In the Friday ruling on Watts v. Jones, authored by Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook and joined by Chief Judge Michael Brennan and Judge Diane Sykes:
Two detectives who were looking into an inmate at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility sought to speak with David Watts, another prisoner who had mailed letters implying he possessed valuable information about a murder and an attempted murder. One detective appeared at Watts’s cell and, fearing that the inmate under scrutiny might overhear anything he said, declined to speak. Watts contends that, despite this, he was subjected to threats and harassment. Although there was no physical harm, Watts filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages from the detectives for exposing him to risk.
The court held that such a claim is unavailable, at least without physical injury, but also offered observations about the prior efforts to litigate the case under seal and under pseudonyms:
The district court issued an order sealing the litigation to a large extent, effectively creating anonymity for the litigants and any potential witnesses. A motion to continue the sealing during the appeal resulted in a one-judge order denying that request but mandating anonymity across the board. Consequently, the parties filed publicly accessible briefs without identifying the individuals involved. After hearing oral argument, this court now concludes that anonymity is inappropriate given this court’s strong presumption that adult litigants must appear under their real names.
As far as we can tell, keeping the defendants anonymous is completely inappropriate. Police officers, prison guards, and many other public officials are routinely sued in their own names for acts alleged to be unlawful or even unconstitutional. At oral argument, counsel for the defendants consented to using their names.
Counsel indicated that the district judge might have believed that identifying the defendants would also identify the plaintiff, but there is no support for such a belief. The defendants are police officers who have dealt with hundreds if not thousands of prisoners over the years. Revealing the defendants’ identities would not point to any single inmate.
The plaintiff sought anonymity on the grounds of a professed fear that other inmates might harm him. Yet, once again, claims based on potential harm are routinely litigated with the parties’ real names. Indeed, the plaintiff’s three-page table of contents lists numerous decisions addressing the risk of retaliation against cooperating witnesses, and not one of those decisions uses pseudonyms.
Although the plaintiff asserts fear, he does not allege actual harm by any other inmate—and this even though the origin of his suit lies in the assertion that, several years ago, the defendants allowed other inmates to discover his status as a cooperative witness. When the plaintiff began litigation premised on this unrealized fear, he forfeited his entitlement to anonymity. (By contrast, individuals protected by the informants’ privilege have their identities shielded in criminal trials largely because they did not bring publicity on themselves by initiating litigation.) The plaintiff cannot secure anonymity by making allegations that expose him to risk….
The Seventh Circuit remains notably skeptical of pseudonymous litigation; the outcome in this case might differ before other courts, and it is unclear how it would be decided elsewhere.
