Israel has aimed to alter the balance of power across the Middle East through its military superiority, yet it has not found a political solution to the conflicts threatening its security. Its actions against opponents have shifted the regional equilibrium without addressing the root causes of instability. The result is a nation that remains militarily commanding but whose political and diplomatic integration into the region remains deeply unsettled.
This was one of the most provocative observations shared by Professor Emma Sky at the Workshop on Global Order: Leadership for Times of Change, organized by IE University at Yale University’s Jackson School of Global Affairs, which I attended last week. Sky is a British expert on the Middle East with extensive on-the-ground experience in Iraq and Afghanistan and is currently affiliated with Yale. She spent years working alongside US forces in Iraq, an experience that gives her a distinctive perspective on the contradictions of American policy: she has witnessed both where decisions are made and what follows as a result.
“Israel’s operations against its adversaries have shifted the regional balance of power without addressing the underlying causes of instability”
“Israel is becoming increasingly like Sparta. Its military dominance contrasts with its difficulty in building diplomatic relationships that can provide lasting security,” Sky said. Her comparison offers a wider lens on the 27 October election. Israelis are voting to decide who will govern their country, but they do so amid a transformation of the regional order that has underpinned their security for decades. Perhaps most strikingly, these two debates barely intersect.
An election dominated by Netanyahu
As Sky explained, the Israeli campaign revolves around a slogan far simpler than any discussion of the future of the Middle East: “Anyone but Bibi”. The opposition to Benjamin Netanyahu has brought together political figures who, just a few years ago, would scarcely have seen themselves as part of the same political camp. Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman, both from the Israeli right, now find themselves in what is described as the liberal or democratic bloc. What unites them is not necessarily a shared position on the Palestinian question, but a determination to bring Netanyahu’s time in power to an end.
Two issues dominate the electoral debate. The first is the conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews, whose exemption from compulsory service has become a source of tension in Israeli society. The second is the demand for an inquiry into the failures that made the attacks of 7 October 2023 possible. Both raise questions about how responsibilities are shared among citizens and how institutions are held accountable. Yet it is striking how little attention is paid to the future of the Palestinians. Israel is engaged in an intense debate over who should lead it, while the bigger questions about its territorial, political and diplomatic future remain unanswered.
Two competing visions of Israel
To see this election simply as a referendum on Netanyahu would be to miss the deeper issues. Israel has long been divided between two visions of its identity. One sees it first and foremost as a democratic state for all its citizens. The other places its character as a Jewish state at the centre. These identities are not necessarily incompatible, but the tensions between them have intensified as demographics, the role of religion and the priorities of different social groups have changed.
“To see this election simply as a referendum on Netanyahu would be to miss the deeper issues. Israel has long been divided between two visions of its identity”
Sky drew on an episode of particular significance in Jewish history: the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in AD 70, during the Roman conquest. Jewish tradition has attributed part of that catastrophe to hatred and internal divisions among Jews themselves. The comparison is not intended to equate two historical moments, but to show how deeply divisions within a society can jeopardise its future. In Israel today, the widening gulf between religious and secular communities, and between those who prioritise the state’s Jewish character and those who advocate a shared civic identity, has turned that longstanding concern into a contemporary political question. The divide between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, between secular and religious constituencies, reflects a struggle that goes far beyond which party is in government.
There has also been a shift in the boundaries of Israeli political debate. Figures such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, whose positions were once considered beyond the pale of acceptable coalition politics, are now part of the contest for power. Sky invoked the familiar concept of the Overton window to explain this shift: the boundaries of what is politically acceptable are not fixed and can move in either direction. Following this line of reasoning, the question is not simply whether Netanyahu will remain in office, but which political positions he has succeeded in entrenching and which may endure even if he leaves.
Arab citizens and the battle for a parliamentary majority
One of the most interesting observations from the session concerned the role of Arab parties in Israel. Sky argued that building a majority capable of replacing Netanyahu depends on a political choice the opposition has so far been reluctant to confront fully: accepting Arab representatives as partners in a governing coalition.
