Is Title IX Hindering the U.S. Men’s International Soccer Team?

In the wake of the U.S. Men’s National Team’s World Cup loss, observers have been asking what steps might sharpen the United States’ talent pool for global competitions. After a 4-1 defeat to Belgium, it became clear to many that other nations—often European—have cultivated more effective pipelines for male soccer talent than the United States. The lingering question remains: why hasn’t the U.S. succeeded in cultivating superior male players?

    <p>As someone who avidly follows both the U.S. men’s and women’s national teams, I’ve tracked the debate closely. Frequently cited culprits include America’s pay-to-play youth soccer framework, the temptation of top athletes to pursue other sports, and a perceived lack of a genuine American soccer “culture.”</p> 
    <p>But recently, Scott Yenor of the Heritage Foundation attempted to introduce a fresh suspect. He posited that America’s Title IX regime has been a factor in the U.S. men’s underwhelming performances on the international stage. I’m not sure if his aim was provocation, but the argument feels detached from the current realities of how soccer talent is developed, warranting a concise rebuttal.</p> 
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    <p>Yenor’s narrative suggests that Title IX’s ban on sex-based discrimination in collegiate sports has created “perverse incentives.” He argues that Title IX pressures universities with (American) football programs to level the playing field by reinforcing women’s rosters in other sports—and, on occasion, by downsizing men’s soccer. He cites statistics indicating that participation in NCAA Division I soccer by sex has shifted over time, with women now outnumbering men.</p> 
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    <p>According to Yenor, these trends demonstrate that while American women’s soccer boasts a world-class pipeline, Title IX hinders men from building a comparable one. He provocatively concludes that only when the United States abandons its sex-based quota system for athletics will American men stop being humiliated by Belgium.</p> 
    <p>From my perspective, Yenor’s argument reveals a fundamental misapprehension of how talent pipelines for male players in international soccer function. Because his analysis fails to seriously engage with the genuine discourse on improving the USMNT, his policy recommendation misses the mark.</p> 
    <p>Looking at his chart, the timeline doesn’t align well with World Cup histories for either the men’s or women’s national teams. Title IX became law in the mid-1970s. The men’s side did not qualify for many World Cups before and after that era. Focusing on the modern era, the U.S. men failed to qualify from 1954 to 1986. They did qualify in 1990—more than ten years after Title IX’s inception—and then reached the Round of 16 in 1994. In 2002, the team advanced to the quarterfinals. In its four most recent appearances (2010, 2014, 2022, and 2026), the men have consistently made the Round of 16 but have not progressed beyond that stage.</p> 
    <p>Undoubtedly, Title IX played a significant role in accelerating success for the U.S. women. They captured the first Women’s World Cup in 1991 and subsequently triumphed in 1999, 2015, and 2019. However, in their most recent appearance in 2023, the U.S. Women’s National Team (USWNT) exited at the Round of 16. This pattern—steady triumph followed by a sharp dip in the most recent tournament—bears little relation to the decades-long surge in college participation by women that Yenor cites.</p> 
    <p>The central flaw in Yenor’s argument is its narrowing focus to the back end of the talent pipeline—players entering college soccer programs. But as extensive discussion—before and after the USMNT’s defeat by Belgium—has shown, cultivating international-level talent demands beginning well before college. The Athletic offers a concise synthesis of the debate. It quotes Marije Elferink-Gemser, a Dutch academic who studies sports and talent development, who notes that “ball-handling skills are so demanding that they must be developed from a young age.” The consensus tends to place the “golden age” for skill acquisition in the first six years of life, with some arguing the window may extend to twelve years old.</p> 
