redistribution-centered program because mobile factors of production can relocateto other places. Entrepreneurs and economic elites can escape higher taxes on wealth or income, while multinationals can transfer their tax domicile to countries with lower levies on capital gains or corporate taxes. When redistribution proves impossible, other matters — culture wars related to identity and tradition — take center stage in political mobilization.
“Growth and dynamism observed in some European Union countries reflect previous decisions aimed at sheltering wealthy individuals and firms seeking lower taxation”
Growth and dynamism observed in some European Union countries — Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands — reflect prior decisions aimed at sheltering wealthy individuals and firms seeking lower taxation. Outside the Union, centers such as Switzerland, Dubai, Hong Kong and Singapore have become even more powerful magnets for attracting capital. But the issue is not limited to tax rates. Equally decisive are the ease of founding companies and the shape of corporate law. Thus, in the first half of the nineteenth century, when French corporate law was restrictive, many French—and German—firms formed in liberal Belgium. The country later served as a model for new laws enacted in France and Germany during the 1860s and 1870s, launching the first wave of tripartition.
Similarly, in the United Kingdom and France of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, policymakers perceived the need to shelter capital. That role was played by the Channel Islands, linked to the United Kingdom, and the border state of Andorra, alongside France. Neither of these territories belongs to the European Union.
Andorra, which Cagé and Piketty do not even mention, is a peculiar sovereign entity whose co-heads of state are the French president and the Spanish bishop of Urgell. Even a socialist like Mitterrand held the title of “co-prince of Andorra” during his presidency.
Although border controls have been conspicuously absent on the French side, Spain maintains strict controls on the border between Catalonia and Andorra. It remains to be seen how long this situation will endure. At the end of 2023, an association agreement between the European Union and Andorra was negotiated, but final signatures are still pending.
The Danger of Tripartition
In any case, there are reasonable grounds to fear that tripartition could unleash political chaos that would further threaten the survival of democracy. That was the fate of the German Weimar Republic during the interwar period, still today the emblematic case of democratic collapse.
“Although border controls have been conspicuously absent on the French side, Spain maintains strict controls on the border between Catalonia and Andorra”
The parties that originally occupied the German center — the Social Democrats, the Catholic Centre, and the liberal German Democratic Party — lost votes even during years of economic prosperity. Their support deteriorated further during the Great Depression. The relative beneficiaries were the Nazis and the Communists. But since neither was willing to form a coalition with the other, the ensuing chaos produced a longing for dictatorship.
It is easy to see why this analysis matters for contemporary France. The fragmentation of the center makes it possible that the 2027 presidential race ends in a second round between the nationalist, anti-globalization and anti-European right led by Marine Le Pen, and the nationalist, anti-globalization and anti-European left led by Jean-Luc Mélenchon. It is in this context that Cagé and Piketty defend the restoration of a bipartite politics. But, to return to bipartition, tax policy, not national identity or migration, must be at the center of political debate.
As a warning, Cagé and Piketty point to a mid-1920s precedent, when the center-left coalition of Prime Minister Édouard Herriot failed to implement a capital-imposition program that would stabilize the economy and finances. That failure inspired François Goguel, one of the founders of electoral sociology, to develop one of the main precursors to the French political system analysis elaborated by Cagé and Piketty themselves.
“All one can do is hope that a calm and peaceful examination of historical precedents will help guide the future conflicts that, inevitably, will arise in the twenty-first century”
Looking back, they conclude: “It is never easy to agree on the social distribution of the burden when it reaches such magnitudes, and it is probably inevitable that resolving these conflicts will go through periods of considerable political and social tension. It is only to be hoped that a calm and peaceful examination of historical precedents helps guide the future conflicts that, inevitably, will arise in the twenty-first century.”
Cagé and Piketty identify a similar obstacle in two other earlier historical episodes that played a key role in shaping French political sensibilities. The first was the failure of the revolutionary left, in the 1790s, to expropriate Church and aristocratic lands in a way that benefited the bulk of the peasantry, and not merely a small urban bourgeoisie. Then came the revolutionary surge of 1848, when rural constituencies again felt betrayed. Amid a severe agricultural crisis, the government decreed an increase in property taxes, adding another burden that rural France would carry for a long time to come. Facing a widespread sense of being betrayed by urban elites, many turned toward the charismatic figure of Napoleon’s nephew, who would soon become emperor.
When the Music Stops
As Cagé and Piketty rightly note, political blockages that periodically paralyze French politics are the consequence of accumulated debt. “As in the eighteenth century,” they explain, “the forward march through debt can be seen as a consequence of the apparent impossibility of instituting a fair tax system. The working and middle classes are no longer willing to pay more and prefer that the burden fall more on the wealthier. In the face of government resistance or inability to move in this direction, the only viable and immediate response is to accumulate more debt.”
“The solution they propose is to raise taxation on wealth and capital, following the precedent of the Lastenausgleich program—’load-bearing compensation’—implemented in West Germany in 1952 to compensate Germans for damages suffered during Hitler’s war. Yet, that German policy was introduced under conditions that contemporary France is unlikely to replicate. The Lastenausgleich reflected the awareness that a war had been lost and that sacrifices were necessary. But it was also applied at the right moment to take advantage of an economic recovery based on market principles that was just beginning to unfold.”
The proposed solution is to increase taxation on wealth and capital, following the precedent of Lastenausgleich — “load-bearing compensation” — applied in West Germany in 1952 to indemnify Germans for damages suffered during Hitler’s war. However, that German policy was introduced under conditions that contemporary France will scarcely be able to reproduce. The Lastenausgleich reflected the understanding that a war had been lost and sacrifices were needed. But it was also implemented at the opportune moment to capitalize on an economic recovery based on market principles that was just starting to unfold.
Finally, the fiscal program helped sustain what would come to be known as the Wirtschaftswunder, the postwar economic miracle. But, in the absence of a “miracle,” it would have produced the same political disenchantment that Cagé and Piketty document when examining France in the 1790s, 1848-1849 and the 1920s, which led to a mobilization toward the left and significantly strengthened the French Communist Party.
“The political cycles driven by debt that have shaped French history for so long are not over and could well trigger a new wave of revolutionary fervor”
Collectively, Cagé and Piketty have produced a unique and well-documented analysis of the challenges facing French democracy and of the historical role that debt has played in conditioning the choice between reform and revolution. Looking at the authors’ photograph on the inner dust jacket, where they smile and wear striking red outfits, one is tempted to read their work as a omen. The debt-driven political cycles that have long shaped French history have not ended and could well unleash a new wave of revolutionary fervor.
© Project Syndicate, 2026.
In collaboration with the “la Caixa” Foundation
