Last Saturday, Iceland rejected resuming its negotiations for accession to the European Union. The result of the referendum is a no to the EU, but not to Europe. For seven decades, the Nordic country has participated in the continent’s institutional architecture: since 1949, as a founding member of NATO, and, since 1970, as one of the four members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), a supranational organization composed of Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Iceland itself, and whose members apply a large portion of the EU’s economic legislation.
The fit of Iceland in the EU has always been difficult. The country applied to join the Union in 2008, amid the financial crisis. However, the negotiations did not take long to stall due to disagreements between Brussels and Reykjavik regarding fishing. For Icelandic voters, surrendering part of their sovereignty over fisheries was an unthinkable concession, especially to join a bloc that, at that time, was undergoing a deep economic and political crisis. In 2013, therefore, both sides suspended the negotiations. When, in 2025, Trump threatened to invade Greenland, the Icelandic government reopened the “European question.” It argued that the international order born after World War II had changed; that the new world order posed a threat to Iceland; and that the island’s future, with a population of barely 400,000, lay in the EU. However, the alleged US threat did not resonate with the Icelandic electorate, as did not other arguments cited by the Government: the cost of maintaining its own currency, the supposed benefits of adopting the euro or the advantages of being able to participate in decision-making in Brussels. For the electorate of one of the world’s highest per capita income countries, belonging to the European Economic Area and the Schengen area was more than enough.
“When, in 2025, Trump threatened to invade Greenland, the Icelandic government reopened the ‘European question’. It argued that the international order born after World War II had changed”
If for Iceland joining the European Union was not seen as an imperative necessity, the Icelandic electorate’s rejection does not represent a dramatic defeat for the EU itself. The value of incorporating Iceland would have been more symbolic —to show the world that, ten years after Brexit, the EU remained attractive— than practical. Restarting the accession process would have required complex negotiations on fishing. In the best-case scenario, these negotiations would have led to the entry of a relatively small economy (its GDP would be the second smallest in the EU, only ahead of Malta) that, moreover, already cooperates with the EU on economic policy (through EFTA) as well as on security and defense (through NATO).
The “no” from Iceland is not dramatic because it serves to remind, precisely, that Europe is more than the European Union itself. The political architecture of the European continent is made up of a series of institutions (the EU itself, EFTA, NATO, the European Political Community, the Council of Europe) and agreements (Schengen, the European Economic Area, the customs union) whose competences and members overlap. In this map, the EU is the most important bloc, but not the only one. Once the negotiations for accession with Iceland are off the table, the European Union must focus, for the rest of the decade, on expanding and deepening this policy of alliances.
First of all, the European Union must accelerate the accession of candidate countries. Of the nine countries that hold this status, not all have the same prospects of joining the EU. The most advanced negotiations are those with Montenegro, which hopes to join the EU in 2028, and with Albania, which aims to do so around 2030. Other countries, such as North Macedonia, Moldova and Ukraine, are in full negotiations, albeit with more distant horizons. For years now, both EU institutions and some member states have dragged their feet, delaying a process that, in some cases, has been open for more than two decades. However, accelerating the incorporation of candidate countries —if not all, at least as many as possible— is important for three reasons.
“The Icelandic ‘no’ is not dramatic because it serves to remind, precisely, that Europe is more than the European Union itself”
First, the European Union has a political debt to some countries —as European as any of the twenty-seven that already make up the Union— that have waited for membership for decades. In many cases, the accession process has entailed a high political cost for their various governments, which have been forced to undertake substantial political, institutional and economic reforms in exchange for an accession that never quite arrives. Second, bringing these countries into the Union would reduce the power of Russian siren songs, helping to strengthen EU security. Finally, facing accession would also compel the European Union to rethink its own institutional architecture, carrying out reforms to streamline, for example, its decision-making processes in foreign policy matters.
Expanding the European Union is important, but it cannot be enough. Brussels can also leverage the range of options at its disposal to strengthen its alliances with Canada, Japan and South Korea, three fundamental players that, during Donald Trump’s second presidency, have drawn closer to Europe.
When, in early 2025, Donald Trump threatened to annex Canada, some analysts argued the possibility that Canada would join the European Union, a horizon that enjoys considerable support among both Canadian voters (42%) and European voters. Formal accession is practically impossible. Even if Canada were favorable, Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, the legal basis governing the accession process, limits this possibility to “any European state.” However, there are many ways to integrate Canada into the EU framework that do not require its formal accession. In terms of security and defense, this rapprochement has already begun: since the start of the year, Canadian companies can participate in SAFE, the program that encourages European companies to undertake joint defense acquisitions. As for economic integration, Ottawa and Brussels have a wide range of options: from negotiating sector-specific agreements —such as in minerals, energy or research— to revising the bilateral free trade agreement. Canada could, even, join a customs union, join EFTA or join the internal market.
“There are many ways to integrate Canada into the EU’s structure that do not require its formal accession”
Eeconomic integration with Canada —a country of enormous political complexity, with a territory similar in size to the EU and separated from Europe by 6,000 km of ocean— would pose many political, economic and even logistical challenges. However, it could also represent a paradigm shift for a European Union that, in one go, would strengthen its economic independence from the U.S., gain a fundamental ally and show the world that it can continue to play an important role on the economic stage.
These same considerations should also favor a closer relationship with Japan and South Korea, two indispensable allies in Asia that, in recent years, have experienced both a distancing from Trump and a closening to the U.S. With Japan, progress has mostly occurred in security and defense; with South Korea, in defense, but also in economic and digital policy. In both cases, repeated threats by Trump as well as the need to diversify alliances in the face of China’s rise have been crucial to bringing these countries into the European orbit. And although, once again, formal integration into the EU’s political structures is unthinkable, a European Union with political will, legal creativity and strategic ambition could present a range of options —from participation in SAFE to economic integration in specific sectors or participation in the European Political Community— that would graft both countries into the European policy framework.
The Icelandic referendum is not a warning shot for the EU, but a window of opportunity. Although it will not entail an immediate enlargement of the EU, it does allow reopening the debate on the enlargement of the Union itself, an expansion that, given the dual threats of the U.S. and Russia, is more urgent than ever. It also reminds us that Europe is more than the EU and that even the latter has political, economic and institutional mechanisms with which to strengthen its alliances with countries like Canada, Japan and South Korea.
If in the twentieth century the European project sought to foster economic and political integration to guarantee the security and prosperity of the continent, the geopolitics of the twenty-first century requires Europe to adopt a more global approach: weaving alliances that transcend continental borders. The success of this strategy will depend on the skill, courage and ambition of European leaders.