    <p>After children master basic ball skills, the next phase involves rigorous training in soccer techniques—well before many boys or girls matriculate in college. A common theme in the global talent discussion is the existence of European (and other) nations’ soccer academies where young talents begin training as early as nine. Consider a standout example: Kylian Mbappé, widely regarded as one of the best players in the world. Mbappé started at a local club at age six, then moved to Clairefontaine, France’s renowned national academy, where his exceptional performances drew interest from major European clubs. At age 14, he joined AS Monaco’s youth system; by 16, he was a first-team player for Monaco; at 18, he transferred to Paris Saint-Germain for a landmark fee, and since then he has become a globally recognized star.</p> 
    <p>To cultivate top-tier, international-caliber talent, the United States must emulate this model of intensive professional training from an early age for a select group of elite prospects. From a talent-pipeline standpoint, it makes little sense to debate whether tweaking Title IX might slightly enhance the men’s soccer programs at schools like the University of Texas or the University of Florida (examples Yenor cites where only club-level programs exist). There are already more than 6,000 men playing NCAA Division I soccer. A few additional players on the varsity benches are unlikely to shift America’s standing on the world stage.</p> 
    <p>Moreover, Yenor presumes that relaxing Title IX to provide more scholarships would yield more American players; yet many scholarship beneficiaries come from abroad. For example, the 2024 NCAA Division I men’s final between Vermont and Marshall shows that roughly 73% of starters were international players from nations such as Germany, Japan, and Brazil; Marshall’s 28-man squad included only three Americans.</p> 
    <p>The waning importance of college participation for the USMNT is evident when examining World Cup rosters. College soccer was once the central pipeline for the U.S. men’s roster: every member of the 1990 World Cup squad appears to have played college soccer, and roughly three-quarters of the 1994 and 2002 rosters did. By contrast, the modern era shows a sharp decline. In the last two World Cups, only about eight of the 26 players had NCAA backgrounds—and only a handful of those were regular starters. Among the starters against Belgium this month, only goalkeeper Matt Freese (Harvard) and 38-year-old defender Tim Ream (Saint Louis) appear to be former NCAA players.</p> 
    <p>The shift away from college soccer can be attributed to several factors unrelated to Title IX. A major driver is the rise of MLS academies across the United States, designed to rival the well-developed European systems. More than twenty MLS clubs operate robust academies intended to develop local talent, either to bolster their rosters or to monetize players via international transfers.</p> 
    <p>The next wave of U.S. talent may well emerge from these academies. The Athletic has even produced a thoughtful projection of potential players likely to contribute to the 2030 USMNT roster. Assuming 14 current players return, the projection suggests 16 newcomers, categorized as “just missed” (#15-20) and “next generation” (#21-30), with ages and club affiliations listed:</p> 
    <p><strong>Just Missed in 2026</strong></p> 
    <p>15. Noahkai Banks (19) — FC Augsburg<br> 16. Johnny Cardoso (24) — Atlético de Madrid<br> 17. Tanner Tessmann (24) — Olympique Lyon<br> 18. Aidan Morris (24) — Middlesbrough FC<br> 19. Patrick Agyemang (25) — Derby County<br> 20. Diego Luna (22) — Real Salt Lake</p> 
    <p><strong>Next Generation in 2030</strong></p> 
    <p>21. Zavier Gozo (19) — Real Salt Lake<br> 22. Cavan Sullivan (16) — Philadelphia Union<br> 23. Adri Mehmeti (17) — New York Red Bulls<br> 24. Julian Hall (18) — New York Red Bulls<br> 25. Peyton Miller (18) — New England Revolution<br> 26. Mathis Albert (17) — Borussia Dortmund<br> 27. Rokas Pukstas (21) — HNK Hajduk Split<br> 28. Julian Eyestone (20) — Brentford<br> 29. Diego Kochen (20) — Lyngby Boldklub, on loan from FC Barcelona<br> 30. Josh Wynder (21) — SL Benfica (B team)</p> 
