From Doe v. Doe (E.D. Pa.), handed down today by Judge Gerald Pappert:
Jane Doe maintains that four users on X (the platform formerly known as Twitter) wrongly insinuated she had a sexual relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and exposed her by posting on the site her full name, work history, educational background, phone numbers, and home addresses. Doe brings claims for defamation, false light, public disclosure of private facts, and aiding and abetting. She seeks to proceed under a pseudonym to protect her safety and avert further reputational and professional damage. The court denies the request, holding that the fear of harm does not surpass the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings.
[A.] Normally, parties in a lawsuit must identify themselves. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires disclosure of the participants’ identities. Nevertheless, in “exceptional cases,” proceeding anonymously may be permitted. To qualify, a plaintiff must show two things: (1) a fear of serious harm, and (2) that such fear is reasonable. Courts weigh several factors when evaluating anonymity requests, including (1) how confidential the litigant’s identity has been; (2) the grounds for fearing disclosure or avoidance of it; (3) the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of the litigant’s identity; (4) whether the dispute is primarily legal in nature; (5) whether the party seeking anonymity harbors improper motives; and (6) the overall public interest in access to litigants’ identities. The purpose of this balancing test is to enable a district court to determine whether the fear of substantial harm justifies anonymity while still serving the public interest in transparent litigation.
The first factor does not support anonymity where the litigant’s identity has never been kept confidential. Doe’s identity has not been protected. After Defendants published her information, including her photo and prior addresses, she publicly responded by denying the Epstein connection in the thread produced by the Defendants.
To prove a fear of severe harm, Doe contends that survivors and other named individuals have received death threats. Yet she does not specify how she would be threatened if compelled to proceed under her real name, and courts reject claims of harm or generalized fear that lack concrete support. As she notes, the Defendants have already disseminated her personal information to the public, so proceeding under her own name would not introduce a greater risk.
Doe also asserts a risk of reputational and professional ruin. But, as the courts in this Circuit have held, purely social and reputational harms, without more, do not suffice to establish this factor. Embarrassment or economic harm alone also does not justify anonymity. Because her identity has already been made public, litigating openly provides Doe an opportunity to clear her name and will not contribute further to the harm she alleges has already occurred.
In evaluating the public interest, courts consider whether other similarly situated litigants would be deterred from pursuing their claims. Doe offers no reason to believe that defamation plaintiffs would abandon claims out of fear of revealing their identities. The Epstein-related cases she cites involve plaintiffs alleging Epstein’s sexual abuse, not individuals wrongly linked to him.
If a plaintiff’s claims are purely legal in nature, the public interest in knowing the litigant’s identity is comparatively weak. Doe’s allegations—that the defendants misidentified her as someone who had a sexual relationship with Epstein—are fact-intensive. A central issue is whether the defendants knew or acted with reckless disregard for falsity and had no credible basis to claim she was the woman described in Epstein’s files, which depends on the facts the defendants knew.
There is no evidence that Doe harbors improper motives for anonymity, which favors keeping her anonymous. However, the universal public interest in access to litigants’ identities weighs in favor of disclosure in most cases.
The court recognizes the harm Doe claims but finds she has not shown how using her real name would subject her to “severe harm” beyond what she has already endured. Any harm from using her own name would not be greater than the public’s strong interest in open judicial proceedings.
This approach aligns, in my view, with the line of decisions holding that libel plaintiffs cannot sue under a pseudonym; see Roe v. Smith and the federal authorities cited therein.