“The question is which political positions the prime minister has succeeded in entrenching and which may endure even if he leaves”
Two Arab leaders represent different approaches. Mansour Abbas, leader of Ra’am, joined the coalition that temporarily removed Netanyahu from power in 2021 and has advocated direct participation by Arab parties in government. Yousef Jabareen, a lawyer and the new leader of the Joint List, which brings together Hadash, Ta’al and Balad, takes a more conditional approach: he is willing to consider offering parliamentary support, but demands political commitments that go beyond replacing the prime minister.
Israel’s Arab citizens are not a homogeneous political bloc, and their representatives disagree on how best to exercise their influence. Yet both approaches force the Jewish opposition to answer a question that goes beyond parliamentary arithmetic: is it prepared to recognise Arab parties as legitimate partners in forming a government?
This question is particularly significant in Israel because it connects the arithmetic of parliamentary majorities with the debate over national identity. A coalition bringing Jewish and Arab parties together would not, in itself, resolve the Palestinian conflict. Nor would it erase the ideological differences among the opposition parties. But it would offer a different model of political participation.
Another important figure is Gadi Eisenkot, a former chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces and leader of the centrist Yashar party, who represents one of the main alternatives to Netanyahu. His military background and participation in the war cabinet formed after 7 October give him a very different profile from that of the traditional left-wing opposition. Eisenkot advocates institutional reform and an inquiry into the failures that enabled the Hamas attacks, but his positions on security remain close to those of the current government. His greatest challenge may come after the election: assembling a parliamentary majority without fully accepting the involvement of Arab parties.
The challenge of turning military power into security
Perhaps the most important aspect of the session, however, was Sky’s attempt to connect the Israeli election with the unraveling of the old US-led order in the Middle East.
For decades, regional security rested on three priorities for Washington: securing energy supplies, protecting Israel and preventing a hostile power from dominating the region. That system has been eroded by US decisions, regional conflicts and technological change.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq destabilised the regional balance and indirectly strengthened Iran. The Arab Spring challenged the stability of traditional alliances. The US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal undermined confidence in the durability of American diplomatic commitments.
There has also been a decisive change in warfare: relatively inexpensive drones and missiles can threaten infrastructure that requires extraordinarily costly systems to defend. Sky summed up the problem in one observation: the United States may retain its allies’ dependence without retaining their trust.
For Israel, the implications are profound. Its military superiority remains considerable, but it needs something its armed forces cannot deliver on their own: a regional environment in which its security does not depend solely on the ability to defeat its adversaries.
“Israel needs something its armed forces cannot deliver on their own: a regional environment in which its security does not depend solely on the ability to defeat its adversaries”
The Abraham Accords represented an attempt to move in that direction. Normalisation of relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco opened up diplomatic and economic opportunities. Saudi Arabia’s possible inclusion would have broadened that process considerably. But the war in Gaza has made it harder to establish regional legitimacy for normalisation without progress on the Palestinian question.
And the Palestinian question? It has not gone away
From this perspective, the prospects for a political settlement are particularly bleak. It is difficult to imagine a one-state solution that Israeli society would accept, since it would challenge the country’s identity as a Jewish state. Yet there is no credible path towards a two-state solution either.
The situation in Gaza, Hamas’s continued presence and the weakness of the Palestinian leadership make any transition even harder. Sky’s analysis introduced an important distinction: a change of Israeli government could alter certain policies, particularly the response to settler violence in the West Bank, without necessarily bringing about an immediate change in Gaza.
It is a useful warning against seeing the election as an automatic solution to the region’s problems. The Palestinian question may feature little in an election campaign while remaining one of the greatest obstacles to Israel’s integration into the Middle East.
After Netanyahu
Sky compared aspects of Israeli politics with trends in other Western democracies: the growing importance of identity, polarisation between political communities and the difficulty of building agreements that can survive electoral confrontation.
The comparison does not mean the societies are equivalent. But it does show how an election can become a contest over the very definition of a country. Israel faces that debate under particularly difficult circumstances. The regional order is changing, US security guarantees have become less predictable, and the prospects for diplomatic integration remain constrained by unresolved conflicts.
The election on 27 October will determine who holds political power next. It will not, on its own, resolve the tensions between military security, national identity and democratic coexistence.
As I left the Yale session, that was the thought that stayed with me: Israel’s greatest challenge is not simply deciding who governs after Netanyahu, but finding a way to turn its military power into a sustainable political future.