    <p>From these sixteen prospective players, only three appear to have previously played college soccer (or seem likely to do so in the future): Aidan Morris, Patrick Agyemang, and Julian Eyestone. Notably, two of these three also passed through MLS academies (Morris spent three pre-college years at the Columbus Crew academy; Eyestone joined FC Dallas’s academy around age ten). Only one of the trio—Agyemang, the eldest—completed four years of college soccer. Morris played one autumn season at Indiana before leaving to sign with Columbus Crew; Eyestone played one autumn season at Duke before signing with Brentford in England. In total, eleven of the sixteen progressed through MLS academies, while several others moved to foreign academies (Banks at FC Augsburg, Cardoso in Brazilian academies, Kochen at Barcelona’s famed La Masia) and Josh Wynder joined a Louisville City/USL academy (the second tier below MLS).</p> 
    <p>One reason players such as Morris and Eyestone seek to depart NCAA soccer quickly is that the NCAA treats athletes as students first and soccer players second. In broad terms, NCAA rules cap “countable athletically related activities.” During the season, Division I typically imposes a 4-hour-per-day and 20-hours-per-week maximum, with mandated days off, and the season spans only a few months. Exceptions exist for Olympic-level athletes, but for elite soccer talents, the NCAA framework is a significant constraint. A professional environment offers a more “professional” setup: year-round daily training, personalized technical work, strength and conditioning, recovery, nutrition, film study, reserve-team fixtures, and integration with the first team. The NCAA season is compressed into a fall window of roughly three months, with occasional stretches of three games in eight days—an unfavorable regime for training. There are further drawbacks. The overarching point is that as fewer top American men enter college soccer, the talent pool benefits from exposure to more competitive, professional environments.</p> 
    <p>An authoritative scholarly examination of the rise of non-college routes to the USMNT comes from Samford University’s Center for Sports Analytics. In a May report, the center predicted a U.S. men’s national team exit in the Round of 16 for 2026. Titled “The 2026 USMNT Is the Best American Soccer Team in History. It Still Isn’t Good Enough,” the analysis draws a careful comparison between the 1994 and 2026 squads, showing how far fewer players nowadays arrive via college soccer. It identifies four additional pathways to the USMNT besides the traditional college route: (1) Youth Export, (2) MLS Academy to Foreign League, (3) the MLS “Lifer,” and (4) Foreign-Raised Dual-National.</p> 
    <p>Interestingly, the report finds that the higher up the field you go for the 2026 USMNT, the more European the development system behind the player appears to be. The analysis notes that even the MLS itself does not produce the game-altering talents; European clubs do, and American teens are now competing for academy slots at those clubs alongside the world’s top young players. The report also highlights robust analytics showing that the leading predictor of a national team’s World Cup performance is the total minutes played by a country’s players in Europe’s five top leagues during the just-concluded season. By that measure, the United States sits just outside the top eight, in tenth place—precisely where the team finished in this year’s World Cup.</p> 
    <p>Thus, on the men’s side, the college pipeline holds scant relevance to World Cup outcomes. But what about the women? Yenor contends that, compared with the men, the U.S. women possess a “world-class pipeline” nurtured by college soccer. It is true that Title IX’s 1970s enactment helped accelerate the American women’s ascent to the world’s top tier, establishing a head start relative to other nations.</p> 
    <p>Yet here too Yenor’s chart—reproduced above—fails to map onto that head start. While it documents rising female participation in NCAA Division I over decades, the development of USWNT players has long been dominated by a handful of elite programs. The fact that institutions such as Mercyhurst, Lindenwood, and others have recently added Division I women’s teams does not align with the core national-team pipeline.</p> 
    <p>Development of international-caliber women’s players through NCAA programs has historically concentrated in the most competitive schools. The premier example is the University of North Carolina, whose Tar Heel women’s program claimed 16 of the first 19 national titles. In more recent years, programs at Stanford, Santa Clara, Penn State, Notre Dame, and a few others have contributed heavily. Yet an increasing number of USWNT players turn professional without ever playing college soccer.</p> 
