Strategic stability is the state in which neither of the two actors involved in a troubled relationship has incentives to strike first. The concept originates from nuclear deterrence, yet it proves applicable to conflicts in the gray zone. In the gray zone there are levels of escalation, and deterrence does not operate with the same effectiveness at all of them. At lower levels, its effectiveness is limited, because the cost–benefit calculation favors the revisionist actor. On that plane, the expectation is less about deterring and more about competing.
Applied to Ceuta and Melilla, competing means strengthening the economic situation of both cities and sustaining narratives that affirm their Spanish identity in the face of Moroccan claims. Deterrence, by contrast, is effective in discouraging escalation to higher levels, such as the Perejil incident in 2002 and the massive assault on Ceuta in May 2021. It is at those higher levels where one can properly speak of strategic stability.
That stability between Morocco and Spain with regard to Ceuta and Melilla has deteriorated because Moroccan revisionism over both cities persists, aimed at long-term annexation through a recognizable pattern of hybrid strategies: migratory pressure, erosion of the autonomous cities’ economic viability, and campaigns in the cognitive domain aimed at both the Spanish and international public opinion. As is easy to observe, this mode of action has intensified in recent months, and it cannot be ruled out that a goal hitherto envisaged as long-term could be considered a short- or medium-term objective, taking advantage of the vulnerability window in which Spain currently finds itself.
“The stability between Morocco and Spain with regard to Ceuta and Melilla has deteriorated because Moroccan revisionism over both cities persists, aimed at long-term annexation”
To that revisionism have been added deficient responses by the Spanish government. The framework for responding to hybrid threats that we developed seven years ago in the project Countering Hybrid Warfare 2 of the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) sets out three components: detect, deter, and respond. The Government has failed, and continues to fail, in the first of these: it refuses to recognize Morocco as a revisionist actor regarding Ceuta and Melilla, despite Rabat’s explicit statements to that effect and the pattern of conduct sustained for more than a decade, from the 2007 recall of its ambassador over the kings’ visit to the circulation of passports that attributed both cities to Morocco. Without identification there is no strategy of competition or deterrence, and the initiative remains in the hands of the revisionist.
Even worse, Spain’s response to the May 2021 escalation did not restore deterrence, but opted for appeasement, materialized, among other measures, in the recognition of Morocco’s plan for Western Sahara. That policy blurred what should have functioned as a focal point or Schelling point: the inviolability of Ceuta’s border, a convergence point of expectations achieved without explicit negotiation. Spain’s response consisted of concessions, not reprisals. Once the focal point was eroded, it is not so surprising that an even greater escalation occurred by the end of July this year, with the Ceuta crisis still open. What is hard to explain is the Government of Spain’s stubborn insistence on continuing to appease Rabat.
“The Government has failed, and continues to fail, in detection: it refuses to recognize Morocco as a revisionist actor regarding Ceuta and Melilla, despite Rabat’s explicit statements to that effect”
Restoring strategic stability requires applying the MCDC framework, but this time effectively. First, identify the threat: define the Moroccan action in Ceuta as aggression against Spain’s territorial integrity that has instrumentalized migration as part of a hybrid strategy, and not treat it as a migratory crisis without political intent. Only a coherent response can be articulated if it starts from an aggression identified as such.
In second place, the Government must impose costs on Morocco. Spain has sufficient instruments of power for this, both in bilateral relations and in the relations between the European Union and Morocco: trade (from tariffs to suspending preferential agreements), financial, energy (given Morocco’s dependence on interconnections for electricity and gas with Spanish territory), and in services and tourism. The fact that Morocco also possesses pressure mechanisms over Spain, such as controlling migratory flows or counterterrorism cooperation, does not cancel Spain’s capacity to respond; it only requires political will to activate it in a coherent and sustained way, not as a one-off gesture after each crisis. The short- and medium-term objective is to restore deterrence and, with it, strategic stability, so that Morocco does not escalate again in the gray zone.
Finally, firmness in deterrence does not equal a permanent deterioration of bilateral relations. It is compatible with offering assurances to Morocco if it demonstrates, with deeds and not merely words, a responsible and good-neighbor diplomacy. However, that offer only makes sense once the focal point eroded in 2021 and broken in 2026 has been restored. Until Ceuta’s border again functions as a credible red line, any gesture of accommodation will be interpreted in Rabat—with justification—as a new sign of weakness.