    <p>The trend away from NCAA soccer for women reflects a broader shift in the legal landscape that now permits talented American girls to turn pro at a younger age. Olivia Moultrie led the way, starting to play at four, being homeschooled in fifth grade to focus on soccer, and becoming the first girl on a boys’ club team to enter the U.S. Soccer Development Academy system. At 11, she secured a full scholarship offer to the UNC Tar Heels, and later trained in Europe. By 13 she was training with the Portland Thorns in the NWSL.</p> 
    <p>In 2021, at age 15, Moultrie filed an antitrust lawsuit in Oregon challenging the NWSL’s age constraint requiring players to be 18. A district judge granted a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, allowing her to compete in the 2021 season. She became the youngest player in NWSL history to score a goal and participate in a championship match. Unsurprisingly, Moultrie has also represented the USWNT, with 18 appearances, including seven in 2026. She is far from alone in pursuing this professional path. Today, many of the brightest USWNT stars have bypassed college soccer entirely. Consider what a hypothetical “starting eleven” for the 2027 Women’s World Cup in Brazil might look like, listed from oldest to youngest, with any college experience noted:</p> 
    <ol> 
    <li>Emily Fox (28) — North Carolina, 2017-2020.</li> 
    <li>Mallory Swanson/Pugh (28) — enrolled at UCLA but did not play an official NCAA season; no college soccer.</li> 
    <li>Phallon Tullis-Joyce (27) — University of Miami, 2014-18.</li> 
    <li>Tierna Davidson (27) — Stanford, 2016-2018.</li> 
    <li>Naomi Girma (26) — Stanford, 2018-2021.</li> 
    <li>Sophia Wilson/Smith (25) — Stanford, 2018-2019; only two NCAA seasons.</li> 
    <li>Trinity Rodman (24) — turned pro directly; no NCAA soccer.</li> 
    <li>Jaedyn Shaw (21) — turned pro at 17; no NCAA soccer.</li> 
    <li>Gisele Thompson (20) — signed with Angel City straight away; no NCAA soccer.</li> 
    <li>Olivia Moultrie (20) — turned pro with Portland; NWSL debut at 15; no NCAA soccer.</li> 
    <li>Lily Yohannes (19) — pursuing a pro pathway via Ajax/Lyon; no NCAA soccer.</li> 
    </ol> 
    <p>Of the eleven players on this projected list, only five have played NCAA soccer, and merely four completed four years. The gap between the older and younger cohorts is striking: among the five youngest players (for example, Moultrie), none have NCAA experience.</p> 
    <p>As with the men, recent scholarly work on the women’s game underscores the significance of non-college routes to the USWNT. Given the rising strength of women’s teams abroad—fueled, in part, by professional training at club level—the reliance on non-college pathways is growing. The U.S. women exited the most recent World Cup in 2023 earlier than ever, in the Round of 16, underscoring the need for a new generation of players who have trained in professional environments to restore American leadership.</p> 
    <p>As the pathways for leading players into both the men’s and women’s national teams demonstrate, NCAA college soccer is fading as part of the international-talent pipeline. There may be arguments for recalibrating some of Title IX’s provisions to broaden athletic opportunities for men in soccer or in other sports (I do not express a position on that matter here). But the assertion that altering Title IX would produce any meaningful uplift for the U.S. men’s international soccer team remains a provocative distraction from the real challenges. To compete with the world’s best professionals, the top U.S. men—and women—need to pursue the most professional trajectories.</p> 
    <p style="text-align: center">***</p> 
    <p>Note: For brevity, this piece uses “World Cup” and “Women’s World Cup,” as those are FIFA’s official competition names. I recognize that applying the gender qualifier to the women’s game but not the men’s could be seen as marginalizing the women’s game. Nevertheless, at present this linguistic convention remains commonplace.</p> 
    <p>Update: I’ve corrected an embarrassing misstep in my projected 2027 USWNT starters by swapping in goalkeeper Phallon Tullis-Joyce. Thanks to David Nieporent for catching that roster error. This correction means that five of the projected 2027 USWNT starters played NCAA Division I soccer.</p> </div